Improved Hardness of BDD and SVP under Gap-(S)ETH

Yi Tang Joint work with Huck Bennett and Chris Peikert

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Preliminaries: Lattices

Lattice $\mathcal{L} \subset \mathbb{R}^d$: set of all integer linear combinations of a basis. Basis $\boldsymbol{B} \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times n}$: rank *n*, dimension *d*, $\mathcal{L} = \boldsymbol{B} \cdot \mathbb{Z}^n$.



Minimum distance (in ℓ_p) $\lambda_1^{(p)}(\mathcal{L})$: smallest ℓ_p norm in $\mathcal{L}\setminus\{0\}$.

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Lattice Problems and post-quantum cryptography:

- Cryptography based on number theory would be broken by attacks with quantum.
- People believe lattice problems have no quantum solution, and thus lattice-based cryptosystems are quantum-secure.

- Good news: worst-case hardness of lattice problems leads to average-case security of the cryptosystems.
- Need precise fine-grained hardness of lattice problems for setting parameters of the cryptosystems confidently.
- Cryptosystems are based on problems unlikely to be NP-hard, while state-of-the-art attacks reduce to problems where we can show NP-hardness / fine-grained hardness.

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γ -approximate Shortest Vector Problem in ℓ_p (SVP_{p, γ})

Instance: lattice \mathcal{L} . Goal: decide whether $\lambda_1^{(p)}(\mathcal{L}) \leq 1$ or $\lambda_1^{(p)}(\mathcal{L}) > \gamma$.

Hardness results and algorithms for $SVP_{p,\gamma}$ (in previous works):



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Hardness results and algorithms for $SVP_{\rho,\gamma}$ (in previous works):



Bounded Distance Decoding in ℓ_p

with relative distance α (BDD_{p,α})

Instance: lattice $\mathcal{L} \subset \mathbb{R}^d$ and target $\mathbf{t} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ satisfying dist_p $(\mathbf{t}, \mathcal{L}) \leq \alpha \cdot \lambda_1^{(p)}(\mathcal{L})$. Goal: find closest lattice vector to \mathbf{t} in \mathcal{L} .



$\mathrm{BDD}_{p,\alpha}$

Instance: \mathcal{L}, \mathbf{t} satisfying dist_p $(\mathbf{t}, \mathcal{L}) \leq \alpha \cdot \lambda_1^{(p)}(\mathcal{L})$. Goal: find closest lattice vector to \mathbf{t} in \mathcal{L} .

Smaller α corresponds to stronger promise and easier problem.

Hardness results for $BDD_{p,\alpha}$ (in previous works [LLM06, BP20]):



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Standard approach to fine-grained hardness: Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH).

ETH variants:

- ETH: 3-SAT cannot be solved in $2^{o(n)}$ time.
- Strong ETH (SETH): k-SAT cannot be solved in $2^{(1-\varepsilon)n}$ time.
- ► Gap-ETH & Gap-SETH: Gap-3-SAT_{1- δ ,1} & Gap-k-SAT_{1- δ ,1}.

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Randomized/non-uniform variants: rand/non-unif time. Assumption strength:

- plain \leq gap;
- ▶ plain \leq randomized \leq non-uniform.

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Our Results: ETH-Type Hardness of BDD

- 1. BDD_{*p*, α} cannot be solved in 2^{*o*(*n*)} time for any *p* \in [1, ∞) and $\alpha > \alpha_{kn} \approx 0.98491$, under non-unif Gap-ETH.
- 2. BDD_{*p*, α} cannot be solved in 2^{*o*(*n*)} time for any *p* \in [1, ∞) and $\alpha > \alpha_p^{\ddagger}$, under rand Gap-ETH.
- ▶ Previous bound [BP20]: α_p^* (with norm embed), under rand ETH.



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Our Results: SETH-Type Hardness of BDD

3. BDD_{p,α} cannot be solved in 2^{n/C} time for any p ∈ [1,∞), p ∉ 2ℤ, C > 1, and α > α[†]_{p,C}, under non-unif Gap-SETH.
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Our Results: SETH-Type Hardness of BDD

- 3. BDD_{*p*, α} cannot be solved in $2^{n/C}$ time for any $p \in [1, \infty)$, $p \notin 2\mathbb{Z}$, C > 1, and $\alpha > \alpha_{p,C}^{\dagger}$, under non-unif Gap-SETH.
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Our Results: SETH-Type Hardness of SVP

4. For any $p > p_0 \approx 2.1397$, $p \notin 2\mathbb{Z}$ and $C > C_p$, SVP_{p, γ} cannot be solved in $2^{n/C}$ time for some constant $\gamma > 1$, under randomized Gap-SETH.

▶ Previous result [AS18]: $\gamma = 1$, under rand SETH.

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Restriction $\text{CVP}'_{p,\gamma}$: further require $\text{dist}_p(\boldsymbol{t}, \boldsymbol{B} \cdot \{0,1\}^n) \leq 1$ for the case $\text{dist}_p(\boldsymbol{t}, \mathcal{L}) \leq 1$.

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Hardness results for $CVP'_{p,\gamma}$:

- ► [BGS17] Under rand Gap-ETH, CVP'_{p,γ(p)} cannot be solved in 2^{o(n)} time.
- ► [ABGS21] Under rand Gap-SETH, (p ∉ 2ℤ,) CVP'_{p,γ(p,ε)} cannot be solved in 2^{(1-ε)n} time.

Goal: reduce $\text{CVP}'_{p,\gamma}$ in rank n' to BDD/SVP in rank n = Cn'.

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Reduction to BDD



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Recall (search) $BDD_{p,\alpha}$: given \mathcal{L}, \mathbf{t} with $dist_p(\mathbf{t}, \mathcal{L}) \leq \alpha \cdot \lambda_1^{(p)}(\mathcal{L})$, find closest lattice vector to \mathbf{t} in \mathcal{L} .

Decisional $BDD_{p,\alpha}$: given \mathcal{L}, \mathbf{t} and distance r, decide whether

• dist
$$_{p}(\boldsymbol{t},\mathcal{L})\leq r$$
 and $\lambda_{1}^{(p)}(\mathcal{L})\geq r/lpha$, or

• dist_p($\boldsymbol{t}, \mathcal{L}$) > r.

In terms of point-counting: decide whether

$$\mid \mathcal{B}_{\rho}(r; t) \cap \mathcal{L}| \geq 1 \text{ and } |\mathcal{B}_{\rho}^{\circ}(r/\alpha) \cap (\mathcal{L} \setminus \{0\})| = 0, \text{ or }$$

$$|\mathcal{B}_p(r; t) \cap \mathcal{L}| = 0.$$

Relaxation (A, G)-BDD_{p, α}: decide whether

- "(good) close" count $\geq G$ and "short" count $\leq A$, or
- "annoying close" count $\leq A$.

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Lattice Sparsification

Sparsification algorithm: given lattice \mathcal{L} and prime index q, sample sublattice $\mathcal{L}' \subset \mathcal{L}$ such that for any¹ finite set $S \subset \mathcal{L}$, $|S \cap \mathcal{L}'|$ concentrates around |S|/q.



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If $G \gg A$, say $G \ge 400A$, then (A, G)-BDD_{p,α} reduces to decisional BDD_{p,α} by sparsification with index $q \approx 20A$.

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New goal: reduce CVP' to (A, G)-BDD with $G \gg A$.

The transformation takes as input $\text{CVP}'_{\rho,\gamma}$ instance (B', t') and parameters $B^{\dagger}, t^{\dagger}, r, s$, and outputs (A, G)-BDD_{ρ,α} instance:

$$\boldsymbol{B} = \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}\boldsymbol{B}' & \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{I}_{n'} & \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{0} & \boldsymbol{B}^{\dagger} \end{pmatrix} , \qquad \boldsymbol{t} = \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}\boldsymbol{t}' \\ \frac{1}{2}\boldsymbol{1}_{n'} \\ \boldsymbol{t}^{\dagger} \end{pmatrix} , \qquad \boldsymbol{r} .$$

For CVP' YES instance:

Promise: dist_p($\boldsymbol{t}', \boldsymbol{B}'\boldsymbol{x}$) ≤ 1 for some $\boldsymbol{x} \in \{0, 1\}^{n'}$.

• "Short" count: $|\mathcal{B}_{p}^{\circ}(r/\alpha) \cap \mathcal{L}| \leq |\mathcal{B}_{p}^{\circ}(r/\alpha) \cap (\mathbb{Z}^{n'} \oplus \mathcal{L}^{\dagger})|.$

• "Close" count: $|\mathcal{B}_p(r; t) \cap \mathcal{L}| \ge |\mathcal{B}_p(r-s-n'/2; t^{\dagger}) \cap \mathcal{L}^{\dagger}|^2$.

²The arithmetic of the distances here is showcased for ℓ_1 , and should be $(r^p - s^p - n'/2^p)^{1/p}$ for general ℓ_p . We will continue to simplify this way in the remaining slides.

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$$\boldsymbol{B} = \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}\boldsymbol{B}' & \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{I}_{n'} & \boldsymbol{0} \\ \boldsymbol{0} & \boldsymbol{B}^{\dagger} \end{pmatrix} , \qquad \boldsymbol{t} = \begin{pmatrix} \boldsymbol{s}\boldsymbol{t}' \\ \frac{1}{2}\boldsymbol{1}_{n'} \\ \boldsymbol{t}^{\dagger} \end{pmatrix} , \qquad \boldsymbol{r} .$$

For CVP' YES instance:

- ▶ Promise: dist_p($\boldsymbol{t}', \boldsymbol{B}'\boldsymbol{x}$) ≤ 1 for some $\boldsymbol{x} \in \{0, 1\}^{n'}$.
- "Short" count: $|\mathcal{B}_{p}^{\circ}(r/\alpha) \cap \mathcal{L}| \leq |\mathcal{B}_{p}^{\circ}(r/\alpha) \cap (\mathbb{Z}^{n'} \oplus \mathcal{L}^{\dagger})|.$
- "Close" count: $|\mathcal{B}_p(r; t) \cap \mathcal{L}| \ge |\mathcal{B}_p(r-s-n'/2; t^{\dagger}) \cap \mathcal{L}^{\dagger}|^2$.

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The transformation outputs:

$$oldsymbol{B} = egin{pmatrix} soldsymbol{B}' & 0 \ oldsymbol{I}_{n'} & 0 \ 0 & oldsymbol{B}^\dagger \end{pmatrix}$$
 , $oldsymbol{t} = egin{pmatrix} soldsymbol{t}' \ rac{1}{2}\mathbf{1}_{n'} \ oldsymbol{t}^\dagger \end{pmatrix}$, r .

For CVP' NO instance:

• Promise: dist_p(t', \mathcal{L}') > γ .

• "Annoying close" count: $|\mathcal{B}_{\rho}(r; t) \cap \mathcal{L}| \leq |\mathcal{B}_{\rho}^{\circ}(r - \gamma s; \left(\frac{1}{2} \mathbf{1}_{n'} \atop t^{\dagger}\right)) \cap (\mathbb{Z}^{n'} \oplus \mathcal{L}^{\dagger})|.$

Putting together, for $G \gg A$, we want:

$$\begin{aligned} |\mathcal{B}_{\rho}(r-s-n'/2;\boldsymbol{t}^{\dagger})\cap\mathcal{L}^{\dagger}| \gg \max\{|\mathcal{B}_{\rho}^{\circ}(r/\alpha)\cap(\mathbb{Z}^{n'}\oplus\mathcal{L}^{\dagger})|,\\ |\mathcal{B}_{\rho}^{\circ}(r-\gamma s;\left(\frac{1}{2}\boldsymbol{1}_{n'}\right))\cap(\mathbb{Z}^{n'}\oplus\mathcal{L}^{\dagger})|\} \ .\end{aligned}$$

Transforming CVP' Instances

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Observations:

|B^o_p(r/α) ∩ (Z^{n'} ⊕ L[†])| ≤ |B^o_p(r/α) ∩ Z^{n'}| · |B^o_p(r/α) ∩ L[†]|.
 |B^o_p(ρ) ∩ Z^{n'}| is exponential in n' (for sufficiently large ρ).
 Hence we want the gadget to be *locally dense*, i.e., to have exponentially more "close" than "short" lattice vectors:

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Main Theorem for BDD

Main theorem for BDD, informal & simplified

If there exist locally dense gadgets $({m B}^{\dagger}, {m t}^{\dagger})$ satisfying^3

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then for $\text{BDD}_{p,\alpha}$: under Gap-ETH,⁴ it cannot be solved in $2^{o(n)}$ time for all $\alpha > \alpha_G$; under Gap-SETH, it cannot be solved in $2^{n/C}$ time for all

$$\alpha > \alpha_G + \frac{1}{f_p(\nu^{C-1})} \; .$$

(Here $f_p(\cdot)$ is increasing and has $\lim_{x \to 1} f_p(x) = 0$, $\lim_{x \to \infty} f_p(x) = \infty$.)

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Lattice kissing number τ_n^{L} : $\max_{\mathcal{L}} |\mathcal{B}_p(1) \cap (\mathcal{L} \setminus \{0\})|$ for rank-*n* lattice \mathcal{L} with $\lambda_1^{(p)}(\mathcal{L}) = 1$.

[VIă19]: for p=2, $au_n^{\mathsf{L}}\geq 2^{c_{\mathsf{kn}}n-o(n)}$, where $c_{\mathsf{kn}}\geq 0.02194$.

Gadgets (in ℓ_2): exponential kissing number lattice \mathcal{L}^{\dagger} , $\boldsymbol{t}^{\dagger} = 0$. Parameters: $\alpha_G = 1$, $\nu = 2^{c_{kn}}$.

Using norm embeddings, we also get gadgets in all ℓ_p in cost of slightly larger $\alpha_G = 1 + o(1)$. Then we have our Result 3: BDD_{p, α} cannot be solved in $2^{n/C}$ time for all

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• Move \mathbf{t}^{\dagger} away from 0 by δ in random direction.

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$$\alpha_{G} = 1 - \varepsilon$$
 for $\varepsilon < \delta$.

- Nevertheless this decreases the "close" count as well, by an expected factor of area(Sⁿ⁻¹ ∩ B_p(1 − ε; t[†]))/ area(Sⁿ⁻¹), where Sⁿ⁻¹ is the unit sphere.
- ([AS18] also uses this idea while we have tighter loss factor.)



Taking care of the tradeoff between the "close" count and δ, ε , we manage to get α_G approaching $2^{-\alpha_{kn}}$, which gives our Result 1: $BDD_{p,\alpha}$ cannot be solved in $2^{o(n)}$ time for all $\alpha > \alpha_{kn} := 2^{-\alpha_{kn}}$.

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Gadgets from integer lattices: $\mathcal{L}^{\dagger} = \mathbb{Z}^n / \rho$, $\mathbf{t}^{\dagger} = (t/\rho) \cdot \mathbf{1}_n$. Minimize α_G over ρ , t subject to

 $|\mathcal{B}_p(\alpha_G \rho; t \cdot 1_n) \cap \mathbb{Z}^n| > |\mathcal{B}_p^{\circ}(\rho) \cap \mathbb{Z}^n|$.

Suppose α_p^{\ddagger} is the optimum. Then we have our Result 2: $BDD_{p,\alpha}$ cannot be solved in $2^{o(n)}$ time for all $\alpha > \alpha_p^{\ddagger}$.

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Reduction to SVP

Overview:

- Similar to the case of BDD, the reduction consists of the (same!) transformation and the sparsification, as well as a standard technique, Kannan's embedding, at the end.
- The transformation maps CVP'_{p,γ} instances to instances of a similar intermediate problem (A, G)-CVP_{p,γ'}.
- [AS18] has the same workflow, while we have a more general transformation with a larger parameter space, and we can set parameters working for CVP'_{ρ,γ} other than CVP'_{ρ,1}.
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