



THAT'S WHY EVENTS ARE ALWAYS REINTERPRETED WHEN VALUES CHANGE. WE NEED NEW VERSIONS OF HISTORY TO ALLOW FOR OUR CURRENT PREJUDICES.





Model Checking










Double Header

Two Lectures

- Model Checking
- Software Model Checking
- SLAM and BLAST
- "Flying Boxes"
 - It is traditional to describe this stuff (especially SLAM and BLAST) with high-gloss animation.
- Some Key Players:
 - Model Checking: Ed Clarke, Ken McMillan, Amir Pnueli
 - SLAM: Tom Ball, Sriram Rajamani
 - BLAST: Ranjit Jhala, Rupak Majumdar, Tom Henzinger

Who are we again?

- We're going to find critical bugs in important bits of software
 - using PL techniques!
- You will be enthusiastic about this
 - and thus want to learn the gritty details









Take-Home Message

- Model checking is the exhaustive exploration of the state space of a system, typically to see if an error state is reachable. It produces concrete counterexamples.
- The state **explosion problem** refers to the large number of states in the model.
- Temporal logic allows you to specify properties with concepts like "eventually" and "always".

Overarching Plan

Model Checking

(Today)

- Transition Systems (Models)
- Temporal Properties
- LTL and CTL
- (Explicit State) Model Checking
- Symbolic Model Checking

Counterexample Guided Abstraction Refinement

- Safety Properties
- Predicate Abstraction
- Software Model Checking
- Counterexample Feasibility
- Abstraction Refinement

("c2bp")

("bebop")

("newton", "hw 5")

(weakest pre, thrm prvr)

Spoiler Space

- This stuff really works!
 - This is not ESC or PCC or Denotational Semantics
- Symbolic Model Checking is a massive success in the model-checking field
 - I know people who think Ken McMillan walks on water in a "ha-ha-ha only serious" way
- SLAM took the PL world by storm
 - Spawned multiple copycat projects
 - Incorporated into Windows DDK as "static driver verifier"

Topic: (Generic) Model Checking

- There are complete courses in model checking; I will skim.
 - Model Checking by Edmund C. Clarke, Orna Grumberg, and Doron A. Peled, MIT press
 - Symbolic Model Checking by Ken McMillan

Model Checking

- Model checking is an automated technique
- Model checking verifies transition systems
- Model checking verifies temporal properties
- Model checking can be also used for falsification by generating counter-examples
- Model Checker: A program that checks if a (transition) system satisfies a (temporal) property

Verification vs. Falsification

- An automated verification tool
 - can report that the system is verified (with a **proof**)
 - or that the system was not verified (with ???)
- When the system was not verified it would be helpful to explain why
 - Model checkers can output an error <u>counter-example</u>: a concrete execution scenario that demonstrates the error
- Can view a model checker as a falsification tool
 - The main goal is to find bugs
- OK, so what can we verify or falsify?

Temporal Properties


- Temporal Property: A property with time-related operators such as "invariant" or "eventually"
- Invariant(p): is true in a state if property p is true in every state on all execution paths starting at that state
 - The Invariant operator has different names in different temporal logics:
 - G, AG, □ ("goal" or "box" or "forall")
- Eventually(p): is true in a state if property p is true at some state on every execution path starting from that state
 - F, AF, ♦ ("diamond" or "future" or "exists")

An Example Concurrent Program

- A simple concurrent mutual exclusion program
- Two processes execute asynchronously
- There is a shared variable turn
- Two processes use the shared variable to ensure that they are not in the critical section at the same time
- Can be viewed as a "fundamental" program: any bigger concurrent one would include this one

```
10: while True do
11: wait(turn = 0);
   // critical section
      work(); turn := 1;
13: end while;
|| // concurrently with
20: while True do
21: wait(turn = 1);
    // critical section
     work(); turn := 0;
23: end while
```

Reachable States of the Example Program



Transition Systems

 In model checking the system being analyzed is represented as a <u>labeled transition system</u>

$$T = (S, I, R, L)$$


- Also called a Kripke Structure

```
    S = Set of states // standard FSM
    I ⊆ S = Set of initial states // standard FSM
    R ⊆ S × S = Transition relation // standard FSM
    L: S → P(AP) = Labeling function // this is new!
```

- *AP*: Set of <u>atomic propositions</u> (e.g., "x=5"∈AP)
 - Atomic propositions capture basic properties
 - For software, atomic props depend on variable values
 - The labeling function labels each state with the set of propositions true in that state

What's in a Label?

- We must decide in advance which facts are important.
- We can have "x=5" or "x=6" but not "x".
- Similarly for relations (e.g., "x<y", "x<z").



Properties of the Program

- Example: "In all the reachable states (configurations) of the system, the two processes are never in the critical section at the same time"
 - Equivalently, we can say that
 - Invariant(¬(pc1=12 ∧ pc2=22))
- Also: "Eventually the first process enters the critical section"
 - Eventually(pc1=12)
- "pc1=12", "pc2=22" are atomic properties

Temporal Logics

- There are four basic temporal operators:
- Xp = Next p, p holds in the next state
- G p = Globally p, p holds in every state, p is an invariant
- F p = <u>Future</u> p, p will hold in a future state, p holds eventually
- p U q = p Until q, assertion p will hold until q holds
- Precise meaning of these temporal operators are defined on execution paths

Execution Paths

A <u>path</u> in a transition system is an infinite sequence of states

```
(s_0, s_1, s_2, ...), such that \forall i \ge 0. (s_i, s_{i+1}) \in R
```

- A path $(s_0, s_1, s_2, ...)$ is an <u>execution path</u> if $s_0 \in I$
- Given a path $x = (s_0, s_1, s_2, ...)$
 - x_i denotes the ith state s_i
 - \mathbf{x}^{i} denotes the i^{th} suffix $(s_{i}, s_{i+1}, s_{i+2}, ...)$
- In some temporal logics one can quantify the paths starting from a state using path quantifiers
 - A: for all paths
 - E: there exists a path

Being Judgmental

We write

$$x \models p$$



- "the path x makes the predicate p true"
 - x is a path in a transition system
 - p is a temporal logic predicate
- Example:

A x.
$$x \models G (\neg(pc1=12 \land pc2=22))$$

Linear Time Logic (LTL)

- LTL properties are constructed from atomic propositions in AP; logical operators \land , \lor , \neg ; and temporal operators X, G, F, U.
- The semantics of LTL properties is defined on paths:

Given a path x:

```
iff
                                                                // atomic prop
                                L(x_0, p)
x \models p
                     iff
                               x^1 \models p
x \models X p
                                                                // next
                     iff
x \models Fp
                                \exists i \geq 0. \ x^i \models p
                                                                // future
                     iff
x \models G p
                                                                // globally
                               \forall i \geq 0. \ x^i \models p
                     iff
                                \exists i \geq 0. \ x^i \models q \ and \ \forall j < i. \ x^j \models p \ // \ until
x \models p U q
```

Satisfying Linear Time Logic

- Given a transition system T = (S, I, R, L) and an LTL property p, <u>T satisfies p</u> if all paths starting from all initial states I satisfy p
- Example LTL formulas:
 - Invariant(\neg (pc1=12 \land pc2=22)): $G(\neg(pc1=12 \land pc2=22))$ Eventually(pc1=12):
 - Eventually(pc1=12):

$$F(pc1=12)$$

Computation Tree Logic (CTL)

- In CTL temporal properties use <u>path quantifiers</u>
 - A: for all paths
 - E: there exists a path
- The semantics of CTL properties is defined on states:

Given a path x

```
s \models p iff L(s, p)

s_0 \models EX p iff \exists a path (s_0, s_1, s_2, ...). s_1 \models p

s_0 \models AX p iff \forall paths (s_0, s_1, s_2, ...). s_1 \models p


s_0 \models EG p iff \exists a path (s_0, s_1, s_2, ...). \forall i \geq 0. s_i \models p

s_0 \models AG p iff \forall paths (s_0, s_1, s_2, ...). \forall i \geq 0. s_i \models p
```

Linear vs. Branching Time


- LTL is a <u>linear time logic</u>
 - When determining if a path satisfies an LTL formula we are only concerned with a single path
- CTL is a <u>branching time logic</u>
 - When determining if a state satisfies a CTL formula we are concerned with multiple paths
 - In CTL the computation is not viewed as a single path but as a computation tree which contains all the paths
 - The computation tree is obtained by unrolling the transition relation
- The expressive powers of CTL and LTL are incomparable (LTL ⊆ CTL*, CTL ⊆ CTL*)
 - Basic temporal properties can be expressed in both logics
 - Not in this lecture, sorry! (Take a class on Modal Logics)

Remember the Example



One path starting at state (turn=0,pc1=10,pc2=20)


Linear vs. Branching Time



LTL Satisfiability Examples

op does not hold






On this path: F p holds, G p does not hold, p does not hold, X p does not hold, X (X p) holds, X (X p)) does not hold



On this path: F p holds, G p holds, p holds, X p holds, X (X p) holds, X (X p))) holds


- p does not hold
- p holds

CTL Examples




At state s: EF p, EX (EX p), AF $(\neg p)$, $\neg p$ holds

AF p, AG p, AG (¬p), EX p, EG p, p does not hold



At state s: EF p, AF p, EX (EX p), EX p, EG p, p holds

AG p, AG (\neg p), AF (\neg p) does not hold



At state s: EF p, AF p, AG p, EG p, Ex p, AX p, p holds

EG (\neg p), EF (\neg p), does not hold

Q: General (468 / 842)

 This country's automobile stickers use the abbreviation CH (Confederatio Helvetica). The 1957 Max Miedinger typeface Helvetica is also named for this country.

Q: Computer Science

• This American computer scientist won the Turing Award for granular database locking and two-tier translation commit semantics. He was reported missing while sailing in 2007.

Model Checking Complexity

- Given a transition system T = (S, I, R, L) and a CTL formula f
 - One can check if a state of the transition system satisfies the temporal logic formula f in $O(|f| \times (|S| + |R|))$ time
- Given a transition system T = (S, I, R, L) and an LTL formula f
 - One can check if the transition system satisfies the temporal logic formula f in $O(2^{|f|} \times (|S| + |R|))$ time
- Model checking procedures can generate counterexamples without increasing the complexity of verification (= "for free")

Which is slower?



State Space Explosion

- The complexity of model checking increases linearly with respect to the size of the transition system (|S| + |R|)
- However, the size of the transition system (| S| + |R|) is exponential in the number of variables and number of concurrent processes
- This exponential increase in the state space is called the <u>state space explosion</u>
 - Dealing with it is one of the major challenges in model checking research

Explicit-State Model Checking

- One can show the complexity results using depth first search algorithms
 - The transition system is a directed graph
 - CTL model checking is multiple depth first searches (one for each temporal operator)
 - LTL model checking is one nested depth first search (i.e., two interleaved depth-firstsearches)
 - Such algorithms are called <u>explicit-state model</u> <u>checking</u> algorithms (details on next slides)


Temporal Properties = Fixpoints

- States that satisfy AG(p) are all the states which are not in EF(¬p) (= the states that can reach ¬p)
- Compute EF($\neg p$) as the fixpoint of Func: $2^s \rightarrow 2^s$
- Given $Z \subseteq S$,
 - Func(Z) = $\neg p \cup reach-in-one-step(Z)$

This is called the inverse image of Z

- or Func(Z) = $\neg p \cup EX(Z)$
- Actually, EF(¬p) is the *least*-fixpoint of Func
 - smallest set Z such that Z = Func(Z)
 - to compute the least fixpoint, start the iteration from $Z=\emptyset$, and apply the Func until you reach a fixpoint
 - This can be computed (unlike most other fixpoints)

Pictoral Backward Fixpoint



This fixpoint computation can be used for:

- verification of EF(¬p)
- or falsification of AG(p)

... and a similar forward fixpoint handles the other cases

Symbolic Model Checking

- Symbolic Model Checking represent state sets and the transition relation as Boolean logic formulas
 - Fixpoint computations manipulate sets of states rather than individual states
 - Recall: we needed to compute EX(Z), but $Z \subseteq S$
- Forward and backward fixpoints can be computed by iteratively manipulating these formulas
 - Forward, inverse image: Existential variable elimination
 - Conjunction (intersection), disjunction (union) and negation (set difference), and equivalence check
- Use an efficient data structure for manipulation of Boolean logic formulas
 - Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs)

Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs)


- Efficient representation for boolean functions (a set can be viewed as a function)
- Disjunction, conjunction complexity: at most quadratic
- Negation complexity: constant
- Equivalence checking complexity: constant or linear
- Image computation complexity: can be exponential

Symbolic Model Checking Using BDDs

- SMV (Symbolic Model Verifier) was the first CTL model checker to use a BDD representation
- It has been successfully used in verification
 - of hardware specifications, software specifications, protocols, etc.
- SMV verifies finite state systems
 - It supports both synchronous and asynchronous composition
 - It can handle boolean and enumerated variables
 - It can handle bounded integer variables using a binary encoding of the integer variables
 - It is not very efficient in handling integer variables although this can be fixed

Where's the Beef

- To produce the explicit counter-example, use the "onion-ring method"
 - A counter-example is a valid execution path
 - For each Image Ring (= set of states), find a state and link it with the concrete transition relation R
 - Since each Ring is "reached in one step from previous ring" (e.g., Ring#3 = EX(Ring#4)) this works
 - Each state z comes with L(z) so you know what is true at each point (= what the values of variables are)



Building Up To: Software Model Checking via Counter-Example Guided Abstraction Refinement

There are easily two dozen
 SLAM/BLAST/MAGIC papers; I will skim.

Key Terms

- CEGAR = Counterexample guided abstraction refinement. A successful software modelchecking approach. Sometimes called "Iterative Abstraction Refinement".
- SLAM = The first CEGAR project/tool.
 Developed at MSR.
- Lazy Abstraction = A CEGAR optimization used in the BLAST tool from Berkeley.
- Other terms: c2bp, bebop, newton, npackets++, MAGIC, flying boxes, etc.

So ... what *is* Counterexample Guided Abstraction Refinement?

- Theorem Proving?
- Dataflow Analysis?
- Model Checking?

Verification by Theorem Proving

```
Example ( ) {
1: do {
      lock();
      old = new;
      q = q- next;
2: if (q != NULL) {
3:
         q->data = new;
         unlock();
         new ++;
  } while(new != old);
    unlock ();
    return;
```

- 1. Loop Invariants
- 2. Logical formula
- 3. Check Validity

```
Invariant:

lock ∧ new = old

V

lock ∧ new ≠ old
```

Verification by Theorem Proving

```
Example ( ) {
1: do {
      lock();
      old = new;
      q = q->next;
2: if (q != NULL) {
3:
      q->data = new;
         unlock();
         new ++;
4: } while (new != old);
   unlock ();
    return;
```

- 1. Loop Invariants
- 2. Logical formula
- 3. Check Validity

- Loop Invariants
- Multithreaded Programs
- + Behaviors encoded in logic
- + Decision Procedures
 Precise [ESC, PCC]

Verification by Program Analysis

```
Example ( ) {
1: do {
     lock(); ●
      old = new;
     q = q- next;
2: if (q != NULL) {●
3:
        q->data = new;●
        unlock();
         new ++;
4: } while (new != old);
   unlock ();
    return;
```

- 1. Dataflow Facts
- 2. Constraint System
- 3. Solve constraints

- Imprecision due to fixed facts
- + Abstraction
- + Type/Flow Analyses

Scalable [CQUAL, ESP, MC]

Verification by Model Checking


```
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    unlock ();
    return;
```

- 1. (Finite State) Program
- 2. State Transition Graph
- 3. Reachability

- Pgm → Finite state model
- State explosion
- + State Exploration
- + Counterexamples

Precise [SPIN, SMV, Bandera, JPF]

One Ring To Rule Them All?




Combining Strengths

Theorem Proving

- Need loop invariants (will find automatically)
- + Behaviors encoded in logic (used to refine abstraction)
- + Theorem provers

(used to compute successors, refine abstraction)



Program Analysis

- Imprecise(will be precise)
- + Abstraction
 (will shrink the state space
 we must explore)

Model Checking

- Finite-state model, state explosion
 (will find small good model)
- + State Space Exploration (used to get a path sensitive analysis)
- + Counterexamples (used to find relevant facts, refine abstraction)

Homework

- Read Lazy Abstraction
- Optionally read TAR