
# **Detecting failures in distributed** systems with the FALCON spy network

Joshua B. Leners, Hao Wu, Wei-Lun Hung, Marcos K. Aguilera, Michael Walfish





**Presenter: Neal Mangaokar** 




• A service that reports status of a remote process as UP or DOWN:


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Fundamental primitive in distributed applications

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RFD reports process is **DOWN**  $\implies$  process crashed

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SAFETY (STRONG ACCURACY):

RFD reports process is **DOWN**  $\implies$  process crashed

• LIVENESS (STRONG COMPLETENESS): Process crashes  $\implies$  RFD eventually reports process is **DOWN** 



### **Bad News**

- process may crash:
  - Can't differentiate between <u>crashed process</u> vs. <u>slow network</u>

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
- Consensus is reducible to RFD:
  - Consensus is impossible =>> RFD is impossible

The FLP result: consensus is impossible in asynchronous systems where one

### Solutions


### Solutions

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
- **Problem:** doesn't extend very well to asynchrony:
  - Too short: might violate safety
  - Too long: might be <u>overly slow</u>  $\tau^{\tau^{*}}$






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


Problem: <u>disruptive</u> (and sociopathic)

### **A Better Solution: FALCON**

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
- **Detect** failures with insider information from process:  $\bullet$ 
  - can make us <u>almost always</u> safe and fast



# **A Better Solution: FALCON**

- **Detect** failures with insider information from process:
  - can make us <u>almost always</u> safe and fast  $\bullet$
- Fallback onto suboptimal solutions as a failsafe:
  - Timeouts + killing ensures liveness and safety when "<u>almost always</u>" fails
- **Don't worry** about extreme asynchrony:
  - Block!





### **Collecting Insider Information with Spies**

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- Client can gather information using a spy:
  - Spy sits on remote machine and monitors "layer" L



App Spy ~ App Layer | L=4

# **Collecting Insider Information with Spies**


- Client can gather information using a spy:
  - Spy sits on remote machine and monitors "layer" L
    - Inspector App Spy

• Spy monitors L, but occupies L and L-1 (inspector and enforcer)

## What Information Does a Spy Collect?

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
- Inspector:
  - Tries to infer operational status (alive, or not)



# What Information Does a Spy Collect?

- Inspector:
  - Tries to infer operational status (alive, or not)

- Enforcer:
  - Tells client operational status
  - LAYER\_DOWN or LAYER\_UP





## **Example: Application Spy**

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- Inspector:
  - Is a thread inside the process
  - Looks for signs of life

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- Inspector:
  - Is a thread inside the process
  - Looks for signs of life
- Enforcer:
  - Is its own process


 Communicates with inspector via IPC to make quick decisions • Before reporting LAYER\_DOWN, double-checks process table


## **Collecting More Information: A Spy Network**



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
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




# **Collecting More Information: A Spy Network**

- One spy per layer
- Each spy implicitly monitors spy above it
  - App spy enforcer dead  $\iff$  OS layer dead
  - OS layer dead  $\implies$  OS spy says LAYER\_DOWN





### Can Spies Mess Up?

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
- Problem: app spy enforcer could die without OS layer dying
- Solution: long end-to-end timeout as fallback

## **Can Spies Mess Up?**


- **Problem:** app spy enforcer could die without OS layer dying
- **Solution:** long end-to-end timeout as fallback

- **Problem:** app spy could miss layer failure (bad "insider" information) • Solution: again, long end-to-end timeout as fallback


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  - FALCON reports final decision DOWN (works because any layer down ⇒ process is down)
- If any enforcer suspicious:
  - Kill layer and be confident :)
- If timeout expires:
  - FALCON issues surgical kill orders and says DOWN




#### Corner Case

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• Problem: haven't heard from network spy

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- Problem: haven't heard from network spy
- Solution: block, because this means either:
  - extreme asynchrony
  - network layer crash (indistinguishable from asynchrony)



#### **Evaluating FALCON**


## **Evaluating FALCON**

- Criteria:
  - 1. Failure detection time (and thus system availability)
  - 2. Disruption (when and how much killing)
  - 3. Computational complexity
  - 4. Code complexity

#### **Detection Time and Availability**


#### **Detection Time and Availability**

Sub-second detection time:



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Sub-second detection time:



• Reduces median ZooKeeper unavailability time by ~6x (kernel/host crashes)

### System Disruption

- Usually minimal killing
- Few cases where it goes overboard:
  - E.g., Network load causes VMM spy enforcer to suspect death (and kill) VMM)
  - Can be fixed by better enforcer logic!

## System Disruption

### **Computational and Code Complexity**

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- Generally **low cost:** < 1% CPU overhead
- Reduces code complexity:
  - FALCON is a RFD  $\implies$  don't need to handle failure mistakes
  - Primary-backup + FALCON = 21% less code than Paxos + timeout!

## More Discussion In The Paper

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- FALCON after recovery
- FALCON for different platforms
- More evaluation against large failure and stress-test suite