Regression Nash Equilibrium in Electricity Market

Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science University of Michigan

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North American power grid



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The world's largest machine

- Mathematical programming (optimization) is a major computational tool for power grids:
 - Operational and long-term planning
 - Electricity market-clearing auctions
 - ► ED, UC, SCUC, PF, OPF, ...

- What makes electricity such a special commodity?
 - + Homogeneous good with instantaneous delivery
 - Requires very sophisticated infrastructure
 - Limited storage capacity \rightarrow balance at all times
 - \rightarrow Only marginal % of electricity is traded in real-time; the majority well ahead of operations.







Two-stage electricity markets



Two-stage electricity markets to manage uncertainty of renewables:

- Day-ahead market: minimize the cost of power supply w.r.t. forecast
- Real-time market: least-cost re-dispatch to accommodate forecast errors

As renewable penetration increases, the cost of real-time re-dispatch also increases

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- time





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How to make renewable power generation less expensive for the system?

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day-ahead market



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real-time market fixed dispatch re-dispatch cost min grid limits $(\Delta \widehat{w})$ s.to forecast error realization









day-ahead market



wind power forecast

Improving cost efficiency across day-ahead and real-time markets:

- Stochastic electricity market design [PZP10, M⁺12, Dvo19]:
 - + Co-optimization of dispatch and re-dispatch decisions
 - + Least-cost solution in *expectation*
 - Market properties only hold in *expectation*



min	dispatch cost $+ \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_{\Delta \widehat{w}}}$ [re-dispatch c
s.to	grid limits $(\widehat{w}, \Delta \widehat{w})$ for all $\Delta \widehat{w} \sim \mathbb{F}$









day-ahead market



wind power forecast

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- Approximating stochastic market efficiency within deterministic markets:
 - Improved scheduling of renewbales [M+14]
 - Cost-aware reserve requirements [DDM18]
 - Cost-aware transmission allocation [JKP17, DP19]

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day-ahead market



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In our work, we follow this path with focused on advanced data analytics (machine learning)







Typical grid optimization problem:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \min_{\mathbf{p},\mathbf{q},\mathbf{u}} & c(\mathbf{p}_{\theta}) + s(\mathbf{u}_{\theta}) & generation \ and \ \mathbf{u}_{\theta} \\ \text{s.to} & f(\mathbf{p}_{\theta},\mathbf{q}_{\theta},\mathbf{w}_{\theta}) = \mathbf{0} & : \lambda_{\theta} & power \ flow \ equa \\ & g(\mathbf{p}_{\theta},\mathbf{q}_{\theta},\mathbf{w}_{\theta}) \leqslant b(\mathbf{u}_{\theta}) & gen, \ flow, \ voltageneration \ flow, \$$

UC cost

ntions

ge limits



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Net load forecasting [PCK07, ZHS24]







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SVM-based prediction of on/off gen. status [PK24]

Efficient warm start for MIP solvers



Net load forecasting [PCK07, ZHS24]







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Real-time electricity pricing via GNNs [LWZ21]

Real-time pricing at ultrafast time scales

SVM-based prediction of on/off gen. status [PK24]

Efficient warm start for MIP solvers



MP values <u>do not includ</u>

Net load forecasting [PCK07, ZHS24]





Real-Time	e Price Adders
RTORPA	\$0.00
RTOFFPA	\$0.00
RTORDPA	\$0.00





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$$g(\mathbf{p}_{m{ heta}}, \mathbf{q}_{m{ heta}}, \mathbf{w}_{m{ heta}}) \leqslant b(\mathbf{u}_{m{ heta}})$$
 gen, flow, voltage

This talk is on the dual role of machine learning in grid operations:

- Significant speed up and reported efficiency gains
 - Assisting decisions on ultrafast time scale
 - Approximates the efficiency of stochastic market design
- Imperfect predictions often lead to decision errors
 - Minimizing the impact of ML errors on pricing and dispatch decisions
 - Achieving equilibrium among ML models applied to grid optimization

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Part II



Introduction

Controlling the impact of ML errors on electricity pricing

Nash equilibrium of ML models in electricity markets

Concluding remarks





Controlling the impact of ML errors on electricity pricing





ML errors = decision errors

DC optimal power flow:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \min_{\mathbf{p} \leqslant \mathbf{p} \leqslant \mathbf{\bar{p}}} & \mathbf{p}^{\top} \mathbf{C} \mathbf{p} + \mathbf{c}^{\top} \mathbf{p} \\ \text{s.to} & \mathbf{1}^{\top} (\mathbf{p} + \widehat{\mathbf{w}} - \mathbf{d}) = \mathbf{0} : \lambda_b & \blacktriangleright \text{ Ele} \\ & |\mathbf{F} (\mathbf{p} + \widehat{\mathbf{w}} - \mathbf{d})| \leqslant \overline{\mathbf{f}} : \lambda_{\overline{f}}, \lambda_{\underline{f}} & \blacktriangleright \text{ Re} \end{array}$$

Locational marginal prices:

$$\boldsymbol{\lambda}(\widehat{\mathbf{w}}) = \underbrace{\mathbf{1} \cdot \lambda_b(\widehat{\mathbf{w}})}_{\text{uniform part}} - \underbrace{\mathbf{F}^{\top}(\boldsymbol{\lambda}_{\overline{f}}(\widehat{\mathbf{w}}) - \boldsymbol{\lambda}_{\underline{f}}(\widehat{\mathbf{w}}))}_{\text{congestion part}}$$

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May not be a dominant generation resource, yet still exposes the entire electricity trading to errors

- ectricity market clearing based on DC-OPF
- elies on the *forecast* w of wind power generation
- Forecast errors \rightarrow pricing errors via market optimization









ML errors = decision errors

DC optimal power flow:

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Forecast errors from a single wind power plant propagate into locational marginal price (LMP) errors across the IEEE 118-Bus RTS. Electricity at certain buses is systematically over- or under-priced [DF23].

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Market clearing as a deep learning layer





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loss function: $\|\widehat{\mathbf{w}} - \mathbf{w}\|_2^2$









Market clearing as a deep learning layer





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DeepWP+ incorporates market clearing as an optimization layer [AK17], which informs on pricing errors









Accelerating market-clearing optimization layer

- Market-clearing optimization layer significantly slows down the training
- Thousands of market-clearing problems are solved at each training epoch
- We use QP duality and fast distributed algorithms to speed up the process

Market-clearing optimization

$$\begin{array}{ll} \min & \mathbf{p}^{\top} \mathbf{C} \mathbf{p} + \mathbf{c}^{\top} \mathbf{p} \\\\ \mathbf{p} \leqslant \mathbf{p} \leqslant \overline{\mathbf{p}} & \mathbf{p}^{\top} \mathbf{C} \mathbf{p} + \mathbf{c}^{\top} \mathbf{p} \\\\ \mathrm{s.to} & \mathbf{1}^{\top} (\mathbf{p} + \widehat{\mathbf{w}} - \mathbf{d}) = \mathbf{0} \\\\ |\mathbf{F} (\mathbf{p} + \widehat{\mathbf{w}} - \mathbf{d})| \leqslant \overline{\mathbf{f}} \end{array}$$

large constrained optimization

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Accelerating market-clearing optimization layer



- Thousands of market-clearing problems are solved at each training epoch
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only inequality constraints

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Equivalent primal form

- $\min_{\underline{p} \leq p \leq \overline{p}} \quad p^{\top} \mathbf{C} p + \mathbf{c}^{\top} p$
 - s.to $Ap \ge b(\widehat{w}) : \lambda$





Accelerating market-clearing optimization layer



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large constrained optimization

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Equivalent primal form Equivalent dual form $\min_{\mathbf{p} \leq \mathbf{p} \leq \overline{\mathbf{p}}} \mathbf{p}^{\top} \mathbf{C} \mathbf{p} + \mathbf{c}^{\top} \mathbf{p}$ $\max_{\boldsymbol{\lambda} \geq \mathbf{0}} \left(\mathbf{A}\mathbf{C}^{-1}\mathbf{c} + \mathbf{b}(\widehat{\mathbf{w}}) \right)^{\top} \boldsymbol{\lambda}$ $-\lambda^{\top} \mathbf{A} \mathbf{C}^{-1} \mathbf{A}^{\top} \lambda$ s.to $Ap \ge b(\widehat{w}) : \lambda$

only non-negativity constraints

amenable to fast proximal and ADMM-like algorithms











▶ 1,000 wind power records from a real wind power turbine:

- Active power output
- Wind speed and direction
- Blade pitch angle
- DeepWP has 4 hidden layers with 30 neurons each. DeepWP+ additionally includes an opt. layer
- ADAM optimizer with varying learning rate

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IEEE 118-bus system



DeepWP: Forecast error objective – LMP errors [-4, 1] \$/MWh **DeepWP+:** LMP error objective - LMP errors [-1, 1] \$/MWh

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Wind power forecasts



DeepWP: Minimizes the average forecast deviation **DeepWP+:** Intentionally over-predicts in certain range of wind speeds

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	DeepWP			DeepWP+						
case	RMSE(ŵ)	$RMSE(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\lambda}})$	$CVaR(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\lambda}})$	RMSE(ŵ)		$\widehat{\mathbf{w}}$) RMSE $(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\lambda}})$		$CVaR(\widehat{\lambda})$		
	MWh	\$/MWh	\$/MWh	MWh	gain	\$/MWh	gain	\$/MWh	gain	
14_ieee	0.35	0.62	1.52	0.35	+ 0 .6%	0.61	-0.6%	1.50	-0.8%	
57_ieee	2.31	11.03	34.64	2.60	+11.2%	10.72		33.59		
24_ieee	4.08	8.62	37.70	4.51	+ 9 .6%	8.33		36.35		
39_epri	5.94	11.15	31.21	6.43	+ 7 .6%	10.19		28.02		
73_ieee	4.02	5.12	16.21	5.51	+ 26 . 9 %	4.24		13.41		
118_{-} ieee	2.29	3.59	11.32	2.60	+12.1%	2.88		9.06		

Price errors reduction comes at the expense of forecast error Price error reduction is more significant in larger networks

For more results, including price fairness: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2308.01436

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	MWh	\$/MWh	\$/MWh	MWh	gain	\$/MWh	gain	\$/MWh	gain
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73_ieee	4.02	5.12	16.21	5.51	+ 26 .9%	4.24		13.41	-20.9%
118_ieee	2.29	3.59	11.32	2.60	+12.1%	2.88		9.06	-25.0%

Price errors reduction comes at the expense of forecast error Price error reduction is more significant in larger networks

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Nash equilibrium of ML models in electricity markets

Regression Equilibrium in Electricity Markets

SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENERGY MARKETS, POLICY AND REGULATION, MAY 2024

Abstract—Renewable power producers participating in elec- C. Special Notation tricity markets build forecasting models independently, volving Abstract—Kenewaote power producers participating in enco-tricity markets build forecasting models independently, relying an their sum data model and feature proformation. In this many on their own data, model and feature preferences. In this paper, on their own data, model and reasure preserences. In this paper, we argue that in renewable-dominated markets, such an uncoorwe argue that in renewante-commuted markets, such an uncour-dinated approach to forecasting results in substantial opportunity costs for stochastic producers and additional operating costs for the power system. As a solution, we introduce Regression Equilibrium—a welfare-optimal state of electricity markets under incertainty, where profit-seeking stochastic producers do not benefit by unilaterally deviating from their equilibrium forecast models. While the regression equilibrium maximizes the private welfare, i.e., the average profit of stochastic producers across the developed and real-time markets, it also allows with the second day-ahead and real-time markets, it also aligns with the socially optimal, least-cost dispatch solution for the system. We base the equilibrium analysis on the theory of variational inequalities equinorium analysis on the theory of variational medianics, providing results on the existence and uniqueness of regression equilibrium in energy-only markets. We also devise two methods for computing the regression equilibrium: centralized optimizafor computing the regression equinorium: centralized optimiza-tion and a decentralized ADMM-based algorithm that preserves Index Terms-ADMM, electricity markets, equilibrium, fore-

casting, renewable energy generation, variational inequalities

Boldface lowercase/uppercase letters denote column vectors/matrices. Norm $||\mathbf{x}||_{\mathbf{C}}^2 = \mathbf{x}^\top \mathbf{C} \mathbf{x}$. $f(\mathbf{x}|\mathbf{y})$ is a function of x with parameter y. Notation $\mathbf{x} \perp \mathbf{y}$ means "orthogonal" (x \perp y \Leftrightarrow x^Ty = 0). For a set x = $(x_1, \dots, x_i, \dots, x_n), x_{-i}$ collects all elements in x except that at position i. Operator $[x]_+$ is the projection of x onto non-negative orthant, \otimes is the Kronecker product, I_n is $n \times n$ identity matrix, and vector 1 (0) is a vector of ones (zeros).

I. INTRODUCTION

HOLESALE electricity markets are designed to maximize social welfare while maintaining the power supply and demand in balance at all times. However, with the increasing integration of stochastic energy resources, markets could struggle to maintain this balance in a welfaremaximizing manner. One reason is the lack of coordination between the day-ahead market, which is cleared based on





Revenue-optimal wind power forecasting in two-stage markets

Baseline approach to wind power forecasting:

- Collect a training dataset $\mathcal{D} = \{(\varphi_1, \mathbf{w}_1), \dots, \varphi_n, \mathbf{w}_n)\}$
- ▶ Machine learning model $\mathbb{W}_{\theta} : \mathcal{F} \mapsto \mathcal{W}$ with parameter θ
- \blacktriangleright Learn optimal parameter θ^* by minimizing a prediction loss

$$\min_{\|\boldsymbol{\theta}\|_1 \leqslant \tau} \quad \mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{\theta} \mid \mathcal{D}) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \|\mathbb{W}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{\varphi}_i) - \mathbf{w}_i\|_2^2$$





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Revenue-optimal forecasting [PCK07, CK19, WSC23]:

- **1.** Day-ahead stage: LMP λ_1 pricing the forecast of wind power
- 2. Real-time stage: LMP λ_2 pricing any forecast deviation

$$\max_{\|\boldsymbol{\theta}\|_1 \leqslant \tau} \quad \mathcal{R}^{W}(\boldsymbol{\theta} \,|\, \mathcal{D}, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_1, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_2) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{l=1}^{N} \mathcal{L}_{l}(\boldsymbol{\theta} \,|\, \mathcal{D}, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_1, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_2) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{l=1}^{N} \mathcal{L}_{l}(\boldsymbol{\theta} \,|\, \mathcal{D}, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_1, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_2) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{l=1}^{N} \mathcal{L}_{l}(\boldsymbol{\theta} \,|\, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_1, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_2) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{l=1}^{N} \mathcal{L}_{l}(\boldsymbol{\lambda}_1, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_2) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{l=1}^{n$$

 $\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(\lambda_{1i} \mathbb{W}_{\theta}(\varphi_{i}) + \lambda_{2i}(w_{i} - \mathbb{W}_{\theta}(\varphi_{i})) \right)$ i=1day-ahead revenue real-time revenue





Optimization of wind power producers $\max_{\substack{\boldsymbol{\theta}_{i} \mid \leq \tau_{i}}} \mathcal{R}^{W}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{j} \mid \mathcal{D}_{j}, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_{1}, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_{2}) - \gamma \cdot \mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{j} \mid \mathcal{D}_{j})$ $\left\| \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j} \right\| \leq \tau_{j}$

for all producers $j \in 1, \ldots, b$

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regularization by prediction loss

expected revenue









Optimization of wind power producers

 $\left\| \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j} \right\| \leq \tau_{j}$

 $\max_{\|\boldsymbol{\theta}_j\| \leqslant \tau_j} \quad \mathcal{R}^{W}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_j | \mathcal{D}_j, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_1, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_2) - \gamma \cdot \mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_j | \mathcal{D}_j)$ for all producers $j \in 1, \ldots, b$



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Optimization of controllable generators

 $\max_{\mathbf{p}_{i},\mathbf{r}_{i}\in\mathcal{G}} \mathcal{R}^{G}(\mathbf{p}_{i},\mathbf{r}_{i} \mid \boldsymbol{\lambda}_{1i},\boldsymbol{\lambda}_{2i}) - c(\mathbf{p}_{i},\mathbf{r}_{i})$

for all training samples $i \in \mathcal{D}_{1:b}$











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Optimization of wind power producers $\max_{\substack{|\boldsymbol{\theta}_{j}| \leq \tau_{j}}} \mathcal{R}^{W}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{j}|\mathcal{D}_{j},\boldsymbol{\lambda}_{1},\boldsymbol{\lambda}_{2}) - \gamma \cdot \mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{j}|\mathcal{D}_{j})$

 $\left\| \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j} \right\| \leq \tau_{j}$

for all producers $j \in 1, \ldots, b$



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Optimization of controllable generators

 $\max_{\mathbf{p}_{i},\mathbf{r}_{i}\in\mathcal{G}} \mathcal{R}^{G}(\mathbf{p}_{i},\mathbf{r}_{i} \mid \boldsymbol{\lambda}_{1i},\boldsymbol{\lambda}_{2i}) - c(\mathbf{p}_{i},\mathbf{r}_{i})$

for all training samples $i \in \mathcal{D}_{1:b}$

Others









Optimization of wind power producers $\max_{\substack{\boldsymbol{\theta}_{j} \\ \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j} \\ \boldsymbol{\theta}_{j}}} \mathcal{R}^{W}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{j} | \mathcal{D}_{j}, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_{1}, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_{2}) - \gamma \cdot \mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{j} | \mathcal{D}_{j})$ $\|\boldsymbol{\theta}_j\| \leqslant \tau_j$ for all producers $j \in 1, \ldots, b$



Market-clearing conditions at the 1st and 2nd stages $\mathbf{0} \leqslant oldsymbol{\lambda}_{1i} \perp \mathbf{p}_i + \sum_{j=1}^b \mathbb{W}_{oldsymbol{ heta}_j}(oldsymbol{arphi}_i) - \mathbf{d} \geqslant \mathbf{0}, \quad \mathbf{0} \leqslant oldsymbol{\lambda}_{2i} \perp \mathbf{r}_i + \sum_{j=1}^b \mathbf{w}_{ji} - \sum_{j=1}^b \mathbb{W}_{oldsymbol{ heta}_j}(oldsymbol{arphi}_i) \geqslant \mathbf{0}$

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Optimization of controllable generators ma

$$\max_{\mathbf{p}_{i},\mathbf{r}_{i}\in\mathcal{G}} \mathcal{R}^{\mathsf{G}}(\mathbf{p}_{i},\mathbf{r}_{i} \mid \boldsymbol{\lambda}_{1i},\boldsymbol{\lambda}_{2i}) - c(\mathbf{p}_{i},\mathbf{r}_{i})$$

for all training samples $i \in \mathcal{D}_{1:b}$

Others











Optimization of wind power producers max. $\mathcal{R}^{W}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{j}|\mathcal{D}_{j}, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_{1}, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_{2}) - \gamma \cdot \mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{j}|\mathcal{D}_{j})$ $\|\boldsymbol{\theta}_{j}\| \leq \tau_{j}$ for all producers $j \in 1, ..., b$



Assumptions:

- Class of ML models \mathbb{W}_{θ} is **convex** in θ , e.g., kernel regression
- Training datasets are such that $n \gg \operatorname{card}[\varphi]$ (unique regression solution)
- The intersection of private feasible regions is compact (at least one feasible dispatch $\forall i \in \mathcal{D}_{1:b}$)

Main result: regression equilibrium exists and is unique!

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for all training samples $i \in \mathcal{D}_{1:b}$



nel regression que regression solution) npact (at least one feasible dispatch $orall i \in \mathcal{D}_{1:b})$









Optimization of wind power producers $\max_{\substack{\|\boldsymbol{\theta}_{j}\| \leq \tau_{j}}} \mathcal{R}^{W}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{j}|\mathcal{D}_{j},\boldsymbol{\lambda}_{1},\boldsymbol{\lambda}_{2}) - \gamma \cdot \mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{j}|\mathcal{D}_{j})$ for all producers $j \in 1, \ldots, b$

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Equilibrium regression profile $\Theta^{\star} = (\theta_1^{\star}, \dots, \theta_b^{\star})$, such that:

- Feasible operation of the power gird and markets
- Maximized wind power profits, with no incentives to deviate
- Minimized expected dispatch costs across the two markets

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for all training samples $i \in \mathcal{D}_{1:b}$











Optimization of wind power producers $\max_{\substack{\|\boldsymbol{\theta}_{j}\| \leq \tau_{j}}} \mathcal{R}^{W}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{j}|\mathcal{D}_{j},\boldsymbol{\lambda}_{1},\boldsymbol{\lambda}_{2}) - \gamma \cdot \mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{j}|\mathcal{D}_{j})$ for all producers $j \in 1, \ldots, b$



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How to compute equilibrium regression Θ^* ?

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for all training samples $i \in \mathcal{D}_{1:b}$













- Equilibrium problem: stacks many private optimization problems
- Variational inequalities (VI): analyzes the interaction between private optimization problems
- In some special cases (like ours), VI connects equilibrium to a centralized optimization

For more details visit Appenix A in: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.17753

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Computing regression equilibrium: centralized optimization

By the Symmetry Principle Theorem [FP03], there exists an equivalent opt solving the equilibrium which happens to minimizes the expected generation and regulation costs

$$\begin{array}{ll} \min_{\Theta,\mathbf{p},\mathbf{r}} & \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} c\left(\mathbf{p}_{i},\mathbf{r}_{i}\right) + \gamma \parallel \Theta \varphi_{i} - \mathbf{v}_{i} \\ \text{s.to} & \mathbf{1}^{\top} (\mathbf{p}_{i} + \Theta \varphi_{i} - \mathbf{d}) = 0, \\ & \mathbf{1}^{\top} (\mathbf{r}_{i} - \Theta \varphi_{i} + \mathbf{w}_{i}) = 0, \\ & |\mathbf{F} (\mathbf{p}_{i} + \Theta \varphi_{i} - \mathbf{d})| \leqslant \overline{\mathbf{f}}, \\ & |\mathbf{F} (\mathbf{p}_{i} + \Theta \varphi_{i} - \mathbf{d})| \leqslant \overline{\mathbf{f}}, \\ & |\mathbf{F} (\mathbf{p}_{i} + \Theta \varphi_{i} - \mathbf{d})| \leqslant \overline{\mathbf{f}}, \\ & |\mathbf{F} (\mathbf{p}_{i} + \Theta \varphi_{i} - \mathbf{d}) \\ & + \mathbf{F} (\mathbf{r}_{i} - \Theta \varphi_{i} + \mathbf{w}_{i})| \leqslant \overline{\mathbf{f}}, \\ & |\mathbf{p} \leqslant \mathbf{p}_{i} + \mathbf{r}_{i} \leqslant \overline{\mathbf{p}}, \\ & |\mathbf{r}_{i}| \leqslant \overline{\mathbf{r}}, \quad \forall i = 1, \dots, n, \\ & |\Theta| \leqslant \tau \end{array}$$

For more details visit Appenix A in: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2405.17753

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... thus enhancing the temporal coordination of day-ahead and real-time markets

real-time cost

 $\mathbf{w}_i \|_2^2$ regularized expected cost

day-ahead power balance

real-time power balance

day-ahead power flow limit

real-time power flow limit generation limit regulation limit equilibrium feature selection







Computing regression equilibrium: Walrasian auction and ADMM

Step 1 Primal update of each wind power producer:

Step 2 Primal update of each conventional generator:

$$\mathbf{p}^{k}, \mathbf{r}^{k} \leftarrow \max_{\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{r} \in \mathcal{G}} \quad \mathcal{R}^{G}(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{r} \mid \boldsymbol{\lambda}_{1}^{k}, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_{2}^{k}) - c(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{r})$$

Step 3 Electricity price updates:

$$egin{aligned} oldsymbol{\lambda}_1^{k+1} &\leftarrow \left[oldsymbol{\lambda}_1^k - arrho \left(oldsymbol{p}^k + \mathbb{W}_{oldsymbol{ heta}^k}(oldsymbol{arphi}) - oldsymbol{d}
ight)
ight]_+ \ oldsymbol{\lambda}_2^{k+1} &\leftarrow \left[oldsymbol{\lambda}_2^k - arrho \left(oldsymbol{r}^k + oldsymbol{w} - \mathbb{W}_{oldsymbol{ heta}^k}(oldsymbol{arphi})
ight)
ight]_+ \end{aligned}$$

Resembles Walrasian auction: Equilibrium is computed via price exchange Proprietary training datasets are localized and not exchanged

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Computing regression equilibrium: Walrasian auction and ADMM

Step 1 Primal update of each wind power producer:

$$\boldsymbol{\theta}^{k} \leftarrow \max_{\|\boldsymbol{\theta}\| \leqslant \tau} \quad \mathcal{R}^{W}(\boldsymbol{\theta}|\mathcal{D}, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_{1}^{k}, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_{2}^{k}) - \gamma \cdot \mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{\theta}|\mathcal{D}) \underbrace{+ \frac{\varrho}{2} \left\| \mathbf{p}^{k-1} + \mathbb{W}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{\varphi}) - \mathbf{d} \right\|_{2}^{2} + \frac{\varrho}{2} \left\| \mathbf{r}^{k-1} + \mathbf{w} - \mathbb{W}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{\varphi}) \right\|_{2}^{2} }_{\text{ADMM feasibility terms}}$$
Primal update of each conventional generator:
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Step 2

$$\boldsymbol{\theta}^{k} \leftarrow \max_{\|\boldsymbol{\theta}\| \leqslant \tau} \quad \mathcal{R}^{W}(\boldsymbol{\theta}|\mathcal{D}, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_{1}^{k}, \boldsymbol{\lambda}_{2}^{k}) - \gamma \cdot \mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{\theta}|\mathcal{D}) \underbrace{+ \frac{\varrho}{2} \left\| \mathbf{p}^{k-1} + \mathbb{W}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{\varphi}) - \mathbf{d} \right\|_{2}^{2} + \frac{\varrho}{2} \left\| \mathbf{r}^{k-1} + \mathbf{w} - \mathbb{W}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{\varphi}) \right\|_{2}^{2} }_{\text{ADMM feasibility terms}}$$
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Resembles Walrasian auction: Equilibrium is computed via price exchange Proprietary training datasets are localized and not exchanged

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ADMM feasibility terms









Experiments on a modified IEEE 24-Bus RTS



- with farms with identical data and features
- Cover 38.4% of load at peak generation
- Kernel regression with 30 transformed features
- ► 5,000 training and 10,000 testing samples

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- Although data is the same, how do equilibrium forecasts depend on the wind farm location in the grid?
- What are the equilibrium benefits in terms profits (any incentives to deviate?) and cost of electricity?













Baseline versus Equilibrium forecasts



Baseline: minimizes a prediction error **Equilibrium:** maximizes wind farm profits

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Systematic over- or under-prediction depending on the wind farm's location in the grid











Wind farm profits and incentives to deviate



- Equilibrium regression yields larger profits for all wind farms
- There are large profit incentives to unilaterally deviate from the baseline regression
- And (almost) no incentives to deviate from the equilibrium regression

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Regression	RMSE, MWh	Avera	age dispatch	cost, \$	Total dispatch cost error, \$		
		total	day-ahead	real-time	average	$CVaR_{10\%}$	
Oracle		37, 246	37,246				
Baseline	88	39, 223					
Equilibrium	395	38, 326					

- Baseline regression: minimal forecast error, yet results in large real-time cost
- Equilibrium regression: large forecast errors, withholds cheap generation from the day-ahead market; yet, results in very cheap real-time re-dispatch
- Saving of 2.4% on average, and 13.6% on average across 10% of the worst-case scenarios









Regression	RMSE, MWh	Aver	age dispatch	cost, \$	Total dispatch cost error, \$		
		total	day-ahead	real-time	average	CVaR _{10%}	
Oracle		37, 246	37, 246				
Baseline	88	39,223	37,459	1,764	1,977	8,626	
Equilibrium	395	38, 326	38,154	172	1,080	3,555	

- Baseline regression: minimal forecast error, yet results in large real-time cost
- market; yet, results in very cheap real-time re-dispatch

Equilibrium regression: large forecast errors, withholds cheap generation from the day-ahead

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Introduction

Controlling the impact of ML errors on electricity pricing

Nash equilibrium of ML models in electricity markets

Concluding remarks



Concluding remarks

Part I:

- We integrate market-clearing optimization into training to inform them on specific decision objective

Part II:

- Network coupling of private ML models (ripple effect on the entire electricity market)
- Nash regression equilibrium syncs private models and yields maximum profits
- It implicitly minimizes the cost across day-ahead and real-time markets ...
- ...thus delivering some benefits of stochastic market design in the existing deterministic markets



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Erroneous ML models have a significant impact on pricing and dispatch decisions in electricity markets

Thank you for your attention!













ECE 598: Computational Power Systems

Term: Winter 2025 Credit Hours: 3 credits Time: Fridays 10:30-13:30 Format : Lecture (75 min) + Break + Tutorial (75 min) Instructor: Vladimir (Vlad) Dvorkin E-mail: dvorkin@umich.edu

Course Description

The growing digitization of power systems and the rapid integration of renewable energy resources call for new computational algorithms to support power system operations and electricity markets. In this course, students will learn the core computational problems in power systems and modern algorithms to solve those problems, while managing the trade-offs between performance, speed and data requirements. 0000 0000 Load/renewable Electricity In the first part of the course, students will fapower forecasting market clearing (NLP, QP, ...) (MILP, MIQP) miliarize themselves with optimization prob-0000 lems in power systems, including economic week/day day dispatch and market clearing for transmission grids, as well as voltage control and peer-to-Optimal power flow Contingency screening Automatic **↔<u> </u>** peer markets for distribution grids. They will Real-time re-dispatch generator control (NLP, LP, QP) also learn how machine learning (ML) aids hour/minute in solving these optimization problems. In seconds $tim\epsilon$ the second part, the focus will be on decen-Figure 1: Computational power systems timeline tralized/distributed decision-making in highvoltage and distribution grids, and how agents can autonomously solve dispatch, control, and learning problems using decentralized/distributed algorithms, such as dual decomposition, ADMM, and their variants. In the third part, students will acquire prescriptive analytics skills: it will introduce algorithms for decision-focused learning in the context of renewable power forecasting and other relevant analytical tasks. Students will work on final projects (to be agreed upon with the instructor) and present the results to their peers. Possible project topics include:

- Decentralized electricity market designs
- Carbon-constrained electric power dispatch and pricing
- Optimization algorithms for voltage control in distribution grids
- Power grid coordination with adjacent infrastructures (e.g., with data centers)



Each weekly session will consist of a lecture and a follow-up tutorial on the lecture materials.

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