

Privately Constraining and Programming PRFs, the LWE Way

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Abstract

Constrained pseudorandom functions allow for delegating “constrained” secret keys that let one compute the function at certain authorized inputs—as specified by a constraining predicate—while keeping the function value at unauthorized inputs pseudorandom. In the *constraint-hiding* variant, the constrained key hides the predicate. On top of this, *programmable* variants allow the delegator to explicitly set the output values yielded by the delegated key for a particular set of unauthorized inputs.

Recent years have seen rapid progress on applications and constructions of these objects for progressively richer constraint classes, resulting most recently in constraint-hiding constrained PRFs for *arbitrary* polynomial-time constraints from Learning With Errors (LWE) [Brakerski, Tsabary, Vaikuntanathan, and Wee, TCC’17], and privately programmable PRFs from indistinguishability obfuscation (*iO*) [Boneh, Lewi, and Wu, PKC’17].

In this work we give a unified approach for constructing both of the above kinds of PRFs from LWE with subexponential $\exp(n^\epsilon)$ approximation factors. Our constructions follow straightforwardly from a new notion we call a *shift-hiding shiftable function*, which allows for deriving a key for the *sum* of the original function and any desired hidden shift function. In particular, we obtain the first privately programmable PRFs from non-*iO* assumptions.

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1 Introduction

Since the introduction of pseudorandom functions (PRFs) more than thirty years ago by Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali [GGM84], many variants of this fundamental primitive have been proposed. For example, *constrained* PRFs (also known as *delegatable* or *functional* PRFs) [KPTZ13, BW13, BGI14] allow issuing “constrained” keys which can be used to evaluate the PRF on an “authorized” subset of the domain, while preserving the pseudorandomness of the PRF values on the remaining unauthorized inputs.

Assuming the existence of one-way functions, constrained PRFs were first constructed for the class of *prefix-fixing* constraints, i.e., the constrained key allows evaluating the PRF on inputs which start with a specified bit string [KPTZ13, BW13, BGI14]. Subsequently, by building on a sequence of works [BPR12, BLMR13, BP14] that gave PRFs from the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem [Reg05], Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [BV15] constructed constrained PRFs where the set of authorized inputs can be specified by an *arbitrary* polynomial-time predicate, although for a weaker security notion that allows the attacker to obtain only a single constrained key and function value.

In the original notion of constrained PRF, the constrained key may reveal the constraint itself. Boneh, Lewi, and Wu [BLW17] proposed a stronger variant in which the constraint is hidden, calling them *privately constrained PRFs*—also known as *constraint-hiding constrained PRFs* (CHC-PRFs)—and gave several compelling applications, like searchable symmetric encryption, watermarking PRFs, and function secret sharing [BGI15]. They also constructed CHC-PRFs for arbitrary polynomial-time constraining functions under the strong assumption that indistinguishability obfuscation (*iO*) exists [BGI⁺01, GGH⁺13]. Soon after, CHC-PRFs for various constraint classes were constructed from more standard LWE assumptions:

- Boneh, Kim, and Montgomery [BKM17] constructed them for the class of point-function constraints (i.e., all but one input is authorized).
- Through a different approach, Canetti and Chen [CC17] constructed them for constraints in NC^1 , i.e., polynomial-size formulas.
- Most recently, Brakerski, Tsabary, Vaikuntanathan, and Wee [BTVW17] improved on the construction from [BKM17] to support arbitrary polynomial-size constraints.

All these constructions have a somewhat weaker security guarantee compared to the *iO*-based construction of [BLW17], namely, the adversary gets just one constrained key (but an unbounded number of function values), whereas in [BLW17] it can get unboundedly many constrained keys. Indeed, this restriction reflects a fundamental barrier: CHC-PRFs that are secure for even two constrained keys (for arbitrary constraining functions) imply *iO* [CC17].

Boneh *et al.* [BLW17] also defined and constructed what they call *privately programmable PRFs* (PP-PRFs), which are CHC-PRFs for the class of point functions along with an additional programmability property: when deriving a constrained key, one can specify the outputs the key yields at the unauthorized points. They showed how to use PP-PRFs to build *watermarking* PRFs, a notion defined in [CHN⁺16]. While the PP-PRF and resulting watermarking PRF from [BLW17] were based on indistinguishability obfuscation, Kim and Wu [KW17] later constructed watermarking PRFs from LWE, but via a different route that does not require PP-PRFs. To date, it has remained an open question whether PP-PRFs exist based on more standard (non-*iO*) assumptions.

1.1 Our Results

Our main contribution is a unified approach for constructing both constraint-hiding constrained PRFs for arbitrary polynomial-time constraints, and privately programmable PRFs, from LWE with subexponen-

tial $\exp(n^\varepsilon)$ approximation factors (i.e., inverse error rates), for any constant $\varepsilon > 0$. Both objects follow straightforwardly from a single LWE-based construction that we call a *shift-hiding shiftable function* (SHSF). Essentially, an SHSF allows for deriving a “shifted” key for a desired shift function, which remains hidden. The shifted key allows one to evaluate the *sum* of the original function and the shift function. We construct CHC-PRFs and PP-PRFs very simply by using an appropriate shift function, which is zero at authorized inputs, and either pseudorandom or programmed at unauthorized inputs.

CHC-PRFs. In comparison with [BTVW17], while we achieve the same ultimate result of CHC-PRFs for arbitrary constraints (with essentially the same efficiency metrics), our construction is more modular and arguably a good deal simpler.¹ Specifically, our SHSF construction uses just a few well-worn techniques from the literature on LWE-based fully homomorphic and attribute-based cryptography [GSW13, BGG⁺14, GVW15b, GVW15a], and we get a CHC-PRF by invoking our SHSF with an *arbitrary* PRF as the shift function. By contrast, the construction from [BTVW17] melds the FHE/ABE techniques with a specific LWE-based PRF [BP14], and involves a handful of ad-hoc techniques to deal with various technical complications that arise.

PP-PRFs. Our approach also yields the first privately programmable PRFs from LWE, or indeed, any non-*iO* assumption. In fact, our PP-PRF allows for programming any polynomial number of inputs. Previously, the only potential approach for constructing PP-PRFs without *iO* [KW17] was from CHC-PRFs having certain extra properties (which constructions prior to our work did not possess), and was limited to programming only a logarithmic number of inputs.

1.2 Techniques

As mentioned above, the main ingredient in our constructions is what we call a *shift-hiding shiftable function* (SHSF). We briefly describe its properties. We have a keyed function $\text{Eval} : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$, where \mathcal{Y} is some finite additive group, and an algorithm $\text{Shift}(\cdot, \cdot)$ to derive *shifted keys*. Given a secret key $msk \in \mathcal{K}$ and a function $H : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$, we can derive a shifted key $sk_H \leftarrow \text{Shift}(msk, H)$. This key has the following two main properties:

- sk_H hides the shifting function H , and
- given sk_H we can compute an *approximation* of $\text{Eval}(msk, \cdot) + H(\cdot)$ at any input, i.e, there exists a “shifted evaluation” algorithm SEval such that for every $x \in \mathcal{X}$,

$$\text{SEval}(sk_H, x) \approx \text{Eval}(msk, x) + H(x). \quad (1.1)$$

We emphasize that the SHSF itself does not have any pseudorandomness property; this will come from “rounding” the function in our PRF constructions, described next.

CHC-PRFs and PP-PRFs. We first briefly outline how we use SHSFs to construct CHC-PRFs and PP-PRFs. To construct a CHC-PRF we instantiate the SHSF with range $\mathcal{Y} = \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ for an appropriately chosen q . The CHC-PRF key is just a SHSF master key msk .

¹Our construction was actually developed independently of [BTVW17], though not concurrently; we were unaware of its earlier non-public versions.

- To evaluate on an input $x \in \mathcal{X}$ using msk we output $\lfloor \text{Eval}(msk, x) \rfloor_p$, where $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor_p$ denotes (coordinate-wise) “rounding” from \mathbb{Z}_q to \mathbb{Z}_p for some appropriate $p \ll q$.
- To generate a constrained key for a constraint circuit $C : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, we sample a key k for an ordinary PRF F , define the shift function $H_{C,k}(x) := C(x) \cdot F_k(x)$, and output the shifted key

$$sk_C \leftarrow \text{Shift}(msk, H_{C,k}).$$

Since Shift hides the circuit $H_{C,k}$, it follows that sk_C hides C .

- To evaluate on an input x using the constrained key sk_C , we output $\lfloor \text{SEval}(sk_C, x) \rfloor_p$.

Observe that for authorized inputs x (where $C(x) = 0$), we have $H_{C,k}(x) = 0$, so $\text{SEval}(sk_C, x) \approx \text{Eval}(msk, x)$ and therefore their rounded counterparts are equal with high probability. (This relies on the additional property that $\text{Eval}(msk, x)$ is not too close to a “rounding border.”) For unauthorized points x (where $C(x) = 1$), to see that the CHC-PRF output is pseudorandom given sk_C , notice that by Equation (1.1), the output is (with high probability)

$$\lfloor \text{Eval}(msk, x) \rfloor_p = \lfloor \text{SEval}(sk_C, x) - H(x) \rfloor_p. \quad (1.2)$$

Because F is a pseudorandom function, $H(x) = F_k(x)$ completely “randomizes” the right-hand side above.

Turning now to PP-PRFs, for simplicity consider the case where we want to program the constrained key at a single input x^* (generalizing to polynomially many inputs is straightforward). A first idea is to use the same algorithms as in the above CHC-PRF, except that to program a key to output y at input x^* we define the shift function

$$H_{x^*,y}(x) = \begin{cases} y' - \text{Eval}(msk, x^*) & \text{if } x = x^*, \\ \mathbf{0} & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

where $y' \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ is chosen uniformly conditioned on $\lfloor y' \rfloor_p = y$. As before, the programmed key is just the shifted key $sk_{x^*,y} \leftarrow \text{Shift}(msk, H_{x^*,y})$. By Equation (1.1), evaluating on the unauthorized input x^* using $sk_{x^*,y}$ indeed yields $\lfloor y' \rfloor_p = y$. However, it is unclear whether the true (non-programmed) value of the function at the unauthorized input $x = x^*$ is pseudorandom given $sk_{x^*,y}$: in particular, because y is chosen by the adversary, $y' \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ may not be uniformly random.

To address this issue, we observe that the above construction satisfies a weaker pseudorandomness guarantee: if the adversary does not specify y but instead y is uniformly random, then by Equation (1.2) the PP-PRF is pseudorandom at x^* . This observation leads us to our actual PP-PRF construction: we instantiate two of the above “weak” PP-PRFs with keys msk_1 and msk_2 . To generate a programmed key for input x^* and output y , we first generate random additive shares y_1, y_2 such that $y = y_1 + y_2$, and output the programmed key $sk_{x^*,y} := (sk_{x^*,y_1}, sk_{x^*,y_2})$ where $sk_{x^*,y_i} \leftarrow \text{Shift}(msk_i, H_{x^*,y_i})$ for $i = 1, 2$. Each evaluation algorithm (ordinary and programmed) is then defined simply as the sum of the corresponding evaluation algorithm from the “weak” construction using the two component keys. Because both programmed keys are generated for random target outputs y_i , we can prove pseudorandomness of the real function value.

Constructing SHSFs. We now give an overview of our construction of shift-hiding shifted functions. For simplicity, suppose the range of the functions is $\mathcal{Y} = \mathbb{Z}_q$; extending this to \mathbb{Z}_q^m (as in our actual constructions) is straightforward. As in [KW17, BKM17] our main tools are the “gadget-matrix homomorphisms” developed in the literature on fully homomorphic and attribute-based cryptography [GSW13, BGG⁺14, GVW15b, GVW15a].

At a high level, our SHSF works as follows. The master secret key is just an LWE secret \mathbf{s} whose first coordinate is 1. A shifted key for a shift function $H: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ consists of LWE vectors (using secret \mathbf{s}) relative to some public matrices that have been “shifted” by multiples of the gadget matrix \mathbf{G} [MP12]; more specifically, the multiples are the bits of FHE ciphertexts encrypting H , and the \mathbb{Z}_q -entries of the FHE secret key sk . To compute the shifted function on an input x , we do the following:

1. Using the gadget homomorphisms for boolean gates [GSW13, BGG⁺14] on the LWE vectors corresponding to the FHE encryption of H , we compute LWE vectors relative to some publicly computable matrices, shifted by multiples of \mathbf{G} corresponding to the bits of an FHE ciphertext encrypting $H(x)$.
2. Then, using the gadget homomorphisms for hidden linear functions [GVW15a] with the LWE vectors corresponding to the FHE secret key, we compute LWE vectors relative to some publicly computable matrix \mathbf{B}_x , but shifted by $(H(x) + e)\mathbf{G}$ where $H(x) + e \approx H(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ is the “noisy plaintext” arising as the inner product of the FHE ciphertext and secret key. Taking just the first column, we therefore have an LWE sample relative to some vector $\mathbf{b}_x + (H(x) + e)\mathbf{u}_1$, where \mathbf{u}_1 is the first standard basis (column) vector.
3. Finally, because the first coordinate of the LWE secret \mathbf{s} is 1, the above LWE sample is simply $\langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{b}_x \rangle + H(x) + e \approx \langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{b}_x \rangle + H(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_q$.

With the above in mind, we then define the (unshifted) function itself on an input x to simply compute \mathbf{b}_x from the public parameters as above, and output $\langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{b}_x \rangle$. This yields Equation (1.1).

2 Preliminaries

We denote row vectors by lower-case bold letters, e.g., \mathbf{a} . We denote matrices by upper-case bold letters, e.g., \mathbf{A} . The Kronecker product $\mathbf{A} \otimes \mathbf{B}$ of two matrices (or vectors) \mathbf{A} and \mathbf{B} is obtained by replacing each entry $a_{i,j}$ of \mathbf{A} with the block $a_{i,j}\mathbf{B}$. The Kronecker product obeys the *mixed-product* property: $(\mathbf{A} \otimes \mathbf{B})(\mathbf{C} \otimes \mathbf{D}) = (\mathbf{AC}) \otimes (\mathbf{BD})$ for any matrices $\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{D}$ with compatible dimensions.

2.1 Gadgets and Homomorphisms

Here we recall “gadgets” [MP12] over \mathbb{Z}_q and several of their homomorphic properties, some of which were implicit in [GSW13], and which were developed and exploited further in [BGG⁺14, GVW15b, GVW15a].

For an integer modulus q , the gadget (or powers-of-two) vector over \mathbb{Z}_q is defined as

$$\mathbf{g} = (1, 2, 4, \dots, 2^{\lceil \lg q \rceil - 1}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{\lceil \lg q \rceil}.$$

For every $u \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, there is an (efficiently computable) binary vector $\mathbf{x} \in \{0, 1\}^{\lceil \lg q \rceil}$ such that $\langle \mathbf{g}, \mathbf{x} \rangle = \mathbf{g} \cdot \mathbf{x}^t = u \pmod{q}$. Phrased differently,

$$(\mathbf{x} \otimes \mathbf{g}) \cdot \mathbf{r}^t = \mathbf{u} \pmod{q} \tag{2.1}$$

for a certain binary $\mathbf{r} \in \{0, 1\}^{\lceil \lg q \rceil^2}$, namely, the one that selects all the products of the corresponding entries of \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{g} .

The gadget matrix is defined as

$$\mathbf{G}_n = \mathbf{I}_n \otimes \mathbf{g} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m},$$

where $m = n \lceil \lg q \rceil$. We often drop the subscript n when it is clear from context. We use algorithms `BoolEval` and `LinEval`, which have the following properties.

- `BoolEval`(C, x, \mathbf{A}), given a boolean circuit $C: \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$ of depth d , an $x \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, and some $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times (\ell+1)m}$, outputs an integral matrix $\mathbf{R}_{C,x} \in \mathbb{Z}^{(\ell+1)m \times km}$ with $m^{O(d)}$ -bounded entries for which

$$(\mathbf{A} + (1, x) \otimes \mathbf{G}) \cdot \mathbf{R}_{C,x} = \mathbf{A}_C + C(x) \otimes \mathbf{G}, \quad (2.2)$$

where $\mathbf{A}_C \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ depends only on \mathbf{A} and C (and not on x).²

- `LinEval`(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{C}), given an $\mathbf{x} \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ and a matrix $\mathbf{C} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times \ell m}$, outputs an integral matrix $\mathbf{R}_x \in \mathbb{Z}^{2\ell m \times m}$ with $\text{poly}(m, \ell)$ -bounded entries such that, for all $\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{C} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times \ell m}$ and $\mathbf{k} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^\ell$,

$$[\mathbf{A} + \mathbf{x} \otimes \mathbf{G} \mid \mathbf{C} + \mathbf{k} \otimes \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{R}_x = \mathbf{B} + \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{k} \rangle \cdot \mathbf{G}, \quad (2.3)$$

where $\mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ depends only on \mathbf{A} and \mathbf{C} (and not on \mathbf{x} or \mathbf{k}).³

More generally, for $\mathbf{x} \in \{0, 1\}^{k\ell}$ by applying the above to the ℓ -bit chunks of \mathbf{x} , in Equation (2.3) we replace $\langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{k} \rangle \cdot \mathbf{G} = (\mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{k}^t) \cdot \mathbf{G}$ with $(\mathbf{x} \cdot (\mathbf{I}_k \otimes \mathbf{k}^t)) \otimes \mathbf{G}$, and now $\mathbf{R}_x \in \mathbb{Z}^{(k+1)\ell m \times km}$, $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times k\ell m}$, and $\mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times km}$.

2.2 Fully Homomorphic Encryption

We use the GSW (leveled) fully homomorphic encryption scheme [GSW13] (`KG`, `Enc`, `Eval`), whose relevant properties for our needs are summarized as follows (we use only a symmetric-key version, which is sufficient for our purposes):

- `KG`($1^\lambda, q$), given a security parameter λ and a requested modulus q , outputs a secret key $\mathbf{k} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^\tau$ (for some $\tau = \text{poly}(\lambda, \log q)$).
- `Enc`(\mathbf{k}, m), given a secret key \mathbf{k} and a message $m \in \{0, 1\}$, outputs a ciphertext ct , which is a binary string.
- `Eval`(C, ct_1, \dots, ct_ℓ), given a boolean circuit $C: \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ and ciphertexts $ct_1, ct_2, \dots, ct_\ell$, outputs a ciphertext $ct \in \{0, 1\}^{\tau \lceil \lg q \rceil}$.

Notice that in the above definition there is no explicit decryption algorithm. Instead we express the essential “noisy” linear relation between the result of homomorphic evaluation and the secret key: for any $\mathbf{k} \leftarrow \text{KG}(1^\lambda, q)$, any boolean circuit $C: \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ of depth at most d , any messages $m_j \in \{0, 1\}$ and ciphertexts $ct_j \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\mathbf{k}, m_j)$ for $j = 1, \dots, \ell$, we have

$$\text{Eval}(C, ct_1, \dots, ct_\ell) \cdot (\mathbf{I}_{\lceil \lg q \rceil} \otimes \mathbf{k}^t) = C(m_1, \dots, m_\ell) \otimes \mathbf{g} + \mathbf{e} \pmod{q} \quad (2.4)$$

for some integral error vector $\mathbf{e} \in [-B, B]^{\lceil \lg q \rceil}$, where $B = \lambda^{O(d)}$. In other words, multiplying (the τ -bit chunks of) the result of homomorphic evaluation with the secret key yields a “noisy” version of a robust encoding of the result (where the encoding is via the powers of two). While the robust encoding allows the noise to be removed, we will not need to do so explicitly.

More generally, if the circuit C has k -bit output, then `Eval` outputs a ciphertext in $\{0, 1\}^{\tau k \lceil \lg q \rceil}$ and Equation (2.4) holds with $\mathbf{I}_{\lceil \lg q \rceil}$ replaced by $\mathbf{I}_{k \lceil \lg q \rceil}$.

²This property is obtained by composing homomorphic addition and multiplication of \mathbf{G} -multiples; the extra 1 attached to x is needed to support NOT gates.

³We stress that `LinEval` does not need to know \mathbf{k} , which we view as representing a secret linear function that is hidden by \mathbf{C} .

2.3 Learning With Errors

For a positive integer dimension n and modulus q , and an error distribution χ over \mathbb{Z} , the LWE distribution and decision problem are defined as follows. For an $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}^n$, the LWE distribution $A_{\mathbf{s},\chi}$ is sampled by choosing a uniformly random $\mathbf{a} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and an error term $e \leftarrow \chi$, and outputting $(\mathbf{a}, b = \langle \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{a} \rangle + e) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$.

Definition 2.1. The decision-LWE $_{n,q,\chi}$ problem is to distinguish, with non-negligible advantage, between any desired (but polynomially bounded) number of independent samples drawn from $A_{\mathbf{s},\chi}$ for a single $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, and the same number of *uniformly random* and independent samples over \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1} .

In this work we use a form of LWE where the first coordinate of the secret vector \mathbf{s} is 1, i.e. $\mathbf{s} = (1, \bar{\mathbf{s}})$ where $\bar{\mathbf{s}} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n-1}$. It is easy to see that this is equivalent to LWE with an $(n-1)$ -dimensional secret: the transformation mapping $(\mathbf{a}, b) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n-1} \times \mathbb{Z}_q$ to $((r, \mathbf{a}), b + r)$ for a uniformly random $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ (chosen freshly for each sample) maps samples from $A_{\bar{\mathbf{s}},\chi}$ to samples from $A_{\mathbf{s},\chi}$, and maps uniform samples to uniform samples.

A standard instantiation of LWE is to let χ be a *discrete Gaussian* distribution (over \mathbb{Z}) with parameter $r = 2\sqrt{n}$. A sample drawn from this distribution has magnitude bounded by, say, $r\sqrt{n} = \Theta(n)$ except with probability at most 2^{-n} . For this parameterization, it is known that LWE is at least as hard as *quantumly* approximating certain “short vector” problems on n -dimensional lattices, in the worst case, to within $\tilde{O}(q\sqrt{n})$ factors [Reg05, PRS17]. Classical reductions are also known for different parameterizations [Pei09, BLP⁺13].

2.4 One Dimensional Rounded Short Integer Solution

As in [BV15, BKM17, KW17] we make use of a special “one-dimensional, rounded” variant of the short integer solution problem (SIS). For the parameters we will use, this problem is actually no easier to solve than LWE is, but it is convenient to define it separately.

Definition 2.2 (1D-R-SIS [BV15, BKM17]). Let $p \in \mathbb{N}$ and let $p_1 < p_2 < \dots < p_k$ be pairwise coprime and coprime with p . Let $q = p \cdot \prod_{i=1}^k p_i$. Then for positive numbers $m \in \mathbb{N}$ and B , the 1D-R-SIS $_{m,p,q,B}$ problem is as follows: given a uniformly random vector $\mathbf{v} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$, find $\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ such that $\|\mathbf{z}\| \leq B$ and

$$\langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{z} \rangle \in \frac{q}{p}(\mathbb{Z} + \frac{1}{2}) + [-B, B].$$

For sufficiently large $p_1 \geq B \cdot \text{poly}(k, \log q)$, solving 1D-R-SIS is at least as hard as approximating certain “short vector” problems on k -dimensional lattices, in the worst case, to within certain $B \cdot \text{poly}(k)$ factors [Ajt96, MR04, BV15, BKM17].

3 Shift-Hiding Shiftable Functions

Here we present our construction of what we call *shift-hiding shiftable functions* (SHSFs), which we use in our subsequent constructions of CHC-PRFs and PP-PRFs. Because there are several parameters and we need some specific algebraic properties, we do not give an abstract definition of SHSF, but instead just give a construction (Section 3.2) and show the requisite properties (Section 3.3).

3.1 Notation

Let $\text{GSW} = (\text{KG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Eval})$ denote the GSW fully homomorphic encryption scheme (Section 2.2), where the secret key is in \mathbb{Z}_q^τ for some $\tau = \tau(\lambda)$. Recall that homomorphic evaluation of a function with k output bits produces a $\tau k \lceil \lg q \rceil$ -bit ciphertext.

Our construction represents shift functions $H: \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ by (bounded-size) boolean circuits. Specifically, we let $H': \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$ for $k = m \lceil \lg q \rceil$ be a boolean circuit where $H'(x)$ is the binary decomposition of $H(x)$, so that, following Equation (2.1),

$$(H'(x) \otimes \mathbf{g}) \cdot (\mathbf{I}_m \otimes \mathbf{r}^t) = H(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m. \quad (3.1)$$

Let $U(H', x) = H'(x)$ denote a universal circuit for boolean circuits $H': \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$ of size σ , and let $U_x(\cdot) = U(\cdot, x)$. Its homomorphic analogue is as follows: letting \bar{z} be the total length of fresh GSW ciphertexts encrypting a circuit of size σ , for any $x \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ define

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{U}_x: \{0, 1\}^{\bar{z}} &\rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\tau k \lceil \lg q \rceil} \\ \bar{U}_x(ct) &= \text{GSW.Eval}(U_x, ct). \end{aligned}$$

Observe that \bar{U}_x can be implemented as a boolean circuit of size (and hence depth) $\text{poly}(\lambda, \sigma)$.

3.2 Construction

Here we give the tuple of algorithms $(\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Eval}, \text{Shift}, \text{SEval}, \mathcal{S})$ that make up our SHSF. For security parameter λ and constraint circuit size σ the algorithms are parameterized by some $n = \text{poly}(\lambda, \sigma)$ and $q = 2^{\text{poly}(\lambda, \sigma)}$, with $m = n \lceil \lg q \rceil = \text{poly}(\lambda, \sigma)$; we instantiate these more precisely in Section 3.4 below.

Construction 3.1. Let $\mathcal{X} = \{0, 1\}^\ell$ and $\mathcal{Y} = \mathbb{Z}_q^m$. Define:

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^\sigma)$: Sample uniformly random and independent matrices $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times (\bar{z}+1)m}$ and $\mathbf{C} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times \tau m}$, and output $pp = (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{C})$.

(The n -by- m chunks of \mathbf{A} will correspond to the \bar{z} bits of a GSW encryption of the shift function; similarly, the chunks of \mathbf{C} will correspond to the GSW secret key in \mathbb{Z}_q^τ .)

- $\text{KeyGen}(pp)$: Sample $\mathbf{s}' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n-1}$ and set $\mathbf{s} = (1, \mathbf{s}')$. Output the master secret key $msk = \mathbf{s}$.
- $\text{Eval}(pp, msk, x \in \{0, 1\}^\ell)$: compute

$$\mathbf{R}_0 = \text{BoolEval}(\bar{U}_x, 0^{\bar{z}}, \mathbf{A}) \in \mathbb{Z}^{(\bar{z}+1)m \times \tau k \lceil \lg q \rceil m}$$

and let

$$\mathbf{A}_x = (\mathbf{A} + (1, 0^{\bar{z}}) \otimes \mathbf{G}) \cdot \mathbf{R}_0 - \bar{U}_x(0^{\bar{z}}) \otimes \mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times \tau k \lceil \lg q \rceil m}.$$

(Observe that by Equation (2.2), $\mathbf{A}_x = \mathbf{A}_C$ for the circuit $C = \bar{U}_x$, and does not depend on the “dummy” ciphertext $0^{\bar{z}}$, which stands in for a GSW encryption of a shift function.)

Next, compute

$$\mathbf{R}'_0 = \text{LinEval}(\bar{U}_x(0^{\bar{z}}), \mathbf{C}) \in \mathbb{Z}^{\tau(k \lceil \lg q \rceil + 1)m \times k \lceil \lg q \rceil m}$$

and let

$$\mathbf{B}_x = [\mathbf{A}_x + \overline{U}_x(0^{\bar{z}}) \otimes \mathbf{G} \mid \mathbf{C}] \cdot \mathbf{R}'_0 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times k \lceil \lg q \rceil m}.$$

(Observe that this corresponds to taking $\mathbf{k} = \mathbf{0}$ in Equation (2.3), so \mathbf{B}_x does not depend on the “dummy” ciphertext $0^{\bar{z}}$; it depends only on \mathbf{A}_x , hence \mathbf{A} and x , and \mathbf{C} .)

Finally, output

$$\mathbf{s} \cdot \mathbf{B}_x \cdot (\mathbf{I}_m \otimes \mathbf{r}^t \otimes \mathbf{u}_1^t) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m,$$

where $\mathbf{r} \in \{0, 1\}^{\lceil \lg q \rceil^2}$ is as in Equation (3.1) and $\mathbf{u}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ is the first standard basis vector.

- $\text{Shift}(pp, msk, H)$: for a shift function $H: \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ whose binary decomposition $H': \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$ can be implemented by a circuit of size σ , sample a GSW encryption key $\mathbf{k} \leftarrow \text{GSW.KG}(1^\lambda, q)$, then encrypt H' bit-by-bit under this key to obtain a ciphertext $ct \leftarrow \text{GSW.Enc}_{\mathbf{k}}(H')$. Next, let

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{a} &= \mathbf{s}(\mathbf{A} + (1, ct) \otimes \mathbf{G}) + \mathbf{e} \\ \mathbf{c} &= \mathbf{s}(\mathbf{C} + \mathbf{k} \otimes \mathbf{G}) + \mathbf{e}' \end{aligned}$$

where \mathbf{e} and \mathbf{e}' are error vectors whose entries are sampled independently from χ . Output

$$sk_H = (ct, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c}).$$

(Recall that $\mathbf{A}' = \mathbf{A} + (1, ct) \otimes \mathbf{G}$ and $\mathbf{C}' = \mathbf{C} + \mathbf{k} \otimes \mathbf{G}$ support homomorphic operations on ct and \mathbf{k} via right-multiplication by short matrices, using the gadget homomorphisms. Shifted evaluation, defined next, performs such right-multiplications on $\mathbf{a} \approx \mathbf{s}\mathbf{A}'$, $\mathbf{c} \approx \mathbf{s}\mathbf{C}'$.)

- $\text{SEval}(pp, sk_H, x)$: On input $sk_H = (ct, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c})$ and $x \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, compute

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{R}_{ct} &= \text{BoolEval}(\overline{U}_x, ct, \mathbf{A}) \\ \mathbf{a}_x &= \mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{R}_{ct}. \end{aligned}$$

(By Equation (2.2), we have $\mathbf{a}_x \approx \mathbf{s}(\mathbf{A}_x + \overline{U}_x(ct) \otimes \mathbf{G})$, where recall that $\overline{U}_x(ct)$ is a GSW encryption of $H'(x)$, computed homomorphically.)

Next, compute

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{R}'_{ct} &= \text{LinEval}(\overline{U}_x(ct), \mathbf{C}) \\ \mathbf{b}_x &= [\mathbf{a}_x \mid \mathbf{c}] \cdot \mathbf{R}'_{ct}. \end{aligned}$$

(By Equations (2.3) for LinEval and (2.4) for GSW decryption, we have $\mathbf{b}_x \approx \mathbf{s}(\mathbf{B}_x + \mathbf{h}' \otimes \mathbf{G})$, where \mathbf{h}' is a noisy version of the robust encoding $H'(x) \otimes \mathbf{g}$.)

Finally, output

$$\mathbf{b}_x \cdot (\mathbf{I}_m \otimes \mathbf{r}^t \otimes \mathbf{u}_1^t) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m,$$

where \mathbf{r}, \mathbf{u}_1 are as in Eval above.

(Here the $\mathbf{I}_m \otimes \mathbf{r}^t$ term reconstructs a noisy version of $H(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ from \mathbf{h}' as in Equation (3.1), and the $\mathbf{u}_1^t \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ term selects the first column of \mathbf{G} , whose inner product with \mathbf{s} is 1.)

- $\mathcal{S}(1^\lambda, 1^\sigma)$: Sample a GSW secret key $\mathbf{k} \leftarrow \text{GSW.KG}(1^\lambda, q)$ and compute (by encrypting bit-by-bit) $ct \leftarrow \text{GSW.Enc}_{\mathbf{k}}(C)$, where C is some arbitrary size- σ boolean circuit. Sample uniformly random and independent $\mathbf{A} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times (\bar{z}+1)^m}$, $\mathbf{a} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{(\bar{z}+1)^m}$, $\mathbf{C} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times \tau m}$, $\mathbf{c} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{\tau m}$. Output $pp = (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{C})$ and $sk = (ct, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c})$.

3.3 Properties

Here we prove the three main properties of our SHSF that we will use in subsequent sections.

procedure $\text{RealKey}_{\mathcal{A}}(1^\lambda, 1^\rho)$

$H \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, 1^\sigma)$
 $pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^\rho)$
 $msk \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(pp)$
 $sk \leftarrow \text{Shift}(pp, msk, H)$
 $(pp, sk) \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$

(a) The real shifted key generation experiment

procedure $\text{IdealKey}_{\mathcal{A}}(1^\lambda, 1^\sigma)$

$H \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, 1^\sigma)$
 $(pp, sk) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(1^\lambda, 1^\sigma)$
 $(pp, sk) \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$

(b) The random key generation experiment

Figure 1: The real and random shifted key generation experiments.

Lemma 3.2 (Shift Hiding). *Assuming the hardness of $\text{LWE}_{n-1,q,\chi}$ and CPA security of the GSW encryption scheme, for any PPT \mathcal{A} and any $\sigma = \sigma(\lambda) = \text{poly}(\lambda)$,*

$$\{\text{RealKey}_{\mathcal{A}}(1^\lambda, 1^\sigma)\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \stackrel{c}{\approx} \{\text{IdealKey}_{\mathcal{A}}(1^\lambda, 1^\sigma)\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}, \quad (3.2)$$

where RealKey and IdealKey are the respective views of \mathcal{A} in the experiments defined in Figure 1.

Proof. Let \mathcal{A} be any polynomial-time adversary. To show that Equation (3.2) holds we define a sequence of hybrid experiments and show that they are indistinguishable.

Hybrid H_0 : This is the experiment RealKey .

Hybrid H_1 : This is the same as H_0 , except that we modify how the \mathbf{A} and \mathbf{C} are constructed as follows: after we generate ct and \mathbf{k} we choose uniformly random \mathbf{A}' and \mathbf{C}' and set

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{A} &= \mathbf{A}' - (1, ct) \otimes \mathbf{G} \\ \mathbf{C} &= \mathbf{C}' - \mathbf{k} \otimes \mathbf{G}. \end{aligned}$$

Hybrid H_2 : This is the same as H_1 , except that we sample the \mathbf{a}_i and \mathbf{c}_j uniformly at random from \mathbb{Z}_q^m .

Hybrid H_3 : This is the same as H_2 , except that we again directly choose \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{C} uniformly at random (without choosing \mathbf{A}', \mathbf{C}').

Hybrid H_4 : This is the same as H_2 , except that ct encrypts the (arbitrary) size- σ circuit C (as in \mathcal{S}) instead of H' , i.e., we set $ct \leftarrow \text{GSW.Enc}_{\mathbf{k}'}(C)$. Observe that this is exactly the experiment IdealKey .

Claim 3.3. H_0 and H_1 are identical.

Proof. This is because \mathbf{A}' and \mathbf{C}' are uniformly random and independent of ct and \mathbf{k} . □

Claim 3.4. *Assuming the hardness of $\text{LWE}_{n-1,q,\chi}$, we have $H_1 \stackrel{c}{\approx} H_2$.*

Proof. We use any adversary \mathcal{A} that attempts to distinguish H_1 from H_2 to build an adversary \mathcal{A}' that solves $\text{LWE}_{n-1,q,\chi}$ with the same advantage. First, \mathcal{A}' receives samples $(\mathbf{A}', \mathbf{a}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times (\bar{z}+1)m} \times \mathbb{Z}_q^{(\bar{z}+1)m}$ and

$(\mathbf{C}', \mathbf{c}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times \tau m} \times \mathbb{Z}_q^{\tau m}$, then proceeds exactly as in H_1 to interact with \mathcal{A} , and outputs what \mathcal{A} outputs. If the samples are LWE samples from $A_{\mathbf{s}, \chi}$ where $\mathbf{s} = (1, \mathbf{s}')$ for $\mathbf{s}' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n-1}$, then

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{a} &= \mathbf{s} \cdot \mathbf{A}' + \mathbf{e} = \mathbf{s}(\mathbf{A} + (1, ct) \otimes \mathbf{G}) + \mathbf{e} \\ \mathbf{c} &= \mathbf{s} \cdot \mathbf{C}' + \mathbf{e}' = \mathbf{s}(\mathbf{C} + \mathbf{k} \otimes \mathbf{G}) + \mathbf{e}'\end{aligned}$$

for error vectors \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{e}' whose entries are drawn from χ , therefore \mathcal{A} 's view is identical to its view in H_1 . If the samples are uniformly random, then \mathcal{A} 's view is identical to its view in H_2 . This proves the claim. \square

Claim 3.5. H_2 and H_3 are identical.

Proof. This is because \mathbf{A}', \mathbf{C}' are uniformly random and independent of ct and \mathbf{k} . \square

Claim 3.6. If GSW is CPA-secure then $H_3 \stackrel{c}{\approx} H_4$.

Proof. This follows immediately from the fact that the GSW secret key $\mathbf{k} \leftarrow \text{GSW.KG}(1^\lambda, q)$ is used only to encrypt H (yielding ct) or the arbitrary circuit C , respectively, in H_3 and H_4 . \square

This completes the proof of Lemma 3.2. \square

Lemma 3.7 (Border Avoiding). For any PPT \mathcal{A} , $i \in [m]$, $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ and $\sigma = \text{poly}(\lambda)$, assuming the hardness of 1D-R-SIS $_{(\bar{z}+\tau+1)m,p,q,B}$ for some large enough $B = m^{\text{poly}(\lambda,\sigma)} = \lambda^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$, we have

$$\Pr_{\substack{(pp,sk) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(1^\lambda, 1^\sigma) \\ x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pp,sk)}}} \left[\text{Eval}(pp, sk, x)_i \in \frac{q}{p}(\mathbb{Z} + \frac{1}{2}) + [-B, +B] \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Proof. We show how to use an adversary which finds an $x \in \mathcal{X}$ such that

$$\text{SEval}(pp, sk, x)_i \in \frac{q}{p}(\mathbb{Z} + \frac{1}{2}) + [-B, +B] \quad (3.3)$$

for some $i \in [m]$ to solve 1D-R-SIS.

Given a (uniformly random) 1D-R-SIS $_{(\bar{z}+\tau+1)m,p,q,B}$ challenge $\mathbf{v} = (\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{(\bar{z}+1)m} \times \mathbb{Z}_q^{\tau m}$, we put \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c} in the sk given to \mathcal{A} , and generate pp in the same way as in the \mathcal{S} algorithm. Let x be a query output by \mathcal{A} , and consider the response

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{y}_x &= \text{SEval}(pp, (ct, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c}), x) \\ &= \mathbf{b}_x \cdot \mathbf{U} \\ &= [\mathbf{a} \mid \mathbf{c}] \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{R}_{ct} & \\ & \mathbf{I}_{\tau m} \end{bmatrix}}_{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{R}'_{ct} \cdot \mathbf{U},\end{aligned}$$

where $\mathbf{R}_{ct}, \mathbf{R}'_{ct}$ are $m^{\text{poly}(\lambda,\sigma)}$ -bounded matrices as computed by SEval, and \mathbf{U} is a binary matrix. Now if Equation (3.3) holds for some $i \in [m]$, then $(\mathbf{y}_x)_i \in \frac{q}{p}(\mathbb{Z} + \frac{1}{2}) + [-B, B]$, which means that the i th column of \mathbf{T} is a valid 1D-R-SIS $_{(\bar{z}+\tau+1)m,p,q,B}$ solution to the challenge $\mathbf{v} = (\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c})$, as desired. \square

Lemma 3.8 (Approximate Shift Correctness). For any shift function $H: \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ whose binary decomposition $H': \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$ can be represented by a boolean circuit of size σ , and any $x \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, $pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^\rho)$, $msk \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(pp)$ and $sk_H \leftarrow \text{Shift}(pp, msk, H)$, we have

$$\text{SEval}(pp, sk_H, x) \approx \text{Eval}(pp, msk, x) + H(x)$$

where the approximation hides some $\lambda^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$ -bounded error vector.

Proof. Let $\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{a}_x, \mathbf{b}_x, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{A}_x$ and \mathbf{B}_x be as defined in algorithms SEval, Eval and Shift. First, observe that by definition of $\mathbf{a} \approx \mathbf{s}(\mathbf{A} + (1, ct) \otimes \mathbf{G})$, $\mathbf{a}_x = \mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{R}_{ct}$, and Equation (2.2), we have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{a}_x &\approx \mathbf{s}(\mathbf{A} + (1, ct) \otimes \mathbf{G}) \cdot \mathbf{R}_{ct} \\ &= \mathbf{s}(\mathbf{A}_x + \overline{U}_x(ct) \otimes \mathbf{G}), \end{aligned}$$

where the approximation hides an error vector with entries bounded by $m^{\text{poly}(\lambda, \sigma)} = \lambda^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$. Similarly, by definition of \mathbf{b}_x , the generalized Equation (2.3), and the generalized Equation (2.4) we have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{b}_x &= [\mathbf{a}_x \mid \mathbf{c}] \cdot \mathbf{R}'_{ct} \\ &\approx \mathbf{s}[\mathbf{A}_x + \overline{U}_x(ct) \otimes \mathbf{G} \mid \mathbf{C} + \mathbf{k} \otimes \mathbf{G}] \cdot \mathbf{R}'_{ct} \\ &= \mathbf{s}(\mathbf{B}_x + (\overline{U}_x(ct) \cdot (\mathbf{I}_{k[\lg q]} \otimes \mathbf{k}^t)) \otimes \mathbf{G}) \\ &= \mathbf{s}(\mathbf{B}_x + (H'(x) \otimes \mathbf{g} + \mathbf{e}_x) \otimes \mathbf{G}) \end{aligned}$$

where the approximation hides some $\lambda^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$ -bounded error, and \mathbf{e}_x is also $\lambda^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$ -bounded. Therefore, by Equation (3.1), the mixed-product property, and because $\mathbf{G} \cdot \mathbf{u}_1^t = \mathbf{u}_1^t \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, and the first coordinate of \mathbf{s} is 1, the output of $\text{SEval}(pp, sk_H, x)$ is

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{b}_x \cdot (\mathbf{I}_m \otimes \mathbf{r}^t \otimes \mathbf{u}_1^t) &\approx \mathbf{s}\mathbf{B}_x \cdot (\mathbf{I}_m \otimes \mathbf{r}^t \otimes \mathbf{u}_1^t) + \mathbf{s}((H'(x) \otimes \mathbf{g} + \mathbf{e}_x) \otimes \mathbf{G}) \cdot (\mathbf{I}_m \otimes \mathbf{r}^t \otimes \mathbf{u}_1^t) \\ &= \text{Eval}(pp, msk, x) + \mathbf{s}((H(x) + \mathbf{e}_x(\mathbf{I}_m \otimes \mathbf{r}^t)) \otimes \mathbf{u}_1^t) \\ &= \text{Eval}(pp, msk, x) + H(x) + \mathbf{e}_x(\mathbf{I}_m \otimes \mathbf{r}^t) \\ &\approx \text{Eval}(pp, msk, x) + H(x), \end{aligned}$$

where again the approximations hide $\lambda^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$ -bounded error vectors, as claimed. \square

The following is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3.8.

Corollary 3.9. Fix the same notation as in Lemma 3.8. If for all $i \in [m]$ we have

$$(\text{SEval}(pp, sk, x) - H(x))_i \notin \frac{q}{p}(\mathbb{Z} + \frac{1}{2}) + [-B, +B],$$

then

$$\lfloor \text{SEval}(pp, sk, x) - H(x) \rfloor_p = \lfloor \text{Eval}(pp, msk, x) \rfloor_p.$$

3.4 Parameter Instantiation

We now instantiate the LWE parameters n, q and the 1D-R-SIS parameter k to correspond with subexponential $\exp(n^\varepsilon)$ and $\exp(k^\varepsilon)$ approximation factors for the underlying worst-case lattice problems, for an arbitrary desired constant $\varepsilon > 0$. Let $B = \lambda^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$ be the bound from Corollary 3.9. For 1D-R-SIS we need to choose k sufficiently large primes $p_i = B \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda) = \lambda^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$ to get an approximation factor of

$$B \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda) = \lambda^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$$

for k -dimensional lattices. Therefore, we can choose a sufficiently large $k = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ to make this factor $\exp(k^\varepsilon)$. We then set

$$q = p \prod_{i=1}^k p_i = p \cdot \lambda^{k \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)} = \lambda^{\text{poly}(\lambda)},$$

which corresponds to some $\lambda^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$ approximation factor for n -dimensional lattices. Again, we can choose a sufficiently large $n = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ to make this factor $\exp(n^\varepsilon)$.

4 Constraint-Hiding Constrained PRF

In this section we formally define constraint-hiding constrained PRFs (CHC-PRFs) and give a construction based on our shiftable PRF from Section 3.

4.1 Definition

Here we give the definition of CHC-PRFs, specializing the simulation-based definition of [CC17] to the case of a single constrained-key query.

Definition 4.1. A *constrained function* is a tuple of efficient algorithms (Setup, KeyGen, Eval, Constrain, CEval) having the following interfaces (where the domain \mathcal{X} and range \mathcal{Y} may depend on the security parameter):

- Setup($1^\lambda, 1^\sigma$), given the security parameter λ and an upper bound σ on the size of the constraining circuit, outputs public parameters pp .
- KeyGen(pp), given the public parameters pp , outputs a master secret key msk .
- Eval(pp, msk, x), given the master secret key and an input $x \in \mathcal{X}$, outputs some $y \in \mathcal{Y}$.
- Constrain(pp, msk, C), given the master secret key and a circuit C of size at most σ , outputs a constrained key sk_C .
- CEval(pp, sk_C, x), given a constrained key sk_C and an input $x \in \mathcal{X}$, outputs some $y \in \mathcal{Y}$.

Definition 4.2. A constrained function is a *constraint-hiding constrained PRF* (CHC-PRF) if there is a PPT simulator \mathcal{S} such that, for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} (that without loss of generality never repeats a query) and any $\sigma = \sigma(\lambda) = \text{poly}(\lambda)$,

$$\{\text{Real}_{\mathcal{A}}(1^\lambda, 1^\sigma)\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \stackrel{c}{\approx} \{\text{Ideal}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}(1^\lambda, 1^\sigma)\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}},$$

where Real and Ideal are the respective views of \mathcal{A} in the experiments defined in Figure 2.

The above simulation-based definition simultaneously captures privacy of the constraining function, pseudorandomness on unauthorized inputs, and correctness of constrained evaluation on authorized inputs. The first two properties (privacy and pseudorandomness) follow because in the ideal experiment, the simulator must generate a constrained key without knowing the constraining function, and the adversary gets oracle access to a function that is uniformly random on unauthorized inputs.

For correctness, we claim that the real experiment is computationally indistinguishable from a modified one where each query x is answered as $\text{CEval}(pp, sk_C, x)$ if x is authorized (i.e., $C(x) = 0$), and as $\text{Eval}(pp, msk, x)$ otherwise. In particular, this implies that $\text{Eval}(pp, msk, x) = \text{CEval}(pp, sk_C, x)$ with all but negligible probability for all the adversary's authorized queries x . Indistinguishability of the real and modified experiments follows by a routine hybrid argument, with the ideal experiment as the intermediate one. In particular, the reduction that links the ideal and modified real experiments itself answers authorized queries x using CEval , and handles unauthorized queries by passing them to its oracle.




Figure 2: The real and ideal experiments.

4.2 Construction

We now describe our construction of a CHC-PRF for domain $\mathcal{X} = \{0, 1\}^\ell$ and range $\mathcal{Y} = \mathbb{Z}_p^m$, which handles constraining circuits of size σ . It uses the following components:

- A pseudorandom function $\text{PRF} = (\text{PRF.KG}, \text{PRF.Eval})$ having domain $\{0, 1\}^\ell$ and range \mathbb{Z}_q^m , with key space $\{0, 1\}^\kappa$.
- The shift hiding shiftable function $\text{SHSF} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Eval}, \text{Shift}, \text{SEval}, \text{Sim})$ from Section 3, which has parameters q, B that appear in the analysis below.

For a boolean circuit C of size at most σ and some $k \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ define the function $H_{C,k}: \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ as

$$H_{C,k}(x) = C(x) \cdot \text{PRF.Eval}(k, x) = \begin{cases} \text{PRF.Eval}(k, x) & \text{if } U(C, x) = 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Notice that the size of (the binary decomposition of) $H_{C,k}$ is upper bounded by

$$\sigma' = \sigma + s + \text{poly}(n, \log q), \tag{4.1}$$

where s is the circuit size of (the binary decomposition of) $\text{PRF.Eval}(k, \cdot)$.

Construction 4.3. Our CHC-PRF with domain $\mathcal{X} = \{0, 1\}^\ell$ and range $\mathcal{Y} = \mathbb{Z}_p^m$ is defined as follows:

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^\sigma)$: output $pp \leftarrow \text{SHSF.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\sigma'})$ where σ' is defined as in Equation (4.1).
- $\text{KeyGen}(pp)$: output $msk \leftarrow \text{SHSF.KeyGen}(pp)$.
- $\text{Eval}(pp, msk, x \in \{0, 1\}^\ell)$: compute $\mathbf{y}_x = \text{SHSF.Eval}(pp, msk, x)$ and output $\lfloor \mathbf{y}_x \rfloor_p$.
- $\text{Constrain}(pp, msk, C)$: on input a circuit C of size at most σ , sample a PRF key $k \leftarrow \text{PRF.KG}(1^\lambda)$ and output $sk_C \leftarrow \text{SHSF.Shift}(pp, msk, H_{C,k})$.
- $\text{CEval}(pp, sk_C, x)$: on input a constrained key sk_C and $x \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, output $\lfloor \text{SHSF.SEval}(pp, sk_C, x) \rfloor_p$.

4.3 Security Proof

Theorem 4.4. *Construction 4.3 is a constraint-hiding constrained PRF assuming the hardness of $\text{LWE}_{n-1,q,\chi}$ and $\text{ID-R-SIS}_{(z\sigma'+\tau+1)m,p,q,B}$ (where z, τ are respectively the lengths of fresh GSW ciphertexts and secret keys as used in SHSF), the CPA security of the GSW encryption scheme, and that PRF is a pseudorandom function.*

Proof. Our simulator $\mathcal{S}(1^\lambda, 1^\sigma)$ for Construction 4.3 simply outputs $\text{SHSF.S}(1^\lambda, 1^{\sigma'})$. Now let \mathcal{A} be any polynomial-time adversary. To show that \mathcal{S} satisfies Definition 4.2 we define a sequence of hybrid experiments and show that they are indistinguishable. Before defining the experiments in detail, we first define a particular “bad” event in all but one of them.

Definition 4.5. In each of the following hybrid experiments except H_0 , each query x is answered as $\lfloor \mathbf{y}_x \rfloor_p$ for some \mathbf{y}_x that is computed in a certain way. Define *Borderline* to be the event that at least one such \mathbf{y}_x has some coordinate in $\frac{q}{p}(\mathbb{Z} + \frac{1}{2}) + [-B, B]$.

Hybrid H_0 : This is the ideal experiment $\text{Ideal}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}$.

Hybrid H_1 : This is the same as H_0 , except that on every unauthorized query x (i.e., where $C(x) = 1$), instead of returning a uniformly random value from \mathbb{Z}_p^m , we choose $\mathbf{y}_x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ and output $\lfloor \mathbf{y}_x \rfloor_p$.

Hybrid H_2 : This is the same as H_1 , except that we abort the experiment if *Borderline* happens.

Hybrid H_3 : This is the same as H_2 , except that we initially choose a PRF key $k \leftarrow \text{PRF.KG}(1^\lambda)$ and change how unauthorized queries x (i.e., where $C(x) = 1$) are handled, answering all queries according to a slightly modified CEval . Specifically, for any query x we answer $\lfloor \mathbf{y}_x \rfloor_p$ where

$$\mathbf{y}_x = \text{SHSF.SEval}(pp, sk, x) - C(x) \cdot \text{PRF.Eval}(k, x).$$

Hybrid H_4 : This is the same as H_3 , except that (pp, sk) are generated as in the real experiment. More formally we instantiate $pp \leftarrow \text{SHSF.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\sigma'})$, $msk \leftarrow \text{SHSF.KeyGen}(pp)$ and compute $sk \leftarrow \text{SHSF.Shift}(pp, msk, H_{C,k})$.

Hybrid H_5 : This is the same as H_4 , except that we answer all evaluation queries as in the Eval algorithm, i.e., we output $\lfloor \mathbf{y}_x \rfloor_p$ where

$$\mathbf{y}_x = \text{SHSF.Eval}(pp, msk, x).$$

Hybrid H_6 : This is the same as H_5 , except that we no longer abort when Borderline happens. Observe that this is exactly the real experiment $\text{Real}_{\mathcal{A}}$.

We now prove that adjacent pairs of hybrid experiments are indistinguishable.

Claim 4.6. *Experiments H_0 and H_1 are identical.*

Proof. This follows directly from the fact that p divides q . □

Claim 4.7. *Assuming that $\text{ID-R-SIS}_{(z\sigma'+\tau+1)m,p,q,B}$ is hard, we have $H_1 \stackrel{c}{\approx} H_2$. In particular, in H_1 the event Borderline happens with negligible probability.*

Proof. Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary attempting to distinguish H_1 and H_2 . We want to show that in H_1 event Borderline happens with negligible probability. Let x be a query made by \mathcal{A} . If $C(x) = 1$ then \mathbf{y}_x is uniformly random in \mathbb{Z}_q^m , so for any $i \in [m]$ we have

$$\Pr[(\mathbf{y}_x)_i \in \frac{q}{p}(\mathbb{Z} + \frac{1}{2}) + [-B, B]] \leq 2 \cdot B \cdot p/q = \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

If $C(x) = 0$, the claim follows immediately by the border-avoiding property of SHSF (Lemma 3.7). □

Claim 4.8. *If PRF is a pseudorandom function then $H_2 \stackrel{c}{\approx} H_3$.*

Proof. We use any adversary \mathcal{A} that attempts to distinguish H_2 from H_3 to build an adversary \mathcal{A}' having the same advantage against the pseudorandomness of PRF. Here \mathcal{A}' is given access to an oracle \mathcal{O} which is either $\text{PRF.Eval}(k, \cdot)$ for $k \leftarrow \text{PRF.KG}(1^\lambda)$, or a uniformly random function $f: \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$. We define \mathcal{A}' to proceed as in H_2 to simulate the view of \mathcal{A} , except that on each query x it sets

$$\mathbf{y}_x = \text{SHSF.SEval}(pp, sk, x) - C(x) \cdot \mathcal{O}(x)$$

and answers $\lfloor \mathbf{y}_x \rfloor_p$. Finally, \mathcal{A}' outputs whatever \mathcal{A} outputs. Clearly, if \mathcal{O} is $\text{PRF.Eval}(k, \cdot)$ then the view of \mathcal{A} is identical to H_3 , whereas if the oracle is $f(\cdot)$ then the view of \mathcal{A} is identical to its view in H_2 . This proves the claim. □

Claim 4.9. *Assuming the hardness of $\text{LWE}_{n-1,q,\chi}$ and CPA-security of GSW, $H_3 \stackrel{c}{\approx} H_4$.*

Proof. This follows immediately from the shift hiding property of SHSF, i.e., Lemma 3.2. □

Claim 4.10. *H_4 and H_5 are identical.*

Proof. This follows by Corollary 3.9 and noticing that both experiments abort if Borderline happens. □

Claim 4.11. *Under the hypotheses of Theorem 4.4, we have $H_5 \stackrel{c}{\approx} H_6$.*

Proof. This follows by combining all the previous claims and recalling that we have proved that Borderline happens with negligible probability in H_1 . □

This completes the proof of Theorem 4.4. □

5 Privately Programmable PRF

In this section we formally define privately programmable PRFs (PP-PRFs) and give a construction based on our shiftable PRF from Section 3.

5.1 Definitions

We start by giving a variety of definitions related to “programmable functions” and privately programmable PRFs. In particular, we give a simulation-based definition that is adapted from [BLW17].

Definition 5.1. A *programmable function* is a tuple $(\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Eval}, \text{Program}, \text{PEval})$ of efficient algorithms having the following interfaces (where the domain \mathcal{X} and range \mathcal{Y} may depend on the security parameter):

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$, given the security parameter λ and a number k of programmable inputs, outputs public parameters pp .
- $\text{KeyGen}(pp)$, given the public parameters pp , outputs a master secret key msk .
- $\text{Eval}(pp, msk, x)$, given the master secret key and an input $x \in \mathcal{X}$, outputs some $y \in \mathcal{Y}$.
- $\text{Program}(pp, msk, \mathcal{P} = \{(x_i, y_i)\})$, given the master secret key msk and k pairs $(x_i, y_i) \in \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$ for distinct x_i , outputs a programmed key $sk_{\mathcal{P}}$.
- $\text{PEval}(pp, sk_{\mathcal{P}}, x)$, given a programmed key $sk_{\mathcal{P}}$ and an input $x \in \mathcal{X}$, outputs some $y \in \mathcal{Y}$.

We now give several definitions that capture various functionality and security properties for programmable functions. We start with the following correctness property for *programmed* inputs.

Definition 5.2. A programmable function is *statistically programmable* if for all $\lambda, k = \text{poly}(\lambda) \in \mathbb{N}$, all sets of k pairs $\mathcal{P} = \{(x_i, y_i)\} \subseteq \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$ (with distinct x_i), and all $i \in [k]$ we have

$$\Pr_{\substack{pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^k) \\ msk \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(pp) \\ sk_{\mathcal{P}} \leftarrow \text{Program}(pp, msk, \mathcal{P})}} [\text{PEval}(pp, sk_{\mathcal{P}}, x_i) \neq y_i] = \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

We now define a notion of *weak simulation security*, in which the adversary names the inputs at which the function is programmed, but the outputs are chosen at random (and not revealed to the adversary). As before, we always assume without loss of generality that the adversary never queries the same input x more than once in the various experiments we define.

Definition 5.3. A programmable function is *weakly simulation secure* if there is a PPT simulator \mathcal{S} such that for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} and any polynomial $k = k(\lambda)$,

$$\{\text{RealWeakPPRF}_{\mathcal{A}}(1^\lambda, 1^k)\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \stackrel{c}{\approx} \{\text{IdealWeakPPRF}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}(1^\lambda, 1^k)\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}},$$

where RealWeakPPRF and IdealWeakPPRF are the respective views of \mathcal{A} in the procedures defined in Figure 3.

Similarly to Definition 4.2, the above definition simultaneously captures privacy of the programmed inputs given the programmed key, pseudorandomness on those inputs, and correctness of PEval on *non-programmed* inputs.

procedure RealWeakPPRF $_{\mathcal{A}}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$
 $\{x_i\}_{i \in [k]} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$
 $\{y_i\}_{i \in [k]} \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}$
 $pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$
 $msk \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(pp)$
 $sk \leftarrow \text{Program}(pp, msk, \{(x_i, y_i)\})$
 $(pp, sk) \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$
repeat
 $x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}$
 $\text{Eval}(pp, msk, x) \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$
until \mathcal{A} halts
(a) The real experiment

procedure IdealWeakPPRF $_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$
 $\{x_i\}_{i \in [k]} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$
 $(pp, sk) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$
 $(pp, sk) \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$
repeat
 $x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}$
if $x \notin \{x_i\}$ **then**
 $\text{PEval}(pp, sk, x) \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$
else
 $y \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}; y \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$
until \mathcal{A} halts
(b) The ideal experiment

Figure 3: The (weak) real and ideal experiments.

Definition 5.4. A programmable function is a *weak privately programmable PRF* if it is statistically programmable (Definition 5.2) and weakly simulation secure (Definition 5.3).

We now define a notion of (non-weak) simulation security for programmable functions. This differs from the weak notion in that the adversary specifies the programmed inputs *and* corresponding outputs, and the simulator in the ideal game is also given these input-output pairs. The simulator needs this information because otherwise the adversary could trivially distinguish the real and ideal experiments by checking whether $\text{PEval}(pp, sk_{\mathcal{P}}, x_i) = y_i$ for one of the programmed input-output pairs (x_i, y_i) . Simulation security itself therefore does not guarantee any privacy of the programmed inputs; below we give a separate simulation-based definition which does.

procedure RealPPRF $_{\mathcal{A}}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$
 $\mathcal{P} = \{(x_i, y_i)\} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$
 $pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$
 $msk \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(pp)$
 $sk_{\mathcal{P}} \leftarrow \text{Program}(pp, msk, \mathcal{P})$
 $(pp, sk_{\mathcal{P}}) \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$
repeat
 $x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}$
 $\text{Eval}(pp, msk, x) \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$
until \mathcal{A} halts
(a) The real experiment

procedure IdealPPRF $_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$
 $\mathcal{P} = \{(x_i, y_i)\} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$
 $(pp, sk_{\mathcal{P}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{P})$
 $(pp, sk_{\mathcal{P}}) \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$
repeat
 $x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}$
if $x \notin \{x_i\}$ **then**
 $\text{PEval}(pp, sk_{\mathcal{P}}, x) \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$
else
 $y \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}; y \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$
until \mathcal{A} halt
(b) The ideal experiment

Figure 4: The real and ideal experiments

Definition 5.5. A programmable function is *simulation secure* if there is a PPT simulator \mathcal{S} such that for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} and any polynomial $k = k(\lambda)$,

$$\{\text{RealPPRF}_{\mathcal{A}}(1^\lambda, 1^k)\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \stackrel{c}{\approx} \{\text{IdealPPRF}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}(1^\lambda, 1^k)\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}},$$

where Real and Ideal are the respective views of \mathcal{A} in the procedures defined in Figure 4.

We mention that a straightforward hybrid argument similar to one from [BKM17] shows that simulation security implies that (KeyGen, Eval) is a pseudorandom function.

Finally, we define a notion of privacy for the programmed inputs. This says that a key programmed on adversarially chosen inputs and *random* corresponding outputs (that are not revealed to the adversary) does not reveal anything about the programmed inputs.




Figure 5: The real and ideal privacy experiments

Definition 5.6. A programmable function is *privately programmable* if there is a PPT simulator \mathcal{S} such that for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} and any polynomial $k = k(\lambda)$,

$$\{\text{RealPPRFPrivacy}_{\mathcal{A}}(1^\lambda, 1^k)\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \stackrel{c}{\approx} \{\text{IdealPPRFPrivacy}_{\mathcal{A}}(1^\lambda, 1^k)\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}},$$

where RealPPRFPrivacy and IdealPPRFPrivacy are the respective views of \mathcal{A} in the procedures defined in Figure 5.

We now give our main security definition for PP-PRFs.

Definition 5.7. A programmable function is a *privately programmable PRF* if it is statistically programmable, simulation secure, and privately programmable.

5.2 From Weak PP-PRFs to PP-PRFs

In this section we describe a general construction of a privately programmable PRF from any weak privately programmable PRF. Let $\Pi' = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Eval}, \text{Program}, \text{PEval})$ be a programmable function with domain \mathcal{X} and range \mathcal{Y} , where we assume that \mathcal{Y} is a finite additive group. The basic idea behind the construction is simple: define the function as the sum of two parallel copies of Π' , and program it by programming the copies according to additive secret-sharings of the desired outputs. Each component is therefore programmed to uniformly random outputs, as required by weak simulation security.

Construction 5.8. We construct a programmable function Π as follows:

- $\Pi.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$: generate $pp_i \leftarrow \Pi'.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$ for $i = 1, 2$ and output $pp = (pp_1, pp_2)$.
- $\Pi.\text{KeyGen}(pp)$: on input $pp = (pp_1, pp_2)$ generate $msk_i \leftarrow \Pi'.\text{KeyGen}(pp_i)$ for $i = 1, 2$, and output $msk = (msk_1, msk_2)$.

- $\Pi.\text{Eval}(pp, msk, x)$: on input $pp = (pp_1, pp_2)$, $msk = (msk_1, msk_2)$, and $x \in \mathcal{X}$ output

$$\Pi'.\text{Eval}(pp_1, msk_1, x) + \Pi'.\text{Eval}(pp_2, msk_2, x).$$

- $\Pi.\text{Program}(pp, msk, \mathcal{P})$: on input $pp = (pp_1, pp_2)$, $msk = (msk_1, msk_2)$, k pairs $(x_i, y_i) \subset \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$, first sample uniformly random $r_i \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}$ for $i \in [k]$, then output $sk_{\mathcal{P}} = (sk_1, sk_2)$ where

$$sk_1 \leftarrow \Pi'.\text{Program}(pp_1, msk_1, \mathcal{P}_1 = \{(x_i, r_i)\})$$

$$sk_2 \leftarrow \Pi'.\text{Program}(pp_2, msk_2, \mathcal{P}_2 = \{(x_i, y_i - r_i)\}).$$

- $\Pi.\text{PEval}(pp, sk_{\mathcal{P}}, x)$: on input $pp = (pp_1, pp_2)$, $sk_{\mathcal{P}} = (sk_1, sk_2)$, and $x \in \mathcal{X}$ output

$$\Pi'.\text{PEval}(pp_1, sk_1, x) + \Pi'.\text{PEval}(pp_2, sk_2, x).$$

Theorem 5.9. *If Π' is a weak privately programmable PRF then Construction 5.8 is a privately programmable PRF.*

Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 5.10 and Theorem 5.15, which respectively prove the simulation security and private programmability of Construction 5.8, and from the statistical programmability of Π' , which obviously implies the statistical programmability of Construction 5.8. \square

Theorem 5.10. *If Π' is a weak privately programmable PRF then Π is simulation secure.*

Proof. Let \mathcal{S}' be the simulator algorithm for the weak simulation security of Π' (Definition 5.3). Our simulator $\mathcal{S}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{P} = \{(x_i, y_i)\})$ for the simulation security of Π (Definition 5.5) works as follows:

1. Compute $(pp_2, sk_2) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}'(1^\lambda, 1^k)$ where $k = |\mathcal{P}|$.
2. Compute $pp_1 \leftarrow \Pi'.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$, $msk_1 \leftarrow \Pi'.\text{KeyGen}(pp_1)$, and

$$sk_1 \leftarrow \Pi'.\text{Program}(pp_1, msk_1, \{(x_i, y_i - \Pi'.\text{PEval}(pp_2, sk_2, x_i))\}).$$

3. Output $(pp = (pp_1, pp_2), sk = (sk_1, sk_2))$.

We now define the following hybrids and show that they are indistinguishable.

Hybrid H_0 : This is the real experiment $\text{RealPPRF}_{\mathcal{A}}$ from Figure 4, up to negligible statistical distance. Specifically: the adversary \mathcal{A} first outputs $\{(x_i, y_i)\}$. We then generate $pp_i \leftarrow \Pi'.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$ and $msk_i \leftarrow \Pi'.\text{KeyGen}(pp_i)$ for $i = 1, 2$. We choose uniformly random $r_i \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}$ for $i \in [k]$, and let

$$sk_1 \leftarrow \Pi'.\text{Program}(pp_1, msk_1, \{(x_i, r_i)\})$$

$$sk_2 \leftarrow \Pi'.\text{Program}(pp_2, msk_2, \{(x_i, y_i - \Pi'.\text{PEval}(pp_1, sk_1, x_i))\}).$$

(Note that in $y_i - r_i$ we have replaced r_i with a call to $\Pi'.\text{PEval}$; these are equivalent up to negligible statistical distance by statistical programmability.) We give $(pp = (pp_1, pp_2), sk = (sk_1, sk_2))$ to \mathcal{A} . Then \mathcal{A} is given query access to $\Pi'.\text{Eval}(pp_1, msk_1, \cdot) + \Pi'.\text{Eval}(pp_2, msk_2, \cdot)$.

Hybrid H_1 : This is the same as the previous experiment, except we change how pp_1 and sk_1 are generated, and how queries are answered. We generate $(pp_1, sk_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}'(1^\lambda, 1^k)$, and no longer generate msk_1 . To answer each query x , if $x \notin \{x_i\}$ then we output $\Pi'.PEval(pp_1, sk_1, x) + \Pi'.Eval(pp_2, msk_2, x)$; otherwise, we output a uniformly random value from \mathcal{Y} .

Hybrid H_2 : This is the same as the (real) experiment H_0 , except that for queries $x \notin \{x_i\}$, just as in H_1 we output $\Pi'.PEval(pp_1, sk_1, x) + \Pi'.Eval(pp_2, msk_2, x)$.

Hybrid H_3 : This is the same as the previous experiment, except we replace $y_i - \Pi'.PEval(pp_1, sk_1, x_i)$ with $y_i - r_i$, then we swap the roles of r_i and $y_i - r_i$ (using r_i when computing sk_2 and $y_i - r_i$ when computing sk_1), then replace $y_i - r_i$ with $y_i - \Pi'.PEval(pp_2, sk_2, x_i)$.

Hybrid H_4 : This is the same as the previous experiment, except we change how pp_2 and sk_2 are generated and how queries are answered. We generate $(pp_2, sk_2) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}'(1^\lambda, 1^k)$, and no longer generate msk_2 . To answer a query x , if $x \notin \{x_i\}$ then we respond with $\Pi'.PEval(pp_1, sk_1, x) + \Pi'.PEval(pp_2, sk_2, x)$; otherwise, we respond with a uniformly random value from \mathcal{Y} .

Observe that this hybrid is identical to the ideal experiment $\text{IdealPPRF}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}'}$ from Figure 4.

We now show that adjacent hybrid experiments are indistinguishable.

Claim 5.11. *We have $H_0 \stackrel{c}{\approx} H_1$.*

Proof. Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary attempting to distinguish H_0 from H_1 . We build an adversary \mathcal{A}' against the weak simulation security of Π' that runs \mathcal{A} internally and works as follows:

- When \mathcal{A} outputs $\{(x_i, y_i)\}$, \mathcal{A}' outputs $\{x_i\}$ and receives some (pp_1, sk_1) .
- \mathcal{A}' computes $pp_2 \leftarrow \Pi'.Setup(1^\lambda, 1^k)$, $msk_2 \leftarrow \Pi'.KeyGen(pp_2)$, and

$$sk_2 \leftarrow \Pi'.Program(pp_2, msk_2, \{(x_i, y_i - \Pi'.PEval(pp_1, sk_1, x_i))\}),$$

and gives $(pp = (pp_1, pp_2), sk = (sk_1, sk_2))$ to \mathcal{A} .

- When \mathcal{A} queries some x , \mathcal{A}' queries x and receives a response y' , and returns $y' + \Pi'.Eval(pp_2, msk_2, x)$ as the answer to \mathcal{A} .

Because the r_i are uniformly random in H_0 , it is straightforward to verify that if \mathcal{A}' is in the RealWeakPPRF (respectively, IdealWeakPRF) experiment, then the view of \mathcal{A} is identical to its view in H_0 (resp., H_1). So by weak simulation security of Π' , we have $H_0 \stackrel{c}{\approx} H_1$. \square

Claim 5.12. *We have $H_1 \stackrel{c}{\approx} H_2$.*

Proof. Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary attempting to distinguish H_1 from H_2 . We build an adversary \mathcal{A}' against the weak simulation security of Π' that works exactly like the \mathcal{A}' from the proof of Claim 5.11, except for how it handles queries x : if $x \notin \{x_i\}$, then \mathcal{A}' responds with $\Pi'.PEval(pp_1, sk_1, x) + \Pi'.Eval(pp_2, msk_2, x)$; otherwise, \mathcal{A}' queries x and receives a response y' , then responds with $y' + \Pi'.Eval(pp_2, msk_2, x)$.

It is straightforward to verify that if \mathcal{A}' is in experiment IdealWeakPPRF (respectively, IdealRealPPRF), then the view of \mathcal{A} is identical to its view in H_1 (resp., H_2). So by weak simulation security of Π' , we have $H_1 \stackrel{c}{\approx} H_2$. \square

Claim 5.13. We have $H_2 \stackrel{s}{\approx} H_3$.

Proof. This follows by statistical programmability, the fact that $r_i, y_i - r_i$ is a random secret sharing of y_i , so we can swap their roles, and statistical programmability again. \square

Claim 5.14. We have $H_3 \stackrel{c}{\approx} H_4$.

Proof. This is entirely symmetrical to the proof of Claim 5.11, so we omit a detailed proof. \square

This completes the proof of Theorem 5.10. \square

Theorem 5.15. If Π' is weakly simulation secure then Π is privately programmable.

Proof. Let \mathcal{S}' be the simulator algorithm for the weak simulation security of Π' . Our simulator $\mathcal{S}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$ for the private programmability of Π simply generates $(pp_i, sk_i) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}'(1^\lambda, 1^k)$ for $i = 1, 2$ and outputs $(pp = (pp_1, pp_2), sk = (sk_1, sk_2))$. To show that \mathcal{S} satisfies Definition 5.7 we define the following hybrids and show that they are indistinguishable.

Hybrid H_0 : This is the experiment $\text{RealPPRFPrivacy}_{\mathcal{A}}$ from Figure 5.

Hybrid H_1 : This experiment is the same as the previous one, except that we generate $(pp_1, sk_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}'(1^\lambda, 1^k)$.

Hybrid H_2 : This experiment is the same as the previous one, except that we generate $(pp_2, sk_2) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}'(1^\lambda, 1^k)$. Observe that this experiment is identical to the experiment $\text{IdealPPRFPrivacy}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}$ from Figure 5.

Claim 5.16. We have $H_0 \stackrel{c}{\approx} H_1$.

Proof. Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary attempting to distinguish H_0 and H_1 . We build an adversary \mathcal{A}' against the weak simulation security of Π' , which runs \mathcal{A} internally. When \mathcal{A} outputs $\{x_i\}$, \mathcal{A}' also outputs $\{x_i\}$, receiving (pp_1, sk_1) in response. Then \mathcal{A}' generates $pp_2 \leftarrow \Pi'.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$ and $msk_2 \leftarrow \Pi'.\text{KeyGen}(pp_2)$, and chooses uniformly random $r_i \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}$ for $i \in [k]$. It then generates $sk_2 \leftarrow \Pi'.\text{Program}(pp_2, msk_2, \{(x_i, r_i)\})$. Finally it gives $(pp = (pp_1, pp_2), sk = (sk_1, sk_2))$ to \mathcal{A} . It is straightforward to see that if \mathcal{A}' is in RealWeakPPRF (respectively, IdealWeakPPRF) then the view of \mathcal{A} is identical to its view H_0 (resp., H_1). So by weak simulation security of Π' , we have $H_0 \stackrel{c}{\approx} H_1$. \square

Claim 5.17. We have $H_1 \stackrel{c}{\approx} H_2$.

Proof. This is entirely symmetrical to the proof of Claim 5.16, so we omit it. \square

This completes the proof of Theorem 5.15. \square

5.3 Construction of Weak Privately Programmable PRFs

In this section we construct a weak privately programmable PRF from our shiftable function of Section 3. We first define the auxiliary function that the construction will use. For $\{(x_i, \mathbf{y}_i)\}_{i \in [k]} \subset \{0, 1\}^\ell \times \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ where the x_i are distinct, define the function $H_{\{(x_i, \mathbf{w}_i)\}_{i \in [k]}} : \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ as

$$H_{\{(x_i, \mathbf{w}_i)\}_{i \in [k]}}(x) \begin{cases} \mathbf{w}_i & \text{if } x = x_i \text{ for some } i, \\ \mathbf{0} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Notice that the circuit size of $H_{\{(x_i, \mathbf{w}_i)\}_{i \in [k]}}$ is upper bounded by some $\sigma' = \text{poly}(n, k, \log q)$.

Construction 5.18. Our weak privately programmable PRF with input space $\mathcal{X} = \{0, 1\}^\ell$ and output space $\mathcal{Y} = \mathbb{Z}_p^m$ uses the SHSF from Section 3 with parameters q, B chosen as in Section 3.4, and is defined as follows:

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$: Output $pp \leftarrow \text{SHSF.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{\sigma'})$.
- $\text{KeyGen}(pp)$: Output $msk \leftarrow \text{SHSF.KeyGen}(pp)$.
- $\text{Eval}(pp, msk, x \in \{0, 1\}^\ell)$: Compute $\mathbf{y}_x = \text{SHSF.Eval}(pp, msk, x)$ and output $\lfloor \mathbf{y}_x \rfloor_p$.
- $\text{Program}(pp, msk, \mathcal{P})$: Given k pairs $(x_i, \mathbf{y}_i) \in \{0, 1\}^\ell \times \mathbb{Z}_p^m$ where the x_i are distinct, for each $i \in [k]$ compute \mathbf{w}_i as follows: choose $\mathbf{y}'_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ uniformly at random conditioned on $\lfloor \mathbf{y}'_i \rfloor_p = \mathbf{y}_i$, and set

$$\mathbf{w}_i = \mathbf{y}'_i - \text{SHSF.Eval}(pp, msk, x_i).$$

Output $sk_{\mathcal{P}} \leftarrow \text{SHSF.Shift}(pp, msk, H_{\{(x_i, \mathbf{w}_i)\}})$.

- $\text{PEval}(pp, sk_{\mathcal{P}}, x)$: output $\lfloor \text{SHSF.SEval}(pp, sk_{\mathcal{P}}, x) \rfloor_p$.

5.4 Security Proof

Theorem 5.19. *Construction 5.18 is a weak privately programmable PRF (Definition 5.4) assuming the hardness of $\text{LWE}_{n-1, q, \chi}$ and $\text{1D-R-SIS}_{(z\sigma' + \tau + 1)m, p, q, B}$ (where z, τ are respectively the lengths of fresh GSW ciphertexts and secret keys as used in SHSF) and the CPA security of the GSW encryption scheme.*

Proof. The proof follows immediately by Theorem 5.20 and Theorem 5.28 below. \square

Theorem 5.20. *Assuming the hardness of $\text{LWE}_{n-1, q, \chi}$ and $\text{1D-R-SIS}_{(z\sigma' + \tau + 1)m, p, q, B}$ and the CPA security of the GSW encryption scheme, Construction 5.18 is weakly simulation secure.*

Proof. Our simulator $\mathcal{S}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$ for Construction 5.18 simply outputs $(pp, sk) \leftarrow \text{SHSF.S}(1^\lambda, 1^{\sigma'})$. Let \mathcal{A} be any polynomial-time adversary. To show that \mathcal{S} satisfies Definition 5.5 we define a sequence of hybrid experiments and show that they are indistinguishable.

Hybrid H_0 : This is the simulated experiment $\text{IdealWeakPPRF}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}$ (Figure 3).

Hybrid H_1 : This is the same as the previous experiment, except that on query $x \in \{x_i\}$, instead of returning a uniformly random value from \mathbb{Z}_p^m , we choose $\mathbf{y}_x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ and output $\lfloor \mathbf{y}_x \rfloor_p$.

Hybrid H_2 : This is the same as the previous experiment, except that we abort if the event *Borderline* happens, where *Borderline* is as in Definition 4.5.

Hybrid H_3 : This is the same as the previous experiment, except that we initially choose uniformly random $\mathbf{w}'_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ for $i \in [k]$ and change how queries for $x \in \{x_i\}$ are answered (the “else” clause in $\text{IdealWeakPPRF}_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{S}}$): for $x = x_j$, we answer as $\lfloor \mathbf{y}_x \rfloor_p$, where

$$\mathbf{y}_x = \text{SHSF.SEval}(pp, sk, x) - \mathbf{w}'_j.$$

Hybrid H_4 : This is the same as the previous experiment, except that we generate pp and sk as follows: we generate $pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^k)$, $msk \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(pp)$ and $sk \leftarrow \text{SHSF.Shift}(pp, msk, H_{\{(x_i, \mathbf{w}'_i)\}})$.

Hybrid H_5 : This is the same as the previous experiment, except that we answer all queries as in the *Eval* algorithm, i.e., we output

$$\lfloor \text{SHSF.Eval}(pp, msk, x) \rfloor_p.$$

Hybrid H_6 : This is the same as the previous experiment, except that here we generate sk as in the real game. Specifically, for each $i \in [k]$ we choose a uniformly random vector $\mathbf{y}_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^m$ and uniformly random $\mathbf{y}'_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ conditioned on $\lfloor \mathbf{y}'_i \rfloor_p = \mathbf{y}_i$, and then set

$$\mathbf{w}_i = \mathbf{y}'_i - \text{SHSF.Eval}(pp, msk, x).$$

We then set $sk \leftarrow \text{SHSF.Shift}(pp, msk, H_{\{(x_i, \mathbf{w}_i)\}})$.

Hybrid H_7 : This is the same as the previous experiment, except that we no longer abort when *Borderline* happens. Observe that this is the real experiment $\text{IdealRealPPRF}_{\mathcal{A}}$ (Figure 3).

Claim 5.21. *Experiments H_0 and H_1 are identical.*

Proof. This follows directly from the fact that p divides q . □

Claim 5.22. *Under $\text{ID-R-SIS}_{(z\sigma'+\tau+1)m,p,q,B}$ assumption, $H_1 \stackrel{c}{\approx} H_2$. In particular, in H_1 the event *Borderline* happens with negligible probability.*

Proof. The proof is identical to the one for Claim 4.7. □

Claim 5.23. *Experiments H_2 and H_3 are identical.*

Proof. This simply follows by observing that for $x \in \{x_i\}$, \mathbf{y}_x is distributed uniformly at random in both hybrids H_2 and H_3 . □

Claim 5.24. *Assuming the hardness of $\text{LWE}_{n-1,q,\chi}$ and CPA-security of GSW, $H_3 \stackrel{c}{\approx} H_4$.*

Proof. This follows immediately from the shift-hiding property of SHSF (Lemma 3.2). □

Claim 5.25. *H_4 and H_5 are identical.*

Proof. This follows by Corollary 3.9 (rounded shift correctness) and the fact that if *Borderline* happens we abort. □

Claim 5.26. *Experiments H_5 and H_6 are identical.*

Proof. Because p divides q , for each $i \in [k]$ each \mathbf{y}'_i in H_6 is uniformly distributed, which implies that each \mathbf{w}_i is also uniformly distributed, as in H_5 . \square

Claim 5.27. *Assuming the hypotheses of Theorem 5.20, $H_6 \stackrel{c}{\approx} H_7$.*

Proof. This follows by combining all the previous claims and recalling that Borderline happens with negligible probability in H_1 . \square

This completes the proof of Theorem 5.20. \square

Theorem 5.28. *Construction 5.18 is statistically programmable.*

Proof. Fix any $\mathcal{P} = \{(x_i, \mathbf{y}_i)\}_{i \in [k]} \subset \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$. We need to show that for any $i \in [k]$,

$$\Pr_{\substack{pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^k) \\ msk \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(pp) \\ sk_{\mathcal{P}} \leftarrow \text{Program}(pp, msk, \mathcal{P})}} \left[\left[\text{SHSF.SEval}(pp, sk_{\mathcal{P}}, x_i) \right]_p \neq \mathbf{y}_i \right] = \text{negl}(\lambda). \quad (5.1)$$

By Lemma 3.8 we have

$$\begin{aligned} \text{SHSF.SEval}(pp, sk_{\mathcal{P}}, x_i) &\approx \text{SHSF.Eval}(pp, msk, x_i) + H_{\{(x_i, \mathbf{w}_i)\}}(x_i) \\ &= \text{SHSF.Eval}(pp, msk, x_i) + \mathbf{w}_i \\ &= \mathbf{y}'_i, \end{aligned}$$

where the approximation hides some B -bounded error and the last equality holds because $\mathbf{w}_i = \mathbf{y}'_i - \text{SHSF.Eval}(pp, msk, x_i)$. Because \mathbf{y}'_i is chosen uniformly at random such that $[\mathbf{y}'_i]_p = \mathbf{y}_i$, the probability that some coordinate of $\text{SHSF.SEval}(pp, sk_{\mathcal{P}}, x_i)$ is in $\frac{q}{p}(\mathbb{Z} + \frac{1}{2}) + [-B, B]$ is at most $2mBp/q = \text{negl}(\lambda)$, which establishes Equation (5.1). \square

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