Lecture 5
Cryptanalysis of Knapsack Crypto

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1 The Subset-Sum Problem

We begin by recalling the definition of the *subset-sum* problem, also called the "knapsack" problem, in its search form.

Definition 1.1 (Subset-Sum). Given positive integer weights $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ and $s = \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i x_i = \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{x} \rangle \in \mathbb{Z}$ for some bits $x_i \in \{0, 1\}$, find $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$.

The subset-sum problem (in its natural decision variant) is NP-complete. However, recall that NP-completeness is a *worst-case* notion, i.e., there does not appear to be an efficient algorithm that solves *every* instance of subset-sum. Whether or not "most instances" can be solved efficiently, and what "most instances" even means, is a separate question. As we will see below, certain "structured" instances of subset-sum are easily solved. Moreover, we will see that if the bit length of the a_i is large enough relative to n, subset-sum is easy to solve for almost every choice of $\mathbf{a}$, using LLL.

2 Knapsack Cryptography

Motivated by the simplicity and NP-completeness of subset-sum, in the late 1970's there were proposals to use it as the basis of public-key encryption schemes. In these systems, the public key consists of weights $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, \ldots a_n)$ chosen from some specified distribution, and to encrypt a message $\mathbf{x} \in \{0, 1\}^n$ one computes the ciphertext

$$s = \mathsf{Enc}_{\mathbf{a}}(\mathbf{x}) = \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{x} \rangle.$$

A major advantage of this kind of encryption algorithm is its efficiency: encrypting involves just summing up n integers, which is much faster than operations like modular exponentiation, as used in other cryptosystems. As for security, recovering the message $\mathbf{x}$ from the ciphertext is equivalent to solving the subset-sum instance $(\mathbf{a}, s)$, which we would like to be hard.[1] Of course, the receiver who generated the public key needs to have a way of decrypting the message. This is achieved by embedding a secret "trapdoor" into the weights, which allows the receiver to convert the subset-sum instance into an easily solvable one.

One class of easily solved subset-sum instances involves weights of the following type.

Definition 2.1. A *superincreasing sequence* $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, \ldots, a_n)$ is one where $a_i > \sum_{j=1}^{i-1} a_j$ for all i.

Given any superincreasing sequence $\mathbf{a}$ and $s = \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{x} \rangle$, it is easy to find $\mathbf{x}$: observe that $x_n = 1$ if and only if $s > \sum_{j=1}^{n-1} a_i$. Having found x_n, we can then recursively solve the instance $(\mathbf{a}' = (a_1, \ldots, a_{n-1}), s' = s - a_n x_n)$, which still involves superincreasing weights.

Of course, we cannot use a superincreasing sequence as the public key, or it would be trivial for an eavesdropper to decrypt. The final idea is to embed a superincreasing sequence into a "random-looking" public key, along with a trapdoor that lets us convert the latter back to the former. The original method of doing so, proposed by Merkle and Hellman, works as follows:

1. Start with some superincreasing sequence $\mathbf{b} = (b_1, \ldots, b_n)$.
2. Choose some modulus $m > \sum_{i=1}^{n} b_i$, uniformly random $w \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_m^*$, and uniformly random permutation π on $\{1, \ldots, n\}$.

[1] We ignore the fact that accepted notions of security for encryption require much more than hardness of recovering the entire message. However, if the message *is* easy to recover by an eavesdropper, then the scheme is clearly insecure.

3. Let $a_i = w \cdot b_{\pi(i)} \bmod m$. The public key is $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, \ldots, a_n)$, and the trapdoor is (m, w, π).

The encryption of a message $\mathbf{x} \in \{0,1\}^n$ is then

$$s = \mathsf{Enc}_{\mathbf{a}}(\mathbf{x}) = \langle veca, \mathbf{x} \rangle = w \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{n} b_{\pi(i)} x_i.$$

Given the trapdoor (m, w, π), we can decrypt s as follows: simply compute

$$s' = w^{-1} s = \sum_{i=1}^{n} b_{\pi(i)} x_i \bmod m,$$

and then solve the subset-sum problem for the (permuted) superincreasing $\mathbf{b}$ and s', where we identify s' with its canonical integer representative in $\{0, \ldots, m-1\}$. This works because $\sum_{i=1}^{n} b_{\pi(i)} x_i < m$, so s' is the true subset-sum (not modulo anything).

It turns out that some care is needed in choosing the superincreasing sequence $b_1, \ldots, b_n$. For example, the natural choice of $b_i = 2^{i-1}$ ends up admitting some simple attacks. We won't discuss this issue in any detail, because it turns out that the Merkle-Hellman scheme (and almost all of its subsequent variants) can be broken using tools like LLL, regardless of what superincreasing sequence is used.

3 Lattice Attacks on Knapsack Cryptography

In 1982, Shamir showed how to break the basic Merkle-Hellman class of schemes. His attack used Lenstra's polynomial-time algorithm for fixed-dimension integer programming, which uses LLL as a subroutine. (Shamir's attack has been extended to break many subsequent versions of the Merkle-Hellman system.) Shortly thereafter, Lagarias and Odlyzko gave an incomparable attack, later simplified by Frieze, that solves almost all instances of "low-density" subset-sum problems.

Definition 3.1. The *density* of a subset-sum instance is $n / \max_i \log a_i$.

Theorem 3.2 (Lagarias-Odlyzko, Frieze). *There is an efficient algorithm that, given uniformly random and independent weights $a_1, \ldots, a_n \in \{1, \ldots, X\}$, where $X \geq 2^{n^2(1/2+\varepsilon)}$ for some arbitrary constant $\varepsilon > 0$, and $s = \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{x} \rangle$ for some arbitrary $\mathbf{x} \in \{0,1\}^n$, outputs $\mathbf{x}$ with probability $1 - 2^{-n^2(\varepsilon - o(1))}$ over the choice of the a_i.*

Notice that the density of the above subset-sum instances is roughly $2/n$.

Proof. We are given a subset-sum instance $(\mathbf{a} = (a_1, \ldots, a_n), s = \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{x} \rangle)$ for some $\mathbf{x} \in \{0,1\}^n$. Without loss of generality, we may assume that $s \geq (\sum_i a_i)/2$: if not, we replace s by $(\sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i) - s$, which corresponds to flipping all the bits of $\mathbf{x}$. Note that this assumption implies that $\mathbf{x} \neq \mathbf{0}$.

The main idea is to define a lattice where not only is $\mathbf{x}$ a shortest nonzero lattice vector, but all lattice vectors not parallel to $\mathbf{x}$ are vastly longer, by a factor of $2^{n/2}$ or more. Then because LLL gives a $2^{n/2}$-factor approximation to the shortest lattice vector, it must yield $\mathbf{x}$.

Let $B = \lceil \sqrt{n \cdot 2^n} \rceil$, and define the lattice $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{B})$ using the basis

$$\mathbf{B} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & & & & \\ & 1 & & & \\ & & \ddots & & \\ & & & 1 & \\ -Ba_1 & -Ba_2 & \ldots & -Ba_n & Bs \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{Z}^{(n+1)\times(n+1)}.$$

Clearly, $\binom{\mathbf{x}}{0} \in \mathcal{L}$. As we will see in a moment, the B factor in the last row serves to amplify the norms of lattice vectors that do not correspond to *exact* equalities $s = \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{z} \rangle$ for $\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}^n$.

The algorithm simply runs LLL on the above basis $\mathbf{B}$ to obtain a nonzero lattice vector whose length is within a $2^{n/2}$ factor of $\lambda_1(\mathcal{L})$. The following analysis shows that with high probability, the obtained vector is of the form $k\binom{\mathbf{x}}{0}$ for some nonzero integer k, which reveals the solution $\mathbf{x} \in \{0,1\}^n$.

Notice that $\mathbf{Bz} = \binom{\mathbf{x}}{0} \in \mathcal{L}$ is a nonzero lattice vector, and has norm at most $\sqrt{n}$. Also, any lattice vector has a final coordinate divisible by B, and if this coordinate is nonzero, then the vector has length at least $B > 2^{n/2} \cdot \|\mathbf{x}\| \geq 2^{n/2} \cdot \lambda_1(\mathcal{L})$. Therefore, LLL always yields some nonzero lattice vector whose final coordinate is zero, and whose norm is at most $2^{n/2}\sqrt{n}$. We next show that with high probability, nonzero integer multiples of $\binom{\mathbf{x}}{0}$ are the *only* such lattice vectors; therefore, LLL must return one of these.

Consider an arbitrary nonzero vector $\binom{\mathbf{z}}{0} \in \mathbb{Z}^{n+1}$, where $\|\mathbf{z}\| \leq 2^{n/2}\sqrt{n}$ and $\mathbf{z}$ is not an integer multiple of $\mathbf{x}$. We want to bound the probability that this vector is in $\mathcal{L}$, i.e., the probability that $\binom{\mathbf{z}}{0} = \mathbf{B}\binom{\mathbf{z}}{z_{n+1}}$ for some $z_{n+1} \in \mathbb{Z}$. In such an event, we have

$$s \cdot |z_{n+1}| = |s \cdot z_{n+1}| = |\langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{z} \rangle| \leq \|\mathbf{z}\| \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i \leq 2\|\mathbf{z}\| s,$$

so $|z_{n+1}| \leq 2\|\mathbf{z}\|$. Fix any such z_{n+1}. In order for $\binom{\mathbf{z}}{0}$ to be in $\mathcal{L}$, it must be the case that

$$\langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{z} \rangle = z_{n+1} \cdot s = z_{n+1} \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{x} \rangle,$$

which implies that $\langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{y} \rangle = 0$ where $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{z} - z_{n+1}\mathbf{x}$. Since $\mathbf{z}$ is not an integer multiple of $\mathbf{x}$, some $y_i \neq 0$, and we can assume that without loss of generality that $i = 1$. Therefore, we must have $a_1 = -(\sum_{i=2}^{n} a_i y_i)/y_1$.

With these observations, for any fixed $\mathbf{z}, z_{n+1}$ satisfying the above constraints, the probability that $\binom{\mathbf{z}}{0} \in \mathcal{L}$ is bounded by

$$\Pr_{a_i}[\langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{y} \rangle = 0] = \Pr_{a_1}\left[a_1 = -(\sum_{i=2}^{n} a_i y_i)/y_1\right] \leq 1/X,$$

because the a_i are chosen uniformly from $\{1, \ldots, X\}$. Finally, we apply the union bound over all legal choices of $\mathbf{z}, z_{n+1}$. Because $\|\mathbf{z}\| \leq 2^{n/2}\sqrt{n} \leq B$, each coordinate of $\mathbf{z}$ has magnitude at most B, and similarly, $|z_{n+1}| \leq 2\|\mathbf{z}\| \leq 2B$. Therefore, the number of choices for $\mathbf{z}, z_{n+1}$ is at most

$$(2B+1)^n \cdot (4B+1) \leq (5B)^{n+1} \leq 2^{n^2(1/2+o(1))}.$$

Because $X = 2^{n^2(1/2+\varepsilon)}$ for some constant $\varepsilon > 0$, the probability that there exists any $\binom{\mathbf{z}}{0} \in \mathcal{L}$ satisfying the above constraints is at most $2^{-n^2(\varepsilon - o(1))}$, as claimed. □

Variants. We showed that, except for integer multiples of $\binom{\mathbf{x}}{0}$, no lattice vector has length less than $2^{n/2}\sqrt{n}$. So, LLL's approximation factor of $2^{n/2}$ guarantees that it returns $k\binom{\mathbf{x}}{0}$ for some nonzero integer k. Inspecting the analysis, the $2^{n/2}$ factor accounts for the density bound of $2/n$.

What if we had an algorithm that achieves a better approximation factor, e.g., one that solves SVP *exactly*, or to within a $\mathrm{poly}(n)$ factor? For a density of about $1/1.6$, following the same kind of argument, but with tighter bounds on the number of allowed $\mathbf{z}$, one can show that $\pm\binom{\mathbf{x}}{0}$ are the *only* shortest vectors in the lattice (with high probability). Similarly, for density $1/\Theta(\log n)$, one can show that all lattice vectors not parallel to $\binom{\mathbf{x}}{0}$ are some $\mathrm{poly}(n)$ factor longer than it. However, at densities above $2/3$ or so, $\binom{\mathbf{x}}{0}$ may no longer be a shortest nonzero vector in the lattice, so even an exact-SVP oracle might not reveal a subset-sum solution.