



# CommPact:

## Evaluating the Feasibility of Autonomous Vehicle Contracts

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# Platooning

Goal: reduce following distance between vehicles

Advantages:

- Decrease drag (improve fuel economy)
- Increase traffic density

Disadvantages:

- Safety concerns




Photo Source: USDOT

## Safety concerns



One malicious vehicle could suddenly brake and cause a massive accident

Recent Example:

*“Police say a car going east on the QEW in Mississauga suddenly moved into the left lane in front of a line of cars and hit the brakes — causing five vehicles to slam into one another.”*

<http://toronto.citynews.ca/2018/02/08/qew-fatal-crash-arrest/>

By reducing its own following distance, an autonomous vehicle is violating a safety parameter

Before doing so, we would like some assurance that the vehicle is still safe!




## Braking rates vary significantly

Model	Category	Weight (lbs   kg)	Deceleration (m/s <sup>2</sup> )
2017 Koenigsegg Agera RS	Super	3000   1360	11.62 to 12.85
2015 Ford Mustang GT	Sport	3805   1726	10.93
2016 Mazda MX-5 (Miata) Club	Sport	2332   1058	10.44
2016 Honda Civic Sedan (Touring)	Compact	2923   1326	10.09
2016 Honda Civic Sedan (EX)	Compact	2790   1266	9.29
2015 Ford F-150	Truck	5160   2341	9.15
2017 Toyota Sienna Limited	Minivan	4560   2068	8.87
2016 Ford F-150	Truck	4629   2100	7.93

# Reactive approach to sudden braking


Leader emergency brakes.

Let's assume the follower reacts instantly.




# Reactive approach to sudden braking

In this circumstance, we need 4.32 meters of following distance for safety



# Reactive approach to sudden braking

Every 172ms of follower delay = 5 meters of additional following distance



Can we guarantee safety and still platoon at suitable following distances?

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# Autonomous Vehicle Contracts


What if platooning vehicles agreed not to crash into one another?

# Threat Model

We assume the perspective of a human passenger in an autonomous vehicle.



You must trust your own vehicle




Any other vehicle in the platoon may be malicious




Malicious vehicles can accelerate and brake, send arbitrary network traffic, jam communications




# Contracts




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
# Background: Trusted execution with enclaves




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
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
# Use enclaves to *enforce* contract parameters



Enclave filters commands sent to the Powertrain/Braking ECUs

ECUs will ignore all commands not signed by the enclave

# We can't force others to sign contracts




But we can refuse to form a platoon without a contract, retaining our safe separation distance

Once we do negotiate a contract, we can bound vehicle speed and acceleration

# What happens if we *need* to brake?

If vehicles are not allowed to brake suddenly for the safety of the platoon, what about the safety of others?



# In case of emergency...

## Emergency Responsiveness

Attackers can jam communications, so vehicles cannot necessarily coordinate a response while still under contract

### Therefore

We must allow vehicles to regain individual autonomy as soon as possible



## Platoon Safety

A malicious vehicle could fabricate an “emergency” to void a contract while the platoon is still formed

### Therefore

We can't release vehicles from contract until they have reached safe separation

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# On the feasibility of contracts

Can we terminate a contract quickly enough?

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## Goal: Separate and return autonomy in 1500 ms

How long does it take for current vehicles to react to an emergency?

Human Perception Response Time (PRT): ~1500 ms

If we can achieve vehicle separation and autonomy in a similar time frame, it may be considered sufficient emergency responsiveness



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# Phases of terminating a contract

## 1. Recovery Phase

Detect emergency or communications failure

Even if one vehicle detects an emergency, it may not be able to communicate this failure to the platoon

If communications fail, an a timeout must elapse before the platoon begins to separate

## 2. Separation Phase

Each vehicle must achieve a safe following distance before the contract can terminate

Without guaranteed communications, each vehicle must separate independently

Vehicle separation must remain coordinated to ensure safety

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# Separation Phase


Goal: 1000 ms

# Emergency Termination Procedure (ETP)

When the ETP is invoked, we wish to separate the platoon vehicles *as quickly as possible*

Communications may not be possible

We can **pre-program** a synchronized separation procedure into each vehicle in the event of communications failure



Separation Equation:

$$A_n = \frac{n}{N}M$$

M: Maximum Deceleration

N: Highest Vehicle Index

n: Vehicle Index


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


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
# How long does separation take?





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Platoon Size	$v_0$ m/s	$a_0$ m/s <sup>2</sup>	$a_1$ m/s <sup>2</sup>	$a_2$ m/s <sup>2</sup>	$d_0$ m	$d_{stop}$ m	$t_{sep}$ ms
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


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



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


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



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


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



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


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



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
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# Recovery Phase

Goal: 500 ms

# Synchronization Requirements



The ETP assumes vehicles are synchronized

If the ETP starts at different times for different vehicles, it could be catastrophic

Full synchronization across an untrustworthy communication channel cannot be guaranteed

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


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


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
Full synchronization across an untrustworthy communication channel cannot be guaranteed

Key insight: A vehicle must start the ETP **no later than** any preceding vehicle

# Contract Chain

During the Recovery Phase, the leader will periodically extend the contract's recovery phase timeout with a contract chain

The enclave will ensure that each vehicle's ECU updates the timeout *before* the enclave will sign the contract chain, and these signatures are passed *in order* to each vehicle in the platoon





# Setting the ETP timeout

**Goal #1:** minimize the ETP timeout

**Goal #2:** support intermittent packet loss without invoking the ETP

Due to packet loss and intermittent connectivity issues, some contract chains may fail

Platoon size affects the latency (number of hops) for a contract chain to complete

The chance for a false positive can be calculated probabilistically

# Packet loss rate vs. ETP timeout

Packet Loss Rate	Platoon Size	Chance of Termination per 1,000,000 Recovery Chains							
		3 Failed Recoveries		5 Failed Recoveries		8 Failed Recoveries		16 Failed Recoveries	
0.01%	2	7.9972e-6	✓	3.1985e-13	✓	2.5584e-24	✓	6.5470e-54	✓
0.01%	4	6.3943e-5	✗	1.0228e-11	✓	6.5431e-22	✓	4.2829e-49	✓
0.01%	6	2.1568e-4	✗	7.7616e-11	✓	1.6752e-20	✓	2.8081e-46	✓
0.01%	8	5.1092e-4	✗	3.2684e-10	✓	1.6717e-19	✓	2.7968e-44	✓
0.1%	2	0.0079403	✗	3.1856e-8	✓	2.5447e-16	✓	6.4883e-38	✓
0.1%	4	0.061487	✗	1.0123e-6	✓	6.4495e-14	✓	4.1763e-33	✓
0.1%	6	0.19193	✗	7.6334e-6	✓	1.6365e-12	✓	2.6942e-30	✓
0.1%	8	0.39505	✗	3.1942e-5	✗	1.6184e-11	✓	2.6402e-28	✓
1%	2	0.99956	✗	0.0030540	✗	2.4104e-8	✓	5.9281e-22	✓
1%	4	1	✗	0.087212	✗	5.5829e-6	✓	3.2447e-17	✓
1%	6	1	✗	0.47594	✗	1.2948e-4	✗	1.7810e-14	✓
1%	8	1	✗	0.92108	✗	0.0011702	✗	1.4857e-12	✓
5%	2	1	✗	0.9965	✗	0.0073431	✗	6.0189e-11	✓
5%	4	1	✗	1	✗	0.68071	✗	1.6001e-6	✓
5%	6	1	✗	1	✗	1	✗	4.3228e-4	✗
5%	8	1	✗	1	✗	1	✗	0.017835	✗

# Packet loss rate vs. ETP timeout

Packet Loss Rate	Platoon Size	Increasing # contract chains →							
		3 Failed Re							Recoveries
0.01%	2	7.9572e-6	✓	3.1985e-13	✓	2.5584e-24	✓	6.5470e-54	✓
0.01%	4	6.3943e-5	✗	1.0228e-11	✓	6.5431e-22	✓	4.2829e-49	✓
0.01%	6	2.1568e-4	✗	7.7616e-11	✓	1.6759e-20	✓	1.46e-46	✓
0.01%	8	5.1092e-4	✗	3.2684e-10	✓	1.6184e-11	✓	1.44e-44	✓
0.1%	2	0.0070493	✗	3.1856e-8	✓	6.4495e-14	✓	6.4883e-38	✓
0.1%	4	0.0217	✗	1.0123e-6	✓	6.4495e-14	✓	4.1763e-33	✓
0.1%	6	0.0651	✗	7.6334e-6	✓	1.6365e-12	✓	2.6942e-30	✓
0.1%	8	0.1953	✗	3.1942e-5	✗	1.6184e-11	✓	2.6402e-28	✓
0.5%	2	0.0030540	✗	0.0030540	✗	2.4104e-8	✓	5.9281e-22	✓
0.5%	4	0.087212	✗	0.087212	✗	5.5829e-6	✓	3.2447e-17	✓
0.5%	6	0.47594	✗	0.47594	✗	1.2948e-4	✗	1.7810e-14	✓
1%	8	1	✗	1	✗	0.011702	✗	1.4857e-12	✓
5%	2	1	✗	1	✗	0.073431	✗	6.018e-11	✓
5%	4	1	✗	1	✗	0.68071	✗	1.6001e-6	✓
5%	6	1	✗	1	✗	1	✗	4.3228e-4	✗
5%	8	1	✗	1	✗	1	✗	0.017835	✗

Increasing packet loss rate and platoon size  
↓

Low false positive

High false positive

---

# How long do contract chains take?

Can we complete enough chains within 500 ms to avoid false positives?


# Platooning simulation

Our main evaluation platform is PLEXE, a platooning extension for the Veins simulator, running on an SGX-enabled supermicro server <http://plexo.car2x.org/>

We have extended PLEXE to add an SGX enclave to each simulated vehicle

Any attempt to change vehicle speeds is governed by the CommPact enclave

We can use this to approximate the latency of the overall contract chain, including enclave overhead




The screenshot displays the PLEXE simulation interface. The top panel shows a timeline with a red dot indicating the current state of the simulation. The middle panel shows a list of scheduled events, including beacon transmissions and contract chain operations. The bottom panel shows a class hierarchy for the simulation environment.


Class	Name	Info
cPar	playgroundSizeX	65000
cPar	playgroundSizeY	25000
cPar	playgroundSizeZ	50
cPar	traffic_type	"PlatoonsTrafficManager"
ObstacleControl	obstacles	id=2
AnnotationMan	annotations	id=3
ConnectionMan	connectionManager	id=4
BaseWorldUtility	world	id=5
TraCIScenarioM	manager	id=6
PlatoonsTrafficM	traffic	id=7
cCanvas	canvas	2 toplevel figure(s)
Car	node[0]	id=8
Car	node[1]	id=18
Car	node[2]	id=28
Car	node[3]	id=38
Car	node[4]	id=48
Car	node[5]	id=58
Car	node[6]	id=68
Car	node[7]	id=78

The bottom diagram shows a sequence of nodes (node[7] to node[0]) connected by a dashed line, representing the contract chain. Each node is associated with a beacon transmission event.


# Critical Path



# Critical Path



# Critical Path



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# V2V latency measurements

We use Direct Short Range Communications (DSRC) in our prototype.

We performed latency measurements using two Cohda MK5 On-Board Units (OBUs).


Measured latency for 1000 round trips with packet sizes ranging from 128 to 576 bytes at distances between 1 meter and ~7 car-lengths.



# DSRC latency measurements



DSRC Latency vs. Payload Size



Distance had a small and inconclusive impact on latency


# Simulation setup

Supermicro X11SSZ-QF motherboard  
w/ Intel Core I7-6700K 4.0 GHz

ECUs emulated with Raspberry Pi  
3B+ connected over Fast Ethernet

Actual compute time for contract  
chain critical path is measured and  
recorded

Measured DSRC latency data is fed  
into the simulation as well



# Evaluation hardware vs. state of the art



Crypto operations in software  
dominate our overall compute time


ECDSA Sign and Verify operations over  
the NIST P-256 (secp256r1) curve

Operation	i7-6700K	RPI 3B+	ASIC
Sign	0.192 ms	0.709 ms	0.325 ms [1]
Verify	0.321 ms	1.321 ms	0.212 ms [2]

[1] M. Tamura and M. Ikeda, "1.68 $\mu$ J/signature-generation 256-bit ECDSA over GF(p) signature generator for IoT devices," 2016 IEEE Asian Solid-State Circuits Conference (A-SSCC), 2016

[2] M. Knežević, V. Nikov and P. Rombouts, "Low-Latency ECDSA Signature Verification—A Road Toward Safer Traffic," in IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems, 2016

# Simulated Contract Chain Latency





## Final results

Platoon Size	# Chains	FP Rate per 10 hours	Recovery Phase	Separation Phase	Total Delay
2	7	0.00034%	89 ms	158 ms	247 ms
3	8	0.00012%	142 ms	307 ms	449 ms
4	8	0.00089%	181 ms	451 ms	632 ms
5	9	0.00019%	263 ms	594 ms	857 ms
6	9	0.00078%	315 ms	728 ms	1043 ms
7	10	0.00017%	420 ms	867 ms	1287 ms
8	10	0.00051%	493 ms	982 ms	1475 ms

# What if the delay is too long?

We can split the platoon!

The contract chain RTT and separation time are approximately linear to the # of vehicles in the platoon

We can keep the overall delay within acceptable bounds, whatever they may be, during changing conditions by adjusting the platoon length



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# Conclusion


New proposal: autonomous vehicle contracts

Can prevent malicious vehicles from causing platooning collisions

Requires careful balance of risk factors, but these factors can be mitigated

Ultimately, more work is needed to further investigate and develop AV Contracts

Questions?



# Thank You





## Other details

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