

Take-Home Message

- Model checking is the exhaustive exploration of the state space of a system, typically to see if an error state is reachable. It produces concrete counter-examples.
- The state explosion problem refers to the large number of states in the model.
- Temporal logic allows you to specify properties with concepts like "eventually" and "always".

Model Checking

- Transition Systems (Models)
- Temporal Properties
- LTL and CTL
- (Explicit State) Model Checking
- Symbolic Model Checking
- Counterexample Guided Abstraction Refinement

Overarching Plan

- Safety Properties
- Predicate Abstraction
- Software Model Checking
- Counterexample Feasibility
- Abstraction Refinement
- ("c2bp") ("bebop") ("newton", "hw 5") (weakest pre, thrm prvr)

(Today)

Spoiler Space

• This stuff really works!

- This is not ESC or PCC or Denotational Semantics
- Symbolic Model Checking is a massive success in the model-checking field
 I know people who think Ken McMillan walks on
 - water in a "ha-ha-ha only serious" way
- SLAM took the PL world by storm
 - Spawned multiple copycat projects
 - Incorporated into Windows DDK as "static driver verifier"

Topic: (Generic) Model Checking

- There are complete courses in model checking; I will skim.
 - *Model Checking* by Edmund C. Clarke, Orna Grumberg, and Doron A. Peled, MIT press
 - Symbolic Model Checking by Ken McMillan

Model Checking

- Model checking is an *automated* technique
- Model checking verifies transition systems
- Model checking verifies temporal properties
- Model checking can be also used for falsification by generating *counter-examples*
- <u>Model Checker</u>: A program that checks if a (transition) system satisfies a (temporal) property

Verification vs. Falsification

- An automated verification tool
 - can report that the system is verified (with a proof)
 - or that the system was not verified (with ???)
- When the system was not verified it would be helpful to explain why
 - Model checkers can output an error <u>counter-example</u>: a concrete execution scenario that demonstrates the error
- Can view a model checker as a falsification tool - The main goal is to find bugs
- OK, so what can we verify or falsify?


Temporal Properties


- <u>Temporal Property</u>: A property with time-related operators such as "invariant" or "eventually"
- <u>Invariant(p)</u>: is true in a state if property p is true in every state on all execution paths starting at that state
 - The Invariant operator has different names in different temporal logics:
 - G, AG, □ ("goal" or "box" or "forall")
- Eventually(p): is true in a state if property p is true at some state on every execution path starting from that state
 - F, AF, \diamondsuit ("diamond" or "future" or "exists")

An Example Concurrent Program

- A simple concurrent mutual exclusion program
- Two processes execute asynchronously
- There is a shared variable turn
- Two processes use the shared variable to ensure that they are not in the critical section at the same time
- Can be viewed as a "fundamental" program: any bigger concurrent one would include this one
- 11: wait(turn = 0); // critical section 12: turn := 1; 13: end while; 11 // concurrently with 20: while True do 21: wait(turn = 1); // critical section 22: turn := 0; 23: end while

10: while True do






Properties of the Program


- Example: "In all the reachable states (configurations) of the system, the two processes are *never* in the critical section at the same time"
 - Equivalently, we can say that
 Invariant(¬(pc1=12 ^ pc2=22))
- Also: "Eventually the first process enters the critical section"
 - Eventually(pc1=12)
- "pc1=12", "pc2=22" are atomic properties


Temporal Logics

- There are four basic temporal operators:
- 1) X p = Next p, p holds in the next state
- 2) G p = Globally p, p holds in every state, p is an invariant
- 3) F p = Future p, p will hold in a future state, p holds eventually
- 4) p U q = p Until q, assertion p will hold until q holds
- Precise meaning of these temporal operators are defined on execution paths

Execution Paths A path in a transition system is an infinite sequence of states (s₀, s₁, s₂, ...), such that ∀i≥0. (s_i, s_{i+1}) ∈ R A path (s₀, s₁, s₂, ...) is an execution path if s₀ ∈ I Given a path x = (s₀, s₁, s₂, ...) x_i denotes the ith suffix (s_i, s_{i+1}, s_{i+2}, ...) In some temporal logics one can quantify the paths starting from a state using path quantifiers A : for all paths E : there exists a path










Linear vs. Branching Time


- LTL is a <u>linear time logic</u>
 When determining if a path satisfies an LTL formula we are only concerned with a single path
- CTL is a branching time logic
 - When determining if a state satisfies a CTL formula we are concerned with multiple paths
 - In CTL the computation is not viewed as a single path but as a <u>computation tree</u> which contains all the paths
 - The computation tree is obtained by unrolling the transition relation
- The expressive powers of CTL and LTL are incomparable
 - Basic temporal properties can be expressed in both logics
 - Not in this lecture, sorry! (Take a class on Modal Logics)


Remember the Example












State Space Explosion


- The complexity of model checking increases linearly with respect to the size of the transition system (|S| + |R|)
- However, the size of the transition system
 (|S| + |R|) is exponential in the number of
 variables and number of concurrent
 processes
- This exponential increase in the state space is called the <u>state space explosion</u>
 - Dealing with it is one of the major challenges in model checking research

Explicit-State Model Checking

- One can show the complexity results using depth first search algorithms
 - The transition system is a directed graph
 - CTL model checking is multiple depth first searches (one for each temporal operator)
 - LTL model checking is one nested depth first search (i.e., two interleaved depth-firstsearches)
 - Such algorithms are called <u>explicit-state model</u> <u>checking</u> algorithms (*details on next slides*)



- This can be computed (unlike most other fixpoints)



Symbolic Model Checking represent state sets and the transition relation as *Boolean logic formulas*Fixpoint computations manipulate sets of states rather than individual states Recall: we needed to compute EX(Z), but Z ⊆ S Forward and backward fixpoints can be computed by iteratively manipulating these formulas Forward, inverse image: Existential variable elimination Conjunction (intersection), disjunction (union) and negation (set difference), and equivalence check Use an efficient data structure for manipulation of Boolean logic formulas Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs)

Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs)


- Efficient representation for boolean functions (a set can be viewed as a function)
- Disjunction, conjunction complexity: at most quadratic
- Negation complexity: constant
- Equivalence checking complexity: constant or linear
- Image computation complexity: can be exponential

Symbolic Model Checking Using BDDs

- SMV (Symbolic Model Verifier) was the first CTL model checker to use a BDD representation
- It has been successfully used in verification
 of hardware specifications, software specifications, protocols, etc.
- SMV verifies finite state systems
 - It supports both synchronous and asynchronous composition
 - It can handle boolean and enumerated variables
 - It can handle bounded integer variables using a binary encoding of the integer variables
 - It is not very efficient in handling integer variables although this can be fixed

Where's the Beef

- To produce the explicit counter-example, use the "onion-ring method"
 - A counter-example is a valid execution path
 - For each Image Ring (= set of states), find a state and link it with the concrete transition relation R
 - Since each Ring is "reached in one step from previous ring" (e.g., Ring#3 = EX(Ring#4)) this works
 - Each state z comes with L(z) so you know what is true at each point (= what the values of variables are)



Building Up To: Software Model Checking via Counter-Example Guided Abstraction Refinement


• There are easily two dozen SLAM/BLAST/MAGIC papers; I will skim.


Key Terms


- CEGAR = Counterexample guided abstraction refinement. A successful software modelchecking approach. Sometimes called "Iterative Abstraction Refinement".
- SLAM = The first CEGAR project/tool. Developed at MSR.
- Lazy Abstraction = A CEGAR optimization used in the BLAST tool from Berkeley.
- Other terms: c2bp, bebop, newton, npackets++, MAGIC, flying boxes, etc.


So ... what *is* Counterexample Guided Abstraction Refinement?


- Theorem Proving?
- Dataflow Analysis?
- Model Checking?











Homework • Project Due! • Need help? Stop by my office or send email.