

When Virtual Is Better Than Real

Peter M. Chen and Brian D. Noble

*Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
University of Michigan
pmchen@umich.edu, bnoble@umich.edu*

Abstract

This position paper argues that the operating system and applications currently running on a real machine should relocate into a virtual machine. This structure enables services to be added below the operating system and to do so without trusting or modifying the operating system or applications. To demonstrate the usefulness of this structure, we describe three services that take advantage of it: secure logging, intrusion prevention and detection, and environment migration.

1. Introduction

First proposed and used in the 1960s, virtual machines are experiencing a revival in the commercial and research communities. Recent commercial products such as VMware and VirtualPC faithfully emulate complete x86-based computers. These products are widely used (e.g. VMware has more than 500,000 registered users) for purposes such as running Windows applications on Linux and testing software compatibility on different operating systems. At least two recent research projects also use virtual machines: Disco uses virtual machines to run multiple commodity operating systems on large-scale multiprocessors [4]; Hypervisor uses virtual machines to replicate the execution of one computer onto a backup [3].

Our position is that the operating system and applications that currently run directly on real machines should relocate into a virtual machine running on a real machine (Figure 1). The only programs that run directly on the real machine would be the host operating system, the virtual machine monitor, programs that provide local administration, and additional services enabled by this virtual-machine-centric structure. Most network services would run in the virtual machine; the real machine would merely forward network packets for the virtual machine.

This virtual-machine-centric model allows us to provide services *below* most code running on the computer, similar to providing services in the hardware of a real

machine. Because these services are implemented in a layer of software (the virtual machine monitor or the host operating system), they can be provided more easily and flexibly than they could if they were implemented by modifying the hardware. In particular, we can provide services below the guest operating system without trusting or modifying it. We believe providing services at this layer is especially useful for enhancing security and mobility.

This position paper describes the general benefits and challenges that arise from running most applications in a virtual machine, then describes some example services and alternative ways to provide those services.

2. Benefits

Providing services by modifying a virtual machine has similar benefits to providing services by modifying a real machine. These services run separately from all processes in the virtual machine, including the guest operating system. This separation benefits security and portability. Security is enhanced because the services do not have to trust the guest operating system; they have only to trust the virtual machine monitor, which is considerably smaller and simpler. Trusting the virtual machine monitor is akin to trusting a real processor; both expose a narrow interface (the instruction set architecture). In contrast, services in an operating system are more vulnerable to malicious and random faults, because operating systems are larger and more prone to security and reliability holes. Separating the services from the guest operating system also enhances portability. We can implement the services without needing to change the operating system, so they can work across multiple operating system vendors and versions.

While providing services in a virtual machine gains similar benefits to providing services in a real machine, virtual machines have some advantages over the physical machines they emulate. First, a virtual machine can be modified more easily than a physical machine, because the virtual machine monitor that creates the virtual machine




Figure 1: Virtual-machine structure. In this model, most applications that currently run on real machines relocate into a virtual machine running on the host machine. The virtual machine monitor and local administrative programs run directly on the host machine. In VMware, the virtual machine monitor issues I/O through the host operating system, so services that manipulate I/O events can be implemented in the host operating system [2].

abstraction is a layer of software. Second, it is much easier to manipulate the state of a virtual machine than the state of a physical machine. The state of the virtual machine can be saved, cloned, encrypted, moved, or restored, none of which is easy to do with physical machines. Third, a virtual machine has a very fast connection to another computing system, that is, the host machine on which the virtual machine monitor is running. In contrast, physical machines are separated by physical networks, which are slower than the memory bus that connects a virtual machine with its host.

3. Challenges

Providing services at the virtual-machine level holds two challenges. The first is performance. Running all applications above the virtual machine hurts performance due to virtualization overhead. For example, system calls in a virtual machine must be trapped by the virtual machine monitor and re-directed to the guest operating system. Hardware operations issued by the guest must be trapped by the virtual machine monitor, translated, and re-issued. Some overhead is unavoidable in a virtual machine; the services enabled by that machine must outweigh this performance cost. Virtualizing an x86-based machine incurs additional overheads because x86 processors don't trap on some instructions that must be virtualized (e.g. reads of certain system registers). One way to implement a virtual machine in the presence of these "non-virtualizable" instructions is to re-write the binaries at run time to force these instructions to trap [13], but this incurs significant overhead.

The second challenge of virtual-machine services is the semantic gap between the virtual machine and the service. Services in the virtual machine operate below the abstractions provided by the guest operating system and applications. This can make it difficult to provide services. For example, it is difficult to provide a service that checks file

system integrity without knowledge of on-disk structures. Some services do not need any operating system abstractions; secure logging (Section 4.1) is an example of such a service. For services that require higher-level information, one must re-create this information in some form. Full semantic information requires re-implementing guest OS abstractions in or below the virtual machine. However, there are several abstractions—virtual address spaces, threads of control, network protocols, and file system formats—that are shared across many operating systems. By observing manipulations of virtualized hardware, one can reconstruct these *generic* abstractions, enabling services that require semantic information.

4. Example services

In this section, we describe three services that can be provided at the virtual-machine level. Others have used virtual machines for many other purposes, such as preventing one server from monopolizing machine resources, education, easing the development of privileged software, and software development for different operating systems [10].

4.1. Secure logging

Most operating systems log interesting events as part of their security strategy. For example, a system might keep a record of login attempts and received/sent mail. System administrators use the logged information for a variety of purposes. For example, the log may help administrators understand how a network intruder gained access to the system, or it may help administrators know what damage the intruder inflicted after he gained access. Unfortunately, the logging used in current systems has two important shortcomings: integrity and completeness. First, an attacker can easily turn off logging after he takes over the system; thus the contents of the log cannot be trusted after

the point of compromise. Second, it is difficult to anticipate what information may be needed during the post-attack analysis; thus the log may lack information needed to discern how the intruder gained access or what actions he took after gaining access.

Virtual machines provide an opportunity to correct both shortcomings of current logging. To improve the integrity of logging, we can move the logging software out of the operating system and into the virtual machine monitor. The virtual machine monitor is much smaller and simpler than the guest operating system and hence is less vulnerable to attack. By moving the logging software into the virtual machine monitor, we move it out of the domain that an intruder can control. Even if the intruder gains root access or completely replaces the guest operating system, he cannot affect the logging software or the logged data. Logged data can be written quickly to the host file system, taking advantage of the fast connection between the virtual machine monitor and the host computer.

To improve the completeness of logging, we propose logging enough data to replay the complete execution of the virtual machine [3]. The information needed to accomplish a faithful replay is limited to a checkpoint with which to initialize the replaying virtual machine, plus the non-deterministic events that affected the original execution of the virtual machine since the time of the saved checkpoint. These non-deterministic events fall into two categories: external input and time. External input refers to data sent by a non-logged entity, such as a human user or an external computer (e.g. a web server). Time refers to the exact point in the execution stream at which an event takes place. For example, to replay the interleaving pattern between threads, we must log which instruction is preempted by a timer interrupt [17] (we assume the virtual machine monitor is not running on a multi-processor). Note that most instructions executed by the virtual machine do not need to be logged; only the relatively infrequent non-deterministic events need to be logged.

Using the virtual machine monitor to perform secure logging raises a number of research questions. The first question regards the volume of log data needed to support replay. We believe that the volume of data that needs to be logged will not be prohibitive. Local non-deterministic events, such as thread scheduling events and user inputs, are all small. Data from disk reads can be large, but these are deterministic (though the time of the disk interrupts are non-deterministic). The largest producer of log data is likely to be incoming network packets. We can reduce the volume of logged network data greatly by using message-logging techniques developed in the fault-tolerance community. For example, there is no need to log message data received from computers that are themselves being logged, because these computers can be replayed to reproduce the

sent message data [11]. If all computers on the same local network cooperate during logging and replay, then only messages received from external sites need to be logged. For an important class of servers (e.g. web servers), the volume of data received in messages is relatively small (HTTP GET and POST requests). Last, as disk prices continue to plummet, more computers (especially servers worthy of being logged) will be able to devote many gigabytes to store log data [20].

A second research direction is designing tools to analyze the behavior of a virtual machine during replay. Writing useful analysis tools in this domain is challenging because of the semantic gap between virtual machine events and the corresponding operating system actions. The analysis tool may have to duplicate some operating system functionality to distill the log into useful information. For example, the analysis tool may need to understand the on-disk file system format to translate the disk transfers seen by the virtual machine monitor into file-system transfers issued by the operating system. Translating virtual machine events into operating system events becomes especially challenging (and perhaps impossible) if the intruder modifies the operating system. One family of analysis tools we hope to develop trace the flow of information in the system, so that administrators can ask questions like “What network connections caused the password file to change?”.

4.2. Intrusion prevention and detection

Another important component to a security strategy is detecting and thwarting intruders. Ideally, these systems *prevent* intrusions by identifying intruders as they attack the system [9]. These systems also try to *detect* intrusions after the fact by monitoring the events and state of the computer for signs that a computer has been compromised [8, 12]. Virtual machines offer the potential for improving both intrusion prevention and intrusion detection.

Intrusion preventers work by monitoring events that enter or occur on the system, such as incoming network packets. Signature-based preventers match these input events against a database of known attacks; anomaly-based preventers look for input events that differ from the norm. Both these types of intrusion preventers have flaws, however. Signature-based systems can only thwart attacks that have occurred in the past, been analyzed, and been integrated into the attack database. Anomaly-based systems can raise too many false alarms and may be susceptible to re-training attacks.

A more trustworthy method of recognizing an attack is to simply run the input event on the real system and seeing how the system responds. Of course, running suspicious events on the real system risks compromising the system.

However, we can safely conduct this type of test on a *clone* of the real system. Virtual machines make it easy to clone a running system, and an intrusion preventer can use this clone to test how a suspicious input event would affect the real system. The clone can be run as a hot standby by keeping it synchronized with the real system (using primary-backup techniques), or it can be created on the fly in response to suspicious events. In either case, clones admit more powerful intrusion preventers by looking at the response of the system to the input event rather than looking only at the input event. Because clones are isolated from the real system, they also allow an intrusion preventer to run potentially destructive tests to verify the system's health. For example, an intrusion preventer could forward a suspicious packet to a clone and see if it crashes any running processes. Or it could process suspicious input on the clone, then see if the clone still responds to shutdown commands.

A potential obstacle to using clone-based intrusion prevention is the effect of clone creation or maintenance on the processing of innocent events. To avoid blocking the processing of innocent events, an intrusion preventer would ideally run the clone in the background. Allowing innocent events to go forward while evaluating suspicious events implies that these events have loose ordering constraints. For example, a clone-based preventer could be used to test e-mail messages for viruses, because ordering constraints between e-mail messages are very loose.

Intrusion detectors try to detect the actions of intruders after they have compromised a system. Signs of an intruder might include bursts of outgoing network packets (perhaps indicating a compromised computer launching a denial-of-service attack), modified system files [12], or abnormal system-call patterns from utility programs [8]. As with system logging, these intrusion detectors fall short in integrity or completeness. Host-based intrusion detectors (such as those that monitor system calls) may be turned off by intruders after they compromise the system, so they are primarily useful only for detecting the act of an intruder breaking into a system. If an intruder evades detection at the time of entry, he can often disarm a host-based intrusion detector to avoid detection in the future. Network-based intrusion detectors can provide better integrity by being separate from the host operating system (e.g. in a standalone network router), but they suffer from a lack of completeness. Network intrusion detectors can see only network packets; they cannot see the myriad other events occurring in a computer system, such as disk traffic, keyboard events, memory usage, and CPU usage.

Implementing post-intrusion detection at the level of a virtual machine offers the potential for providing both integrity and completeness. Like a network-based intrusion detector, virtual-machine-based intrusion detectors

are separate from the guest operating system and applications. Unlike network intrusion detectors, however, virtual-machine intrusion detectors can see all events occurring in the virtual machine they monitor. Virtual-machine intrusion detectors can use this additional information to implement new detection policies. For example, it could detect if the virtual machine reads certain disk blocks (e.g. containing passwords), then issues a burst of CPU activity (e.g. cracking the passwords). Or it could detect if the virtual machine has intense CPU activity with no corresponding keyboard activity.

As with secure logging, a key challenge in post-intrusion detection in a virtual machine is how to bridge the semantic gap between virtual machine events and operating system events. This challenge is similar to that encountered by network-based intrusion detectors, which must parse the contents of IP packets.

4.3. Environment migration

Process migration has been a topic of interest from the early days of distributed computing. Migration allows one to package a running computation—either a process or collection of processes—and move it to a different physical machine. Using migration, a user's computations can move as he does, taking advantage of hardware that is more convenient to the user's current location.

The earliest systems, including Butler [15], Condor [14], and Sprite [6], focused on load sharing across machines rather than supporting mobile users. These load-sharing systems typically left residual dependencies on the source machine for transparency, and considered an individual process as the unit of migration. This view differs from that of mobile users, who consider the unit of migration to be the collection of all applications running on their current machine.

Recently, migration systems have begun to address the needs of mobile users. Examples of systems supporting mobility include the Teleporting system [16] and SLIM [18]. These systems migrate the user interface of a machine, leaving the entire set of applications to run on their host machine. In the limit, the display device can be a stateless, thin client. This approach provides a better match to the expectations of a migrating user, and need not deal with residual dependencies. However, these systems are intolerant of even moderate latency between the interface device and the cycle server, and thus support only a limited form of user mobility.

Migration based on virtual machines solves these problems. Since the entire (virtual) machine moves, there are no residual dependencies. A user's environment is moved en masse, which matches a user's expectations. By taking advantage of the narrow interface provided by the virtual

machine, very simple migration code can relocate a guest operating system and its applications.

There are several challenges that must be overcome to provide migration at the virtual-machine level. The first is that a machine has substantial state that must move with it. It would be infeasible to move this state synchronously on migration. Fortunately, most of this state is not needed immediately, and much may never be needed at all. We can predict which state is needed soon by taking advantage of temporal locality in disk and memory accesses. This prediction is complicated by the guest operating system's virtual memory abstraction, because the physical addresses seen by a virtual machine monitor are related only indirectly to accesses issued by applications. We can reconstruct information about virtual to physical mappings by observing manipulation of virtualized hardware elements such as the TLB.

After identifying the state likely to be needed soon, we need a mechanism to support migration of that state to the new virtual machine. If migration times are exposed, one can take advantage of efficient, wide-area consistency control schemes, such as that provided by Fluid Replication [5]. Fluid Replication provides safety, visibility, and performance across the wide area identical to that offered by local-area file systems such as NFS. It depends on typical file system access patterns, in particular a low incidence of concurrent data sharing. Machine migration, with coarse-grained, sequential sharing, fits this pattern well, allowing for migration without undue performance penalty.

To provide the most benefit, we must also support migration between physical machines that are not entirely identical. This is difficult because most virtual machine monitors improve performance by accessing some hardware components directly (e.g. the video frame buffer). This direct access complicates matters for the guest operating system when migrating between machines with different components. There are two approaches to solving this kind of problem. The first is to further virtualize the component, at a performance cost. The second is to modify the guest operating system to adapt to the new component on the fly. The right alternative depends on the resource in question, the performance penalty of virtualization, and the complexity of dynamic adaptation.

Migration is only one of several services that leverage the easy packaging, storage, and shipment of virtual machines. Clone-based intrusion detection is one example. One can also extend services that apply to individual resources across an entire virtual machine. For example, cryptographic file systems protect only file data; once an application reads sensitive data, it cannot be made secure. However, suspending a virtual machine to disk when its

user is away provides process-level protection using only the virtual machine services plus file system mechanisms.

5. Alternative structures

Each of the above services can be implemented in other ways. One alternative is to include these services in the operating system. This structure makes it easier for the service to access information in terms of operating system abstractions. For example, an intrusion detector at the operating system level may be able to detect when one user modifies files owned by another user. A virtual machine service, in contrast, operates below the notions of users and files and would have to reconstruct these abstractions. In addition, including these services in the operating system reduces the number of layers and redirections, which will likely improve performance relative to a virtual machine.

However, including services in the operating system has some disadvantages. First, such services are limited to a single operating system (and perhaps a single operating system version), whereas virtual-machine services can support multiple operating systems. For example, a secure logging service in a virtual machine can replay any operating system. Second, for security services such as secure logging and intrusion detection, including the service in the operating system depends critically on the integrity of the operating system. Because operating systems are typically large, complex, and monolithic, they usually contain security and reliability vulnerabilities. For example, the Linux 2.2.16 kernel contained at least 7 security holes [1]. In particular, secure logging is challenging to provide in the operating system, because an intruder may try to crash the system to prevent the log tail from being written to stable storage.

Some of the disadvantages of including services in the operating system can be mitigated by re-structuring the operating system into multiple protection domains [19] and placing security-related services in the most-privileged ring. This approach is similar to kernels that include only the minimum set of services [7]. However, this approach requires re-writing the entire operating system, and frequent crossings between multiple protection domains degrade performance.

A different approach is to add services to a language-specific virtual machine such as Java. Language-specific virtual machines potentially have more information than the operating system, which may be helpful for some services. However, these services would be available only for applications written in the target language. For the system-wide services described above, the entire system would have to be written in the target language.

6. Conclusions

Running an operating system and most applications inside a virtual machine enables a system designer to add services below the guest operating system. This structure enables services to be provided without trusting or modifying the guest operating system or the applications. We have described three services that take advantage of this structure: secure logging, intrusion prevention and detection, and environment migration.

Adding services via a virtual machine is analogous to adding network services via a firewall. Both virtual machines and firewalls intercept actions at a universal, low-level interface, and both must overcome performance and semantic-gap problems. Just as network firewalls have proven useful for adding network services, we believe virtual machines will prove useful for adding services for the entire computer.

7. References

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