Zyzzyva: Speculative Byzantine Fault Tolerance

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Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) Replication

System Model

- Asynchronous system
- Unreliable channels

Crypto

- Public/private key pairs
- Signatures
- Collision-resistant hashes

Service

- Byzantine clients
- Up to *f* Byzantine servers
- n > 3f total servers

System Goals

- Always safe
- Live during periods of synchrony













Introducing....Zyzzyva

- Novel contribution: replicas speculatively execute requests without 3-phase commit
- Correct replicas may be inconsistent
- Replicas may send different responses to clients
- Clients use history and replies to detect inconsistencies
- Clients wait until history and speculative reply are stable to complete request



Zyzzyva: tropical weevil and last word in dictionary

Why Zyzzyva?

- State-of-the-art BFT protocols
 - Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [Castro and Liskov, 1999]
 - Query/Update (Q/U) [Abd-El-Malek et al., 2005]
 - Hybrid-Quorum replication (HQ) [Cowling et al., 2006]
- HQ replication paper => best technique depends on workload
- How does Zyzzyva solve this issue?

BFT State-of-the-Art Comparison

**Gray/bold = best

		PBFT	Q/U	HQ	Zyzzyva
Cost	Total replicas Reps w/ app state	3f+1 2f+1	5f+1 5f+1	3f+1 3f+1	3f+1 2f+1
Throughput	MAC ops at bottleneck server	2+(8f+1)/b	2+8f	4+4f	2+3f/b
Latency	Critical path NW 1-way latencies	4	2	4	3

Zyzzyva Overview

- One primary, 3f replicas
- Execution proceeds as a sequence of views
- Design challenges
 - Conditions for client request completion
 - Defining subprotocols to ensure correctness
- Subprotocols:
 - Agreement Orders requests for replica execution
 - Checkpoint Limits state replicas must store and reduces cost of view changes
 - -View Change Coordinates new primary election if current is faulty or system is running slowly

Node State & Checkpoint Subprotocol

Node State & Checkpoint Subprotocol







- Primary receives request
- Assigns sequence number
- Forwards ordered request to replicas



- Replica receives ordered request
- Speculatively executes request
- Responds to the client



Client Completion Summary

If client receives...

Exactly 3f + 1 speculative response messages



Client Completion Summary

If client receives...







4b.1.

- Replica receives a *COMMIT* message from a client containing a Ccertificate
- Replica acknowledges with a *LOCAL*-*COMMIT* message.



Client Completion Summary

If client receives...



Fewer than 2f + 1 matching responses







4c. If client receives
fewer than 2f + 1
matching responses:

- Client resends its request to all replicas
- Replicas forward the request to the primary

Client Completion Summary

If client receives...







4d. If client receives responses indicating **inconsistent ordering** by

- the primary:
- Client sends a proof of misbehavior to the replicas



4d. If client receives responses indicating **inconsistent ordering** by

- the primary:
- Client sends a proof of misbehavior to the replicas
- Replicas initiate a view change to oust the faulty primary. 34

Client Completion Summary

If client receives...



- To ensure liveness
 - Extra "I hate the primary" phase added
 - A correct replica will not abandon a view unless every other correct replica does as well
- To guarantee safety
 - Weakens condition under which a request appears in the new view's history











VC₅:

- Replica receives 2f + 1 matching VIEW-CONFIRM messages
- Begins accepting requests in the new view

Implementation Optimizations

- Replacing signatures with MACs
- Separating agreement from execution
- Request batching
- Caching out of order requests
- Read-only optimization
 - Single execution response
 - Preferred Quorums

Midterm question!

Evaluation



Evaluation: Latency



Figure 4

Evaluation: Fault Scalability



Conclusion

"By systematically exploiting speculation, Zyzzyva exhibits significant performance improvements over existing BFT services. ... approach[ing] the theoretical lower bounds for any BFT protocol."

References

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Questions?