

Security and Sensitivity of Space Time Communications

Alfred O. Hero

Dept. EECS

University of Michigan - Ann Arbor

hero@eecs.umich.edu


<http://www.eecs.umich.edu/~hero>

Collaborators:

D. Bliss (MIT-LL), K. Forsythe (MIT-LL), T. Marzetta (Lucent-BL),
M. Godavarti (Altrabroadband, Inc)

Outline

1. Wireless network models
2. Performance metrics: capacity vs security
3. Information security: LPD/LPI-constraints
4. Environmental sensitivity



T = coherent fade interval
 M = number of transmit antennas
 N = number of receive antennas
 η_r, η_e = receiver SNR's

Receiver Model

Received signal in l -th frame ($t = 1, \dots, T$)

$$[x_{t1}^l, \dots, x_{tn}^l] = \sqrt{\eta} [s_{t1}^l, \dots, s_{tm}^l] \begin{bmatrix} h_{11}^l & \dots & h_{1n}^l \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ h_{m1}^l & \dots & h_{mn}^l \end{bmatrix} + [w_{t1}^l, \dots, w_{tn}^l],$$

or, equivalently

$$X^l = \sqrt{\eta} S^l H^l + W^l$$

- X^l : $T \times N$ received signal matrices
- S^l : $T \times M$ transmitted signal matrices
- H^l : i.i.d. $M \times N$ channel matrices $\sim \mathcal{C} N(0, I_M \otimes I_N)$
- W^l : i.i.d. $T \times N$ noise matrices $\sim \mathcal{C} N(0, I_T \otimes I_N)$




Figure 2. *Space-time transmitter/receiver.*

Space-Time Coding

- **Block coding:** string L codewords over L frames

$$| S^1 | S^2 | \dots | S^L |$$

where S^l 's are selected from a symbol alphabet $\mathcal{S} \subset \mathcal{Q}^{T \times M}$

- **Random Block Coding:** coder generates S^l at random from \mathcal{S} according to probability distribution $P(S) \in \mathcal{P}$.

- Objective: Find optimal distribution $P(S)$ over \mathcal{P} to:
 - maximize avg. information rate (achieve capacity)

$$C = \max_{P(S)} E[\ln P(X|S)/P(X)]$$

- maximize sequentially-decodable rate (achieve cut-off rate)

$$R_o = \max_{P(S)} E[\exp\{-ND(S_1||S_2)\}]$$

- Transmitter constraints: average power, peak power, other?




Figure 3. Capacity for informed transmitter and receiver (IT-IR).




Figure 4. *Capacity loss due to uninformed transmission (UT-IR).*




Figure 5. Capacity loss due to T/R channel estimation errors.

Link Capacity: avg power constraint: $\text{tr}(E[SS^\dagger]) \leq P_o$

(1): Informed transmitter (IT) and informed receiver (IR) capacity:

$$\begin{aligned}
 C &= E \left[\sup_{P_S} \log P(X|S,H) / P(X|H) \right] \\
 &= TE \left[\sup_{\Sigma: \text{tr}\{\Sigma\} \leq P_o} \ln \left| I_N + \eta H \Sigma H^\dagger \right| \right] \\
 &= TE \left[\ln \left| I_N + \eta H \Sigma_{\text{pow}} H^\dagger \right| \right] = T \sum_i E \left[(\log \mu \lambda_i)^+ \right]
 \end{aligned}$$

- Capacity achieving source $S \sim N(0, I_T \otimes \Sigma_{\text{pow}})$

$$\Sigma_{\text{pow}} = UDU^\dagger, \quad D = \text{diag} \left((\mu - 1/\lambda_i)^+ \right)$$

$$\lambda_i = \text{eigs} \left(\eta H H^\dagger \right) \quad \mu : \text{tr}(\Sigma_{\text{pow}}) = P_o$$

IT-IR Link




Figure 6. *Optimal STC for informed-transmitter informed-receiver*




Figure 7. *Waterpouring solution for power-capacity achieving mode allocation ($N = M = 32$)*

(2): Uninformed transmitter (UT) and IR capacity

$$\begin{aligned} C &= \sup_{P_S} E[\log P(X|S, H) / P(X|H)] \\ &= \sup_{\Sigma: \text{tr}\{\Sigma\} \leq P_o} TE \left[\ln \left| I_N + \eta H \Sigma H^\dagger \right| \right] \\ &= TE \left[\ln \left| I_N + \eta' H H^\dagger \right| \right] \end{aligned}$$

where $\eta' = \eta P_o / M$

Capacity achieving source

$$S \sim N(0, c I_T \otimes I_M)$$

where $c = P_o / M$

UT-IR Link




Figure 8. *Optimal STC for uninformed-transmitter informed-receiver*

(3): UT-UR: H unknown to either T/R

$$C_3 = \max_{P_S} E [\log P_{X|S}(X|S) / P_X(X)]$$

Capacity achieving source

$$S \sim V\Lambda$$

where

* Λ : non-negative $T \times M$ block-diagonal matrix

* V : unitary $T \times T$ matrix

* Λ and V independent

* $\Lambda^\dagger \Lambda = P_o$

UT-UR Link




Figure 9. *Optimal STC for uninformed-transmitter uninformed-receiver*

Channel Sensitivity




Figure 10. *Diagram of a multiple antenna communication system*

Rician Channel Model

- Combined Rayleigh and Specular Multipath Fading:

$$H = \sqrt{1-r} G + \sqrt{r} H_m$$

- G_{mn} are i.i.d. $CN(0, 1)$
 - H_m deterministic matrix such that $\text{tr}\{H_m H_m^\dagger\} = NM$
 - r fraction of channel energy devoted to specular component
 - H_m known to both the transmitter and receiver
 - G not known to the transmitter
- After unitary spatial transformation at T/R: $H_m = [D, 0]$

Rician Capacity: Rank one H_m known to T/R

$$H_m = \sqrt{NM} \underline{e}_M \underline{e}_N^T = \begin{bmatrix} \sqrt{NM} & \dots & 0 \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & \dots & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

UT-IR Capacity:

$$C_H = \max_{l,d} TE \log \det [I_N + \eta H \Lambda^{(l,d)} H^\dagger]$$

where

$$\Lambda^{(l,d)} = \begin{bmatrix} M - (M-1)d & l \underline{1}_{M-1} \\ l \underline{1}_{M-1}^\dagger & d I_{M-1} \end{bmatrix}$$

- d is a positive real number such that $0 \leq d \leq M/(M-1)$
- l is a complex number such that $|l| \leq \sqrt{(\frac{M}{M-1} - d)d}$

Optimal UT-IR Rician Link




Figure 11. *Optimal STC for Rician uninformed-transmitter informed-receiver*




Figure 12. Numerical optimization yields $l = 0$ and values of d shown as a function of r for different values of ρ .

Channel Sensitivity: Physical Scatterers




Figure 13. *Physical point scattering model.*




Figure 14. *Eigenvalue dsn and capacity ratio ($a^2 = \text{tr}\{HH^\dagger\}$)*




Figure 15. Median eigenvalue dsn and capacity ratio

Channel Sensitivity: Interference

Hypothesis: Strong random interferers

Informed Transmitter (IT) and Informed Receiver (IR)

$$C = TE \left[\sup_{\Sigma: \text{tr}\{\Sigma\} \leq P_o} \log \left(I_M + \eta H (I + R)^{-\frac{1}{2}} \Sigma (I + R)^{-\frac{1}{2}} H^\dagger \right) \right]$$

Uninformed Transmitter (UT) and IR

$$C = T \sup_{\Sigma: \text{tr}\{\Sigma\} \leq P_o} E \left[\log \left(I + \eta H (I + R)^{-\frac{1}{2}} \Sigma (I + R)^{-\frac{1}{2}} H^\dagger \right) \right]$$

Where R is $N \times N$ interference spatial covariance matrix at receiver




Figure 16. *Spectral efficiency ratio for 8 x 8 system*




Figure 17. *Normalized capacity for no interferers, cooperative interferers, and un-cooperative interferers.*




Figure 18. *Wireless network with eavesdropper*

Information Security: Eavesdropper Resistance

Hypotheses:

1. Subscriber links have *informed* transmitters/receivers (IT-IR):
 - H_{TR} is known to both parties over a hop
 - Training generally required to learn channel
 - Feedback required to inform transmitter of channel
2. Eavesdropper link has *uninformed* transmitter (UT)
 - H_{TE} unknown to transmitter
 - S, H_{TE} may be known or unknown to eavesdropper
 - Modulation type, signal constellations, source density, may be known to eavesdropper

Eavesdropper Performance Measures

1. P_e eavesdropper error rate for detecting known signal $S = s$ on link

$$P_F = P(\Lambda^e > \gamma | S = 0), \quad P_M = P(\Lambda^e < \gamma | S = s)$$

2. $P_F, P_M = 1 - P_D$: eavesdropper error rates for detecting any activity on link

$$P_F = P(\Lambda^e > \gamma | S = 0), \quad P_M = P(\Lambda^e < \gamma | S \neq 0)$$

3. $C^e = \max_{P_S} I(S; Y)$: eavesdropper link capacity

4. $P_{sde}^e(K)$: eavesdropper symbol intercept error rate

$$P_{sde}^e = P(\hat{S}^e \neq S)$$

Computational Cutoff Rates

$$R_o(H) = \max_{P_{S|H}} -\ln \int \int_{S_1, S_2 \in \mathcal{Q}^{T \times M}} dP_{S|H}(S_1) dP_{S|H}(S_2) e^{-ND(S_1 \| S_2)}$$

1. T/R Informed cutoff rate: H known to both T/R

$$D(S_1 \| S_2) = \frac{\eta}{4} \text{tr} \left(H^\dagger (S_1 - S_2)^\dagger (S_1 - S_2) H \right)$$

2. R informed cutoff rate: H known to R only

$$D(S_1 \| S_2) = \ln \left| I_T + \frac{\eta}{4} (S_1 - S_2)(S_1 - S_2)^\dagger \right|$$

3. Uninformed cutoff rate: H unknown to either T/R

$$D(S_1 \| S_2) = \ln \frac{\left| I_T + \frac{\eta}{2} (S_1 S_1^\dagger + S_2 S_2^\dagger) \right|}{\sqrt{\left| I_T + \eta S_1 S_1^\dagger \right| \left| I_T + \eta S_2 S_2^\dagger \right|}}$$

LPI: Uninformed Eavesdropper Lockout Capacity

Lock out condition: $C_e = 0$

Note: lock out occurs if transmitted signal constellation $\{S_i\}$ satisfies:

$$S_i S_i^\dagger = A, \quad \forall i$$

Examples:

- Doubly unitary codes ($T \geq M$):

$$S_i^\dagger S_i = I_M, \quad S_i S_i^\dagger = \begin{bmatrix} I_M & O \\ O & O \end{bmatrix}$$

Instances

- Square unitary codes ($T = M$): $S_i S_i^\dagger = S_i^\dagger S_i = I_M$

– Space time QPSK: Quaternion codes ($T = M = 2$):

$$\mathcal{S} = \left\{ \pm \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \pm \begin{bmatrix} j & 0 \\ 0 & -j \end{bmatrix}, \pm \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ -1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}, \pm \begin{bmatrix} 0 & j \\ j & 0 \end{bmatrix} \right\}$$

• Constant (spatial) modulus (CM) codes ($T = 1$):

$$S_i = [S_{1i}, \dots, S_{Mi}]$$

$$\text{tr}\{S_i S_i^\dagger\} = \|\underline{S}_i\|^2 = 1$$

Note 1: Q. How much subscriber capacity does lockout cost?

A. Dimensionality analysis ($T = M$):

Constraint $S_i S_i^\dagger = A$ reduces coding d.f. by factor

$$\rho = \frac{M(M+1)/2}{M^2} \approx 1/2$$

LPD constraints

The eavesdropper must make a decision between

$$H_0 : \quad X_i = W_i, \quad i = 1, \dots, L$$

$$H_1 : \quad X_i = S_i H_i + W_i, \quad i = 1, \dots, L$$

His minimum attainable detection error probability has exponential rate

$$\liminf_{L \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{L} \ln P_e = \rho$$

$$\rho = \inf_{\alpha \in [0,1]} \lim_{L \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{L} \ln \int f_{H_1}^{1-\alpha}(X) f_{H_0}^{\alpha}(X) dX$$

- ρ is Chernoff error exponent ($\rho \leq 0$)
- ρ is minimal α -divergence between densities f_{H_1} and f_{H_0}
- Chernoff exponent is achieved for Bayes test

SH-informed Eavesdropper

When eavesdropper knows transmitted sequence $S = s = \{s_1, \dots, s_L\}$ and channel sequence $H_{TE} = \{H_1, \dots, H_L\}$

$$H_0 : S = 0,$$

$$H_1 : S = s$$

$$\rho = \lim_{L \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{L} \sum_{i=1}^L \rho(H_i, s_i)$$

where

$$\rho(H_i, s_i) = -\frac{\eta_e^2}{4} \text{tr}\{s_i H_i H_i^\dagger s_i^\dagger\}.$$

LPD transmitter strategy: Attain $E[\max_{P(S)} \ln P(X|H_{TR}, S)/P(X|H_{TR})]$
subject to constraint on LPD (ρ)

- When $H_i = H_{TE}$ are i.i.d. Rayleigh channels:

$$\rho = -\frac{\eta_e^2}{4} E[\text{tr}\{S_i S_i^\dagger\}].$$

Relevant LPD constraints on Transmitter are:

- Peak power constraint:

$$\text{tr}\{s_i s_i^\dagger\} \leq P_{opk}$$

- Average power constraint:

$$\text{tr}\left\{E[S_i S_i^\dagger]\right\} \leq P_o$$

S-Informed Eavesdropper

When eavesdropper knows S , but not H , α -divergence is

$$\ln \int f^{1-\alpha}(X|S=s) f_{H_0}^\alpha(X|S=0) dX = \sum_{i=1}^L \ln \frac{|I_T + \eta_e s_i s_i^\dagger|^{1-\alpha}}{|I_T + \eta_e (1-\alpha) s_i s_i^\dagger|}$$

Asymptotic development:

$$\ln \frac{|I_T + \eta_e s_i s_i^\dagger|^{1-\alpha}}{|I_T + \eta_e (1-\alpha) s_i s_i^\dagger|} = -\frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)\eta_e^2}{2} \text{tr}\{s_i s_i^\dagger s_i s_i^\dagger\} + o(\eta_e^2).$$

Low SNR scenario

Low SNR representation for the Chernoff error exponent

$$\rho = -\frac{\eta_e^2}{8} \frac{1}{L} \sum_{i=1}^L \text{tr}\{s_i s_i^\dagger s_i s_i^\dagger\} + o(\eta_e^2).$$

Transmitter Strategy:

Attain $E[\max_{P(S)} \ln P(X|H_{TR}, S)/P(X|H_{TR})]$ subject to either

- Peak 4-th moment constraint:

$$\text{tr}\{s_i s_i^\dagger s_i s_i^\dagger\} \leq P_{4pk},$$

- Average 4-th moment constraint:

$$\text{tr}\{E[S_i S_i^\dagger S_i S_i^\dagger]\} \leq P_{4avg},$$

Uninformed Eavesdropper

When eavesdropper knows neither S nor H

$$H_0 : S = 0,$$

$$H_1 : S \neq 0$$

- α -divergence not closed form
- Multivariate Edgeworth expansion of $f(X|S \neq 0)$

$$\begin{aligned} & \ln \int f^{1-\alpha}(X|S \neq 0) f^\alpha(X|S = 0) dY \tag{1} \\ &= \ln \frac{\left| I_T + \eta_e \overline{SS^\dagger} \right|^{1-\alpha}}{\left| I_T + \eta_e (1-\alpha) \overline{SS^\dagger} \right|} + \frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)^2 \eta_e^2}{8} \sigma_{t,u} \mathbf{K}^{t,u,v,w}(X) \sigma_{v,w} + o(\eta_e^4) \end{aligned}$$

$\kappa_{r,s,t,u}(X)$ is received signal kurtosis and

$$\begin{aligned} & \sigma_{t,u} \kappa^{t,u,v,w}(X) \sigma_{v,w} \\ &= \eta_e^2 3N \sum_{k=1}^T \sum_{t,u,v,w=1}^M \text{COV}(s_{kt}, s_{ku}) \text{COV}(s_{kt}s_{ku}, s_{kv}s_{kw}) \text{COV}(s_{kv}, s_{kw}) \end{aligned}$$

Observe

- Skewness of X is always zero for Gaussian channel
- Kurtosis tensor product depends on 4th moment of source:

$$\text{COV}(s_{kt}s_{ku}, s_{kv}s_{kw}) = E[s_{kt}s_{ku}s_{kv}s_{kw}] - E[s_{kt}s_{ku}] E[s_{kv}s_{kw}] \geq 0$$

- First term in (1) dominates for low SNR

Uninformed Eavesdropper: Low SNR

$$\begin{aligned}\rho &= \min_{\alpha \in [0,1]} \left(-\frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)\eta_e^2}{2} \text{tr}\{\overline{SS^\dagger} \overline{SS^\dagger}\} + o(\eta_e^2) \right) \\ &= -\frac{\eta_e^2}{8} \text{tr}\{\overline{SS^\dagger} \overline{SS^\dagger}\} + o(\eta_e^2)\end{aligned}$$

Transmitter strategy:

Attain $E[\max_{P(S)} \ln P(X|H_{TR}, S)/P(X|H_{TR})]$ subject to

$$\text{tr}\{\overline{SS^\dagger} \overline{SS^\dagger}\} \leq P_{4avg}$$

- Equivalent to constraining S to Gaussian source with

$$\text{tr}\{\overline{SS^\dagger} \overline{SS^\dagger}\} \leq P_{4avg}/3$$

LPD-constrained Capacity

Proposition 1 *The LPD-constrained capacity C_{lpd} for the T/R informed link is*

$$C_{\text{lpd}} = TE \left[\ln \left| I_M + \eta_r H \Sigma_{\text{lpd}} H^\dagger \right| \right] = TE \left[\log \left(\frac{\sqrt{1 + \mu \lambda_i^2}}{2} \right) \right]$$

- Attained by $S \sim N(0, I_T \otimes \Sigma_{\text{lpd}})$
- $\Sigma_{\text{lpd}} = UDU^\dagger$, $D = \text{diag}(\sigma_i)$,

$$\sigma_i = \frac{\sqrt{1/\lambda_i^2 + \mu} - 1/\lambda_i}{2}, \quad (2)$$

- $\mu > 0$ is a parameter such that $\sum_i \sigma_i^2 = P_{4\text{avg}}$.

Note:

- eigenstructure of Σ_{lpd} is matched to modes of H .
- power-optimal waterpouring solution is **not** LPD-optimal
-

$$\sqrt{M \operatorname{tr} \{E[SS^\dagger SS^\dagger]\}} \geq \operatorname{tr} \{E[SS^\dagger]\}$$

Conclude: kurtosis constraint also constrains avg power

However: kurtosis constraint produces qualitatively different optimal source distribution.




Figure 19. *Optimal source spectra: SNR = 20dB, M = N = 32*

LPD: Tradeoff Study

Define

$$I_c(\Sigma) = TE \left[\ln \left| I_M + \eta_r H \Sigma H^\dagger \right| \right]$$

1. IT-IR LPD-Capacity $I_{P_{4avg}}(\Sigma_{lpd})$
2. Loss in power-constrained capacity due to LPD constraint

$$I_{P_o}(\Sigma_{lpd}) / I_{P_o}(\Sigma_{pow}) \quad (3)$$

3. Loss in LPD-constrained capacity due to power constraint

$$I_{P_{4avg}}(\Sigma_{pow}) / I_{P_{4avg}}(\Sigma_{lpd}) \quad (4)$$




Figure 20. *IT-IR LPD-constrained capacity ($N = M$)*




Figure 21. *Loss in power-capacity due to LPD constraint ($N = M$)*




Figure 22. *Loss in LPD-capacity due to P_{avg} constraint ($N = M$)*

Comments

- For no transmit diversity ($M = 1$) there is no loss in capacity
- loss increases as more antennas M are deployed by eavesdropper and client
- loss decreases as SNR η_r increases
- as η_r decreases to -20 dB loss flattens out.

Conclusions

1. For Rician channel T transmits rank-1 component at low SNR
2. Capacity for physical scattering is less optimistic than for Rayleigh
3. High-power interference reduces degrees of freedom (number of useful channel modes)
4. LPD- and LPI- constrained *secure* channels are different from *open* channels
5. For uninformed eavesdropper 4th moment constraint constrains LPD
6. LPD-constrained information rate advantage increases with M