3.5 Secure AES Engine with A Local Switched-Capacitor Current Equalizer

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Hardware implementations of the popular AES encryption algorithm [1,2] provide attackers with important side-channel information (delay, power consumption or EM radiation) that can be used to disclose the secret key of the encryption device. Differential power analysis (DPA) [3-5] is one of the most common side-channel attacks because of its simplicity and effectiveness (Fig. 3.5.1). It performs a statistical analysis of supply-current measurements and either the plaintext or ciphertext to disclose the secret key. These two elements can be easily recorded externally without probing internal signals on the chip. Either the plaintext or ciphertext is used to build a model of the current consumption (e.g., during 0 to 1 transition) using knowledge of the AES algorithm and a key guess. By calculating the correlation between the model and the measured current for each possible key guess the key is discovered. In the AES algorithm, the key consists of 16 blocks of 8b, each of which can be attacked independently since AES is a block cipher. For the 128b secret key, the DPA search space is only $16^2=256$, as opposed to $2^{128}$ for a brute-force attack. 

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Key disclosure has been demonstrated in both ASIC and processor AES implementations [6,7]. It has been demonstrated in [1,8] that masking the current signature by adding additional random noise or randomly adding dummy instructions only moderately increases the number of measurements to disclose (MTD). A charge-pump circuit that provides current to a DES engine was presented in [9] but its MTD is not reported. In [10], an ASIC implementation that increases the security of the secret keys is demonstrated. This implementation uses dual-rail logic and completely balanced interconnects to equalize the current in rising and falling transitions. The method raises the MTD of the first block of the secret key to 20k runs. However, it incurs a $5\times$ area, 4× power and 4× performance overhead, in addition to significantly changing the design flow and requiring custom synthesis and modified routing algorithms.

This work implements a switched-capacitor block, show in Fig. 3.5.2, that isolates the switching activity by equalizing the current drawn from the encryption core to secure an AES engine. An array of capacitors provides the supply current for the sensitive blocks of the encryption engine while non-sensitive blocks run directly from the supply. Each capacitor is charged from the supply and is then isolated while it provides charge to the encryption core. The key idea is that the capacitor is then discharged to a known voltage before it is recharged in order to equalize the amount of charge provided by the external power supply.

To demonstrate this idea, the current equalizer is implemented in a 128b AES encryption engine in 0.13um CMOS. The test-chip also contains an unprotected version for comparison. The switched-capacitor block incurs a 7.2% area, 33% power and 2× performance overhead. In addition, the approach allows the designer to use any logic family, follow traditional design flows and protect any encryption engine. Using DPA, the key of the unprotected core is disclosed with a minimum of 4k ciphertexts. To date, the secured core has been subjected to 10M encryptions, 2500× more than the unprotected core, and none of its secret key blocks have yet been disclosed.

The current equalizer block is composed of an array of capacitor modules, show in Fig. 3.5.2. Each capacitor module has 3 different switching states: (S1) replenish charge from the supply, (S2) provide charge for encryption, and (S3) continue discharging to a pre-programmed value. Since there are 3 distinct switching states, a minimum of 3 independent capacitor modules is needed for uninterrupted operation of the encryption core. Different switching configurations operate the different modules with the only restriction that at least one of the modules is in S2 at any given time to provide current for the protected logic.

The switching cycle starts with S1, where the capacitor is charged to a full potential by connecting it directly to the supply and disconnecting it from the core and shunt path. In S2, the capacitor is disconnected from the supply and connected to the encryption core. At the end of S2, each capacitor contains a variable charge that depends on the encryption activity. If at this point the capacitor is connected to the supply, the amount of current drawn would carry encryption information to the external pads. Instead, in S3, the capacitor is disconnected from the core and is shunted until it reaches a known voltage. This state enforces that the amount of charge replenished by the supply in S1 is the same each time. During the shunt state, the current loop is local to the capacitor and shunt and charge and is not externally observable. Although the GND net is not isolated from the internal core, the operations in S2 and S3 are locally isolated and any observable current does not carry significant side-channel information.

Figure 3.5.3 shows the current-equalizer block, which is implemented with 3 capacitor modules, sized and measured to support up to 100MHz of encryption frequency and more than 500MHz of capacitance switching frequency. Each capacitor module contains a 100pf capacitor; the supply, core, and shunting switches; and a comparator that monitors the voltage of the capacitor and triggers when the predefined reference level is reached. The comparator and current references are provided externally for experimentation, but can be implemented on-chip. These modules incur a 25% area overhead compared to the unprotected core and 7.2% when considering the area of necessary modules for encryption such as input/output buffers.

The bar graph of Fig. 3.5.4 shows the correlation coefficients of the guessed keys (grey for incorrect, black for correct) for the DPA attack on the unprotected block at 100k encryptions. The right plot shows that the MTD occurs at 4k runs when the correlation coefficient of the correct key becomes higher than the maximum correlation coefficient of all incorrect keys. The measured current transient for an encryption cycle is shown to illustrate the information that attackers have available to them by probing the supply externally.

The same attack applied to the unprotected core as well as a modified attack (targeting possible side-channel leakage from the MixColumns block) is attempted on the protected core but has not disclosed any block of the key at this point. A total of 10M ciphertexts have been tried and Fig. 3.5.5 shows that the correlation of the correct key is substantially lower than that of the unprotected core. When running the encryption core at 1.2V and 100MHz with the current equalizing block operating at 200MHz, the power overhead is 33% compared to the unprotected core. Operating at 1.2V the performance of the unprotected core is 2× that of the protected core. However, if higher performance is required, area overhead could be traded off at design time by increasing the size of the capacitor module's capacitor and switches, or increasing the number of capacitor modules used. Alternatively, a high switching-capacitor frequency can be used to trade off power for performance. Figure 3.5.6 summarizes the features and performance of the tested and unprotected AES engines and Fig. 3.5.7 shows a die micrograph of the fabricated chip.

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References:
Figure 3.5.1: AES encryption basics and differential power analysis (DPA) side-channel attack.

Figure 3.5.2: Switching-capacitor current-equalizer block with 3 capacitor modules implemented with logic, supply and shunt switches and a comparator to disable the shunting mechanism.

Figure 3.5.3: Circuit diagram and implementation of the current equalizer block and secure AES engine.

Figure 3.5.4: DPA attack on the unprotected AES engine. The two top graphs show that this block’s key is not disclosed after 10M encryptions. The bottom graph shows the transient response during encryption (captured with V-I probes [11]). The Core Vdd signal has 100MHz frequency transients due to the switching capacitors. Boxes (a) and (b) show where current for the unprotected non-critical portions of the chip superimpose noise on the constant fluctuations from the equalizer block. VddCritical is the supply voltage at the protected portions of the core and show different behavior from cycle to cycle, as expected due to changing encryption activity.

Figure 3.5.5: DPA attack on the protected AES engine. The two top graphs show that this block’s key is not disclosed after 10M encryptions. The bottom graph shows the transient response during encryption (captured with V-I probes [11]). The Core Vdd signal has 100MHz frequency transients due to the switching capacitors. Boxes (a) and (b) show where current for the unprotected non-critical portions of the chip superimpose noise on the constant fluctuations from the equalizer block. VddCritical is the supply voltage at the protected portions of the core and show different behavior from cycle to cycle, as expected due to changing encryption activity.

Figure 3.5.6: Performance and comparison table between unprotected and protected AES engines.
Figure 3.5.7: Die micrograph.